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Chapter 1
Introduction
In my thesis, I confronted empirical observations I made in two field studies in Guinea with theo-
retical predictions deduced from the works of Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam
Smith. I was interested in specific aspects of the use and allocation of natural resources and inves-
tigated whether the work of the classical scholars could help understanding those aspects. Natural
resources are elemental for the development and wealth of human societies. Determining factors
leading to a sustainable use and fair allocation of natural resources is therefore not only of central
interest from a scientific perspective, but also from a political, a philosophical, and a practical
point of view.
The history of the Western world has been shaped by turmoil, revolutions, unrests and wars. Stable
and peaceful periods were short and rare. Since the antique time of old Greece, western philosop-
hers have thought about ways to reach peace and stability. From a philosophical point of view,
the problem of social order is: how can stability and peace be reached through political means?
Three central solutions to the problem of social order were repeatedly worked out and presented
in varying forms by western philosophers from different historical eras: the first solution centres
around the use of coercion and the enforcement of security; the second solution centres around
collectivistic values and ideals; the third solution centres around the doctrine of the balance of
diverging interests (Russel 2012).
In the modern era, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Adam
Smith (1723-1790) were the most influential representatives of these three doctrines. Their ideas
were groundbreaking and influential. Key concepts used to understand and shape societies today,
such as the state, the community and the market have their origins in the works of these scholars
(Nonnenmacher 1989). According to Hobbes, humans are voracious, violent and in a constant
quest for power. This is due to their characteristics as natural beings and their right to do anything
necessary in order to guarantee their self-preservation. This is the natural right of any human
being. As long as humans do not concede their natural right, neither peace nor stability can
emerge. Instead, humans stay in a state of brutal anarchy, which is the state of nature. Peace
and stability can therefore only emerge when humans concede their natural right and unite under
the rule of an external authority to which all the rights necessary to rule at will are provided to
keep individuals under control. The sole duty of this authority, known as the Leviathan, is to
guarantee the right for bodily integrity of individuals and to protect individuals from a violent
11
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death. Rousseau disagrees with Hobbes’ description of the natural state of man. He argues that
man in his natural state is just a solitary animal, without interest and need for other humans.
However, humans gradually evolved, lost their independence and became social animals. As social
beings, humans are voracious, violent and in a constant quest for power. For Rousseau, the natural
state of society is a state of brutal anarchy, and this coincides more or less to Hobbes’ state of
nature. And just as Hobbes, Rousseau argues that the individuals must be kept under control for
stability and peace to emerge. However, Rousseau does not accept the Leviathan as a solution
to the problem of social order, arguing that the rule of the Leviathan would only lead to further
fights and conflicts. Instead, the only rightful authority could come from a collective body made
of the people, and dictating the laws through a general will. The general will is representing the
opinions and moral values of all citizens within a society to questions of general interest and is
captured through majority vote. If all individuals of a society share the same beliefs and values, the
general will is leading to lasting social order. Smith, on the other hand, disagrees with Hobbes and
Rousseau in fundamental ways. He believes that humans have always been social beings and have
always cooperated in order to reach common goals in daily life. These cooperative activities do
not result from a pro-social predisposition, but from the self-interest of humans. The self-interest
of humans must therefore not be kept under control, as it is the basis of social order. Smith also
argues that humans do not only have a natural right to self-preservation, but also to live in freedom.
A society can only reach peace and stability as long as these two natural rights are guaranteed. This
condition is best met when the actions of free individuals, following solely their self-interests, are
coordinated through an invisible hand on a free market. A good government should therefore only
interfere as little as possible into the daily business of its people, allowing the market mechanism
to guarantee for the optimal outcome. Although the three scholars had fundamentally differing
views on human nature, the natural rights of humans as well as key aspects of the society, they
took a similar approach, comparing humans in their primitive form with humans in their civilized
form:
“Optimist and pessimist alike agreed that civilisation was to be defined in terms of
this distinction between nature and culture and by the movement of the latter away
from the former. [...] This then is modernity’s key foundational narrative. It has been
employed in numerous ways and to justify diverse political ends, from monarchism
to regicide, but its ontological status remains ambiguous.” (Smith 2002, p. 408)
As their work is so influential, I provide a detailed description of the basic ideas of the three
scholars on the problem of social order in chapter 2 regarding my philosophical foundations: “Wer
sich auf Aristoteles oder Platon, auf Hobbes oder Locke, auf Rousseau oder Kant, auf Marx oder
Max Weber beruft, sollte zumindest wissen, wovon er spricht.” (Nonnenmacher 1989, p. 4).
Philosophy is a central element of human knowledge, because it strongly influences the way pe-
ople think and as it shaped the different dogmatic traditions that influence science today. Scientific
investigation is however based upon scientific theories and not upon philosophical ideas. The cen-
tral tool of theoretical investigation I use in my work is game theory. Game theory provides a
mathematical framework allowing to analyse situations in which a number of actors interact, the-
reby affecting each other’s welfare. Game theory can therefore be used to analyse a wide range
of situations involving strategic interactions between individuals. Potential candidates for a game-
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theoretical analysis are for example the family planning of couples, the price setting of companies,
the level of aggressiveness displayed by individuals involved in a fight, or the effect of a new cri-
minal law on crime rates. Based upon a few simple assumptions, a game-theoretical analysis
allows to deduce the best options available for actors in a given situation and to make predictions
on the most likely outcome. In social science, game theory is frequently applied to the problem of
social order. However, in contrast to the problem of social order discussed in political philosophy,
the problem of social order of interest in game theory is more general and centres around coope-
ration. More specifically, it asks how cooperation can emerge in situations where the incentives
should drive rational actors into defection? Situations in which the rationality of individuals leads
to sub-optimal outcomes at the group level are known as social dilemma situations. The analysis
of social dilemma situations is of high relevance, because political, economic and social problems
frequently occur in such social dilemma situations. Unsurprisingly, concepts and tools used to
analyse social dilemma situations in game theory are linked to the works of Hobbes, Rousseau
and Smith. While the classical scholars formulated influential and ground-breaking ideas, they
did not use a consistent, deductive theoretical framework. By incorporating their ideas into a
game-theoretical framework, the structure underlying their arguments can be formalized, allowing
to gain more general insights through a more consistent analysis. The most basic social dilemma
in game theory, for example the prisoner’s dilemma, is characterized as a formalization of Hobbes’
state of nature and is used to demonstrate, among others, the limits of rational cooperation. The
stag hunt game, another important game-theoretical model, formalizes a short story of Rousseau
and is used to explain the evolutionary path of societies towards civilization. Although game the-
ory can be applied to a wide range of situations, each single game-theoretical analysis is interested
in uncovering the presence of equilibria in the respective game. Such a game-theoretical equili-
brium is an analytical equivalent to Smiths’ metaphor of the invisible hand. In chapter 3 regarding
my theoretical foundations, I describe game-theoretical concepts that are important for the under-
standing of my work and show how the ideas of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith are incorporated
into a game-theoretical framework.
The tragedy of the common is a very prominent social dilemma. In short, the tragedy of the
commons refers to situations where humans overexploit a natural resource they are relying on,
thereby destroying their livelihood. As long as a better outcome would have been possible, for
example by exploiting the resource in a more sustainable way, the overexploitation of natural
resources is a problem of social order and a social dilemma. In my fourth chapter, I first give
a brief description of the fundamental importance of natural resources for the development of
human societies. Not only minerals and fossil fuels are essential for the well-being of humans.
Humanity would also not have survived without wildlife and ecosystem services, for example
clean air and clean water. Population and economic growth are closely linked to the use of natural
resources: increases in per capita resource use leads to increases in per capita population growth.
However, at some point, the overexploitation of a natural resource leads to a collapse of society if
the resource needed is not available anymore. Such a collapse occurring due to overexploitation
of natural resources is a recurring phenomenon in human history, and contemporary societies live
in a constant fear of a societal collapse due to their unsustainable use of natural resources:
“Contemporary unease over natural resource scarcity, energy insecurity, global war-
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ming and other environmental consequences is to be expected, given the rapid rate of
environmental change caused by the global economy and human populations over the
twentieth century.” (Barbier 2011, pp. 4-5)
The tragedy of the commons, as a game-theoretical model, has a specific structure and relies on
some basic assumptions. The main assumption underlying the tragedy of the commons refers
to the specific economic characteristics of common goods. Common goods are goods that are
possessed by a group of people, but the consumption of the good cannot be shared. This means
that the consumption of one unit of the good by one individual excludes other individuals from
consuming this specific unit. In a narrow interpretation, the tragedy of the commons is only
applicable to the exploitation of common goods. The main solutions to the tragedy of the commons
can be linked directly to the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith, promoting either strong state
regulations, community rights, and normative values, or the enforcement of market mechanisms in
situations where these are missing or only weakly implemented. I apply the different mechanisms
proposed by Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith to the analysis of two distinct aspects of natural resource
use. The first concerns the sustainability of natural resource use. The second concerns the fair
allocation of a natural resource among a group of individuals who share the resource. I deduce and
discuss hypothesis related to drivers of sustainable natural resource use and fair natural resource
allocation from the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. These hypotheses are then put to an
empirical test in my two empirical studies in chapters 7 and 8.
Besides an underlying theory and theoretical predictions, a scientific investigation relies on a sound
empirical basis. Although Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith made big claims about mechanisms un-
derlying phenomena observed in the real world, they did not follow a data-driven approach in their
work. Instead, they mainly relied on their capacity to reason about the world and the perception
they had of it. To do justice to the scholars, I must admit that some rudimentary calculations based
on observed quantities can be found in Rousseau’s and Smith’s work. They must have felt the
necessity of a data-driven scientific approach, which was strongly advocated by David Hume:
“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance;
let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?
No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and exis-
tence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and
illusion.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 144, italics as in the original)
However, they lacked the statistical tools, the understanding of the logical structure guiding causal
inference, as well as the corresponding scientific ideology. These evolved after their time and are
discussed in chapter 5 on my methodical foundations. On the other hand, the comparative appro-
ach of classical scholars has proven fruitful and is being applied in the contemporary science of
human nature approach. Similarly to the classical scholars, the main focus of the contemporary
science of human nature approach is based on the comparison of humans from different cultures.
The contemporary science of the approach on the human nature highlights cross-cultural studies,
explicitly including samples of non-Western cultures. This is important, because although Western
societies are overrepresented in scientific samples, they do not represent humanity as a whole. We
can only hope to make reliable inferences about a common human nature by comparing humans
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from different cultural groups. This is, however, no trivial enterprise, because even the concept of
causality is highly controversial. Different positions related to causal inference can be linked to
the ground-breaking work of Hume’s “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding”. I discuss
these positions putting a special focus on counterfactual causality. The concept of counterfactual
causality provides the foundation for experimental research and is the most relevant concept of
causality for my work. I furthermore shortly discuss Popper’s falsificationism, as it provides the
epistemological foundation for statistical hypotheses testing and represents the position I am fol-
lowing in my work. The methodology underlying statistical hypotheses testing was developed by
the frequentist school to statistical inference. I build upon statistical hypotheses testing to describe
different types of regression models in a more detailed manner and discuss the main approaches
used when confronted with the question of which variables and which regression models to use
for statistical inference. I complete my methodological chapter with a simulation study that eva-
luates the performance of different analytical tools of statistical inference. Based on a simulated
experimental data, modelling different types of outcome variables and treatment effects, I show
that mixed effects regression models provide the most reliable and accurate estimates for the true
treatment effect. Consequently, I used mixed effects regression models as my main analytical tool
for statistical inference in my two empirical studies in chapters 7 and 8.
In chapter 6, I describe the extensive field work I conducted in Guinea during a period of nine
months. I describe the institutional framework my fieldwork was embedded in and give a qualita-
tive report of my field work. In this report, I explain different important aspects of my field work,
using a number of images for illustrative purpose. These aspects include the preparation and logis-
tics of the field work, the people working with me, the equipment needed, the living conditions in
the field, as well as the different dimensions of the human population and their environment I was
especially interested in. For my field work, I relied on a sample of Malinke and Fulbe people in
a remote region of rural Guinea. This sample is interesting, because it is made of people living in
traditional, small-scale societies that are partly in transition to more complex and socially stratified
societies and belong to two broader cultural groups. The material I collected during this field work
provides the foundation for the empirical test of my theoretical hypotheses.
In my first empirical study, chapter 7, I linked the data I collected during my field work with
biological transect data on wild mammal abundance collected in the same area during the same
period which allowed for an estimation of the influence of the human population on the wild
mammals living in the same area. Considering wild mammals in the area as a natural resource,
I tested the predictive value of factors considered as important by Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith
for explaining the observed distribution of wild mammals. This allowed me to determine whether
these factors favoured a sustainable natural resource use or not. In my second empirical study,
chapter 8, I conducted a field experiment with the human population in the area. In this experiment,
the participating subjects shared a natural resource they held in common. The outcome of interest
was the allocation of the resource among the different subjects. More specifically, I was interested
in identifying factors favouring fair sharing of the resource in the experiment. Again, by linking
the experimental data with other data I had collected in the study area, I tested the predictive value
of factors considered important by Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith in explaining fair sharing.
I conclude my work with a discussion summarizing the results of my empirical studies related
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to the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. I discuss and evaluate to what extent the work of
the three classical scholars is still valuable today and helps us to understand observed patterns
of natural resource use in a context they were clearly not considering (chapter 9). I close my
discussion by generalizing the results from my field studies to a more global context and applying
the lessons learned to the global environmental crises of global species loss and global warming.
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Chapter 2
Philosophical foundation
Western philosophy has strongly influenced the contemporary perception of humans and society.
Different political and scientifical schools are closely linked to dogmatic traditions reaching back
to western philosophers (Russel 2012). The main representants of the most influential modern
dogmatic traditions are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and
Adam Smith (1723-1790). Their ideas related to the problem of social order and their concepts of
the “Leviation”, the “general will” and the “invisible hand” still form the political-philosophical
core of today’s consideration on society (Nonnenmacher 1989). Most importantly, these scholars
had differing views on the reasons responsible for violence and instability in society and proposed
different institutional solutions to reach security and stability. The fragility of peace and stability
in human societies is known as the problem of social order in political philosophy. In this chapter,
I provide a detailed description of the three scholars’ thoughts and ideas related to the problem of
social order and the institutional mechanisms they proposed as solutions to this problem. I close
the chapter with a short discussion of their works and their relevance for sociology.
2.1 Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes formulated the first systematic work on political thoughts in modern times and
influenced nearly all political theories afterwards (Nonnenmacher 1989, p. 13). His most influ-
ential work "Leviathan or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and
Civil" legitimates absolutism and authoritarianism, highlighting the importance of an absolute ru-
ler and coercive strenght to enforce social order (Nonnenmacher 1989, pp. 45-49; Russel 2012,
pp.563-564). Ultimately, policies promoting strong leadership can be linked to Hobbes. This is
Hobbes’ political legacy. His major philosophical legacy was his conception of the “state of na-
ture”. He argued that humans were no social beings by nature and asked how life in society could
be reached, without recurring to greater metaphysical goods, as was done by philosophers before
his time: “It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees and Ants, live sociably one with another
[...] and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same.”
(Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 119). The (Hobbesian) problem of order had a lasting influence on poli-
tical philosophy after his time: all important works of political philosophy discuss the Hobbesian
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problem of order and the Leviathan (Ellis 1971, p. 692; Nonnenmacher 1989). In this section, I
first introduce the problem of social order as described by Hobbes in his state of nature, followed
by the description of the solution he suggested to overcome the problem of social order, which is
known as the Leviathan.
2.1.1 The state of nature
Hobbes’ state of nature describes a period when people live in brutal anarchy, without a govern-
ment. In such a state, everyone has the right to use violence, and people live in fear of dying a
violent death, a direct consequence of human nature and natural rights. Hobbes describes humans
as being insatiable in their desires. The use of power is the only way they have to fulfil their desires
and humans are therefore continuously looking for means to increase their power. As all humans
are equally trying to satisfy their insatiable desires (Hobbes 2012 [1651], pp. 70-86), they face
three main reasons for conflicts:
"So that in the nature of man, we find three principall causes of quarrel. First,
Competition; Secondly, Diffidence; Thirdly, Glory. The first, maketh men invade for
Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence,
to make themselves Masters of other mens persons, wives, children and cattell; the
second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion,
and any other signe of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, of by reflexion in
their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name." (Hobbes
2012 [1651], p. 88).
The main reason for a conflict, i.e. competition, relates to the sparse resources of the material
world. As the desires of humans are insatiable, the material world will however always be sparse.
Even if a solution to the sparseness of the material world was found, this would not put an end to
conflicts, as the conflicts between humans also extend to the immaterial world: even a smile can
lead to conflicts. Finally, in such a state, where humans fear being mastered by other humans, just
like cattle, a preemptive strike is the most effective mean to survive:
"And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure
himselfe, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the
persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endan-
ger him: And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally
allowed." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], pp. 87-88).
The famous metaphor used by Hobbes to describe the state of nature as a war of all against all
however, does not mean that humans are continuously fighting against each other. The state of
nature is more precisely characterized by constant insecurity and fear, because of the knowledge
that fights and wars might erupt at any time and for any reason (Hobbes 2012 [1651], pp. 88-89).
According to Hobbes, the natural right of every man is self-preservation. In the state of nature,
this means that everyone has the right to everything in order to guarantee his self-preservation:
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"It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even
to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as thin naturall Right of every man to
every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p.
91).
Although there are laws of nature which could lead to peace if they were applied (Hobbes cites
19 such rules) (Hobbes 2012 [1651], pp. 92-109), none of these rules really matter in the state
of nature, as they are not binding: "[...] Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no
strength to secure a man at all." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 117). The state of nature has dramatic
consequences for humanity as it undermines cooperation between people, hindering the emergence
of society, science, arts, as well as any economic development:
"In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is
uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the
commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments
of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the
face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which
is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man,
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 89).
Hobbes’ state of nature is simple, compelling and based solely upon a few basic assumptions. The
selfish, impulsive and voracious nature of humans, combined with their natural right to do anything
in order to secure their self-preservation, supports a state of brutal anarchy in which nothing is safe
and secured.
2.1.2 The Leviathan
Hobbes claims that the destiny of mankind is to overcome the state of nature by building states in
which people live peacefully and work together in order to reach material wealth. Such a state can
however only be built through the subordination of all man under the will of one sovereign. The
humans need to concede their natural right and their power to one external authority:
"The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them
from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure
them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth,
they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and
strength upon one Man, or upon one Asselmbly of men, that may reduce all their
Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will [...]" (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 120).
Only a very strong motive can induce people, who love their freedom and the reign over other
people, to accept the rule of someone else. This motive is the fear of death, which is omnipresent
in the state of nature: "The Passions that encline men to Peace, are Feare of Death [...]" (Hobbes
2012 [1651], p. 90). The subordination of all men under one will happen by the means of a social
contract: "I Authorise and give up my Rigth of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly
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of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like
manner." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 120, italics as in the original). The result of this social contract
is described by Hobbes in the following way: "For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called
a COMMON-Wealth, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man [...]" (Hobbes
2012 [1651], p. 9, upper cases as in the original). The consequences of this simple contract are
huge. The state of nature is put to an end, because only the Leviathan has the right to use violence.
In detail, this means that the sovereign is given the right to represent the subjects, to decide on
the necessary means for peace and defense, to decide on the doctrines which are intended for the
subjects, to decide on the property rights of the subjects, to dictate the laws which the subjects
have to obey, to make war and peace as he likes to, to choose all ministers, magistrates, counselors
and officers, to punish and reward subjects as he pleases and to create new laws. All those rights
are inseparable and indivisible. No subject has the right to question the actions of the sovereign,
to punish the sovereign, to change the sovereign or to be freed from the sovereign (Hobbes 2012
[1651], p. 121-128). If one subject however objects with the sovereign, he is put back into the
state of nature and can "[...] be destroyed by the rest [...]" (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 123). The
only duty of the Leviathan is to get the subjects out of the state of nature and to relieve them from
their fear of a violent death. To this end, the Leviathan needs to defend the subjects from the
aggressions and offences of others. The measures described above serve this sole purpose. As the
natural right of anyone in the world is to survive, subjects have the right to disobey the sovereign
only if he commands them to hurt or kill themselves or to act in a way that could directly harm
themselves. They are furthermore not bound to confess against themselves if interrogated by the
sovereign (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 151).
In Hobbes, the selfishness of humans in the state of nature hinders the emergence of trust at the
lowest levels of human interactions, thereby hindering cooperative activities that could lead to
stable and peaceful societies. The state of nature can only be overcome if people unite and create a
strong absolutist state by giving up their power and their natural right. However, the participation
of people ends there. After having created the absolutist state, humans have no power anymore
and are subject to its rules. On the other hand, this condition is necessary for trust to emerge,
because only in this way arising threats through human selfishness are banned.
2.2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulated the first radical criticism of the commercial society (Nonnen-
macher 1989, p. 194). He is seen as the founder of romanticism (Russel 2012, p. 693) and was
the philosopher of the French revolution (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 18; Nonnenmacher 1989, p.
194). Engels argued that Rousseau made use of the dialectical method and Marxist arguments
before Hegel and Marx were even born (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 37-39). On the other hand,
his work is full of contradictions, and he is also admired by conservatives and reactionaries alike
(Nonnenmacher 1989, p. 194). Russel claims that Hitler was an aftereffect of Rousseau (2012,
p. 693). In his first important work, “Discours sur les sciences et les arts”, Rousseau criticized
the decadence of the commercial society (Nonnenmacher 1989, p. 194). His second important
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work, “De l’inégalité parmis les hommes”, describes the co-evolution of property, inequality and
society. In his most famous work, “Du contrat social”, Rousseau elabourates the principles of con-
stitutional law and argues that only a government subordinated to the general will of the people is
legitimate. It is one of the most read and most influential works of political philosophy. All poli-
tical ideologies of modern times have been associated with it (Nonnenmacher 1989, p. 243-244).
In this section, I first describe the natural state of man, Rousseau’s counterargument to Hobbes’
state of nature. Then, I discuss Rousseau’s evolutionary view on human societies, his description
of the problem of social order, and the solution he suggests.
2.2.1 The natural state of man
Rousseau builds upon an evolutionary theory of human societies. At the beginning, humans were
solitary animals without any social institution. This is Rousseau’s natural state of man.
Rousseau argued that the human nature cannot serve as the foundation for any right and law in
society. In this point, he followed Hobbes (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 94). However, he argued
that humans in the state of nature described by Hobbes (section 2.1.1) were already socialized and
far from their true state of nature. Hobbes’ conclusions about the human nature must therefore
be wrong (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 116). One must imagine a human being without any social
institution in order to be able to have a picture of the human in his state of nature: the human as
some unsocial animal species. As such, humans are subject to natural selection that supports fit
individuals and kills all others. The human animal has no capacity of reasoning and his only needs
are food, rest and sexual reproduction . He is a solitary animal without any need for the company
and help of other humans, and without the knowledge of language. The human animal is neither
good nor bad, as those are moral qualities not known in nature and only useful for the life in
society (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 72-95). In this state of nature, time passes by without changes
and humans live the life of self-sufficient, solitary animals, without tradition, culture, science or
economic progress:
“Concluons qu’errant dans les forêts, sans industrie, sans parole, sans domicile,
sans guerre et sans liaison, sans nul besoin de ses semblables comme sans nul dé-
sir de leur nuire, peut-être même sans jamais en reconnaître aucun individuellement,
l’homme sauvage, sujet à peu de passions, et se suffisant à lui-même, n’avait que les
sentiments et les lumières propres à cet état; qu’il ne sentait que ses vrais besoins,
ne regardait que ce qu’il croyait avoir intérêt de voir, et que son intelligence ne fai-
sait pas plus de progrès que sa vanité. Si par hasard il faisait quelque découverte, il
pouvait d’autant moins la communiquer qu’il ne reconnaissait pas même ses enfants.
L’art périssait avec l’inventeur. Il n’y avait ni éducation, ni progrès; les générations
se multipliaient inutilement; et, chacune partant toujours du même point, les siècles
s’écoulaient dans toute la grossièreté des premiers âges; l’espèce était déjà vieille, et
l’homme restait toujours enfant.” (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 103).
However, the human animal differs from all other animals in three important aspects. First, his
behaviour is not completely determined by instincts, but he has also a free will. Second, he can
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therefore adapt to all kind of situations. Third, he is able to improve himself (Rousseau 1977
[1754], pp. 72-80). These properties, which are only found in humans among all animals, are the
foundation for an evolutionary process which will transform humans, their environment and the
way they live.
In Rousseau, the natural state of man is characterized by the lack of any social institution. Humans
are best conceived as a solitary animal species in the natural state of man. As long as this state
persists, there is no problem of social order, because the live of humans is only subject to the
rules of natural selection. As there are no social institutions in nature, nature cannot serve as the
foundation for society.
2.2.2 From nature to society
Humans did however not stay in the natural state of man, but sequentially developed into social
beings. This evolution included different stages, and at each of these stages, humans built new
social institutions. According to Rousseau (1977 [1754], pp. 109-110), the process that led to the
emergence of complex societies took ages and entirely changed humans and their way of living.
This process can be described in five major steps as follows.
Living in groups The most significant obstacle to the building of societies among humans was
the solitary, self-sufficient lifestyle of humans in their natural state (section 2.2.1). The growth of
the human population and their spread across the world, combined with major catastrophic events,
like earthquakes, floods or deluges, eventually forced humans to share the same territory. Humans
then started to live in groups and experienced the advantages that could be reached by working
together. These first cooperative activities focused on security and economic concerns and were
based on mutual agreements (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 109-114).
The first societies The institution of property was the founding moment of society: “Le premier
qui ayant enclos un terrain s’avisa de dire : Ceci est à moi, et trouva des gens assez simples pour le
croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la société civile.” (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 108). In this first phase
of society building, humans started to reason about measures to increase their security. They also
realized that they were superior to other animals. Language became necessary to coordinate their
activities, and they started to live in families: they built homes in which women and men lived
together with their children. This was the beginning of a first revolution with broad implications:
the social institution of family, basic notions of property, the sexual division of labour, as well as
conjugal and parental love emerged. On the other hand, property and love also led to quarrels,
fights, jealousy, as well as anger among people, and the human species started to soften. Once hu-
mans became used to living together, the ties and relationships between them became so strong and
important that everyone wanted to be treated with respect. Contempt had to be punished and hu-
mans became cruel and bloodthirsty, because the best protection one could find against any offense
committed by others was a severe punishment. This is the stage of development most “peuples
sauvages” (small scale, non-European societies at the time of Rousseau) had reached. Rousseau
argued that this stage of development was best for mankind: while being free and independent,
as if they had been in their natural state, they still enjoyed the benefits of a life in society. This
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is due to the fact that everyone was independent and responsible for his own material wealth, and
the inequality between humans was still mainly determined by the physical differences between
them. He argued that all further development would only improve the condition of individuals at
the expense of the species (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 110-117).
Inequality and conflicts However, mankind did not stay at the development level of “peuples
sauvages”, but invented agriculture and metallurgy. These inventions required the division of
labour necessary and humans were now able to produce more than they needed. On the other
hand, they were not free anymore, because they depended on others and had to work for others.
The inequality between humans increased wide above a level justified by the physical differences
between them. The land was divided among the appropriators and when they were recognized as
the owners of their land by all others, the first laws of justice were established in order to protect
their property. The legal property led to violent conflicts because of the rivalry, the competition
and the differing interests of the people. All wanted to make profit at the expense of others and
when the whole land was divided, the only way to increase one’s property was to take it away
from others (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 117-122). Society, at this stage of development, was in a
constant state of war:
“Il s’élevait entre le droit du plus fort et le droit du premier occupant un conflit
perpétuel qui ne se terminait que par des combats et des meurtres (q). La société
naissante fit place au plus horrible état de guerre [...]” (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 123,
italics as in the original).
The first governments This state of war was especially unbearable to the wealthy people, as
not only their life was at peril, but also their property. The solution they found to end this state of
war was to bundle their forces in order to create a state that would protect and defend all members
of the society through wise laws and the necessary power to do so. The governments of these
states were, however, clearly in favour of the rich people. The natural freedom that people still
enjoyed up to this point was however irrevocably abolished. Property and inequality were fixed as
unalterable rights and all people had the duty to work and to serve the wealthy and the powerful.
The form of the first governments depended on the inequality among the subjects in the area where
the government was founded: if one man owned everything, then he was elected as the unique
governor and the government was a monarchy; if a group of people among the subjects owned
more than all others together, then they were elected together to form an aristocratic government;
finally, if there was no big difference among the subjects, they kept the government in common
and formed a democracy. The first governments were created by the subjects with the aim to serve
and protect their freedom (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 124-136).
The natural state of society While all governments are at first legitimate and elected, with
wealth, merit, and age as main criteria for a government position, the people in power become
accustomed to the rules and start to consider the state as their own property. The same reason
that necessitates a state, the conflicts over properties, also leads to conflicts over state control
control. Eventually, one particular seizes the control over the whole state, and the society ends
in despotism. Sooner or later, all societies end in despotism. Despotism is the natural state of
the society. This state is similar to the natural state of man in important aspects. The equality
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between humans is restored: just like in the natural state, where the survival of humans depends
on natural selection, the survival of humans in the natural state of the society depends on the
goodwill of the despot. While natural selection supports the fit individuals and kills the others in
the natural state of man, the society supports the fit individuals and kills the others in the natural
state of society (Rousseau 1977 [1754], pp. 129-142). However, while in the natural state of man,
fitness is purely defined by the physical attributes of individuals, in the society, fitness is defined by
social institutions. This is why in some societies, physically inferior people command physically
superior people, a situation which would never occur in the natural state of man:
“Il suit encore que l’inégalité morale, autorisée par le seul droit positif, est con-
traire au droit naturel toutes les fois qu’elle ne concourt pas en même proportion avec
l’inégalité physique; distinction qui détermine suffisamment ce qu’on doit penser à
cet égard de la sorte d’inégalité qui règne parmi tous les peuples policés; puisqu’il est
manifestement contre la loi de nature, de quelque manière qu’on la définisse, qu’un
enfant commande à un vieillard, qu’un imbécile conduise un homme sage, et qu’une
poignée de gens regorge de superfluités, tandis que la multitude affamée manque du
nécessaire.” (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 145)
While the problem of social order does not occur in the natural state of man, it becomes relevant
the more humans build social institutions and become interdependent. This is essentially due to
the fact that humans in society are not only subject to natural selection but also to social selection.
The more this social influence increases, the more the problem of social order threatens the sta-
bility of society. At the final stage of the evolution of society, humans are entirely socialized,
with a government, a legal system, private property, and division of labour. At this final stage of
development, which is described by Rousseau as the natural state of society, society is constantly
threatened to sink into nepotism, as individuals fight for the control over the means of power. Ac-
cording to Rousseau, individual self-interest is the root for life in society, but at the same time
constantly threatens the stability of society. The only solution to reach stability is to build a go-
vernment legitimized and controlled by the people. This is the topic of the next section on the
social contract.
2.2.3 The social contract
Rousseau argued that the foundation for social order was to be found in social conventions and
not in nature (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 41). Similarly to Hobbes (section 2.1.1), he argued that
humans needed to associate and build societies if they wanted to survive. However, in contrast to
Hobbes (section 2.1.2), he claimed that it was inconceivable that humans gave up their freedom in
order to live as slaves. Such a contract, where one party would be given all available means and
the duty to command, while the others had to obey, could not serve as the foundation for society.
Instead, he argued that humans would only be willing to unite with others and build a society, if
they were afterwards not only more secure and prosperous, but also as free as before (Rousseau
1966 [1762], pp. 50-51 and Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp. 124-138).
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The state as a collective body This problem is solved by creating a collective body which is
made up of all single members and which is guided by the general will of its members:
“Chacun de nous met en commun sa personne et toute sa puissance sous la su-
prême direction de la volonté générale ; et nous recevons en corps chaque membre
comme partie indivisible du tout.” (Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp. 51-52, italics as in the
original).
This collective body, which unites the resources and strengths of all individual members, is the
state. The united members are the people, and the single members are subjects when subjected
to the rule of the state, and are citizens when taking part in a sovereign act. In such a state, the
people is the sovereign. After the state has been built according to the principles stated in the
social contract, no one can offend any member of the state without offending the state and the
state cannot be offended without having the members of the state also being offended (Rousseau
1966 [1762], pp. 52-54). In this way, all members have a higher likelihood to survive with the
state than without the state. Furthermore, as the state is made up of all members of the people,
it cannot have any particular interest, which is against the interest of the people. This condition
guarantees that no member of the state is subject to any rule he did not consent to.
The general will The state and all its actions are the result of the general will of its people. The
general will represents the common interest of the people and needs to be formulated in general,
abstract conventions. Those conventions have the characteristics of laws which are written down in
a constitution and define the terms of cohabitation in and with the state. When the state is founded
and its constitution drafted, all members must agree to the constitution. Those who do not agree
do not belong to the state and have to leave its territory. Afterwards, new legislations only need
the approval of the majority of the citizens in order to respond to the general will (Rousseau 1966
[1762], pp. 63-150).
However, when laws are implemented, the general case needs to be applied to a particular case.
In order to ensure that the laws are always abstract conventions related to general affairs, it is
important that those responsible for the implementation of the laws do not have the power of
legislation. Otherwise, legislation might become influenced by particular interests and cease to
reflect the general will (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 78).
The government While the power of legislation belongs to the people, the power of imple-
menting the rule of law must therefore be delegated to a public agent. It is the duty of this public
agent, the government, to apply the laws in exactly the same way as stated by the general will.
The people in charge of this duty are the magistrates. When the magistrates are made up of the
majority of the citizens, the government is democratic, when the magistrates are made up of the
minority of the citizens, the government is aristocratic, and when there is only one magistrate, it
is a monarchic government (Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp. 97-105).
The government can be conceptualized as a second collective body within the collective body of
the state. As long as the government abides to the constitution and follows the general will, the
rule of law is guaranteed. However, as the magistrates in the government have their own particular
interests, the state needs to invest resources to control the magistrates and ensure that they do not
abuse their position of power to impose their own particular interest (Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp.
25
CHAPTER 2. PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION
101-103).
The state in private ownership As the magistrates continually try to enforce their particular
interests and to use the power of the state for their own purpose, they will eventually be able to
take over the state. As soon as this happens, the social contract is broken and the citizens of the
state are not obliged by their consent to obey the laws but are forced by the ruler to do so (Rousseau
1966 [1762], pp. 125-127). In the long run, all societies end up in despotism. This is due to the
fact that, while the incentives to use the power of the state to pursue particular interests are very
strong, the sovereign only has limited means to prevent this takeover: “Telle est la pente naturelle
et inéviatble des gouvernements les mieux constitués. Si Sparte et Rome ont péri, quel État peut
espérer de durer toujours?” (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 128).
According to Rousseau, the stability and peace of a society can only be guaranteed through a
collective regime, where the government and the state is in control of the people. In this state, all
citizens decide on all matters of general interest. However, and this is the key point, these collective
decisions will only lead to social order as long as the citizens speak with one voice. According to
Rousseau, diverging interests would only weaken the sovereing, leading to fights and instability.
It is therefore essential for the peace and stability to foster a strong and homogeneous general will.
2.2.4 The reign of the general will
We have seen in the last section that Rousseau strongly argued in favour of the general will as the
main garant for social order. In this section, I describe the means available to form and support a
strong and powerful general will.
Common norms foster the general will According to Rousseau, social order primarily depends
on the capacity of the people of a society to create a state and to express a general will which
is strong and clear enough to dispose of the means of the state and to control the government.
Although he clearly had a pessimistic view on the capacity of people to express such a general
will and restrain particular interests, he argued that the norms of the people can promote such a
general will:
“A ces trois sortes de lois, il s’en joint une quatrième, la plus importante de toutes;
qui ne se grave ni sur le marbre ni sur l’airain, mais dans les coeurs des citoyens; qui
fait la véritable constitution de l’État; qui prend tous les jours de nouvelles forces;
qui, lorsque les autres lois vieillissent ou s’éteignent, les ranime ou les supplée, con-
serve un peuple dans l’esprit de son institution, et substitue insensiblement la force
de l’habitude à celle de l’autorité. Je parle des moeurs, des coutumes, et surtout de
l’opinion; partie inconnue à nos politiques, mais de laquelle dépend le succès de tou-
tes les autres : partie dont le grand législateur s’occupe en secret, tandis qu’il paraît
se borner à des règlements particuliers qui ne sont que le cintre de la voûte, dont
les moeurs, plus lentes à naître, forment enfin l’inébranlable clef.” (Rousseau 1966
[1762], p. 91).
The more the laws of the state coincide with the norms of its members, the stronger and the more
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durable the state will be. However, when the norms vary among the citizens of the state, there is
no complete agreement on general affairs and the state needs to make use of coercive measures to
impose social order (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 99). In a state where all citizens share the same
norms, there is unanimity on all general affairs, the individuals’ interests coincide with the general
will and it is impossible to impose any particular interest on the state. In contrast, when there is
no unanimity on general affairs, not all individuals’ interests coincide with the general will and it
becomes possible to impose laws which only serve particular interests, compromising the rule of
the general will (Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp. 146-147).
Using norms to rule It follows from these thoughts that the state needs to rule mainly by making
use of, shaping and controlling the norms of its members, using laws only to support these norms
and applying censorship to conserve these norms (Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp. 145-146). Following
the example of the best state ever, i.e. Sparta, the state has to teach the relevant norms to its people
(Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 138), prohibitting all activities which could lead to changes in the
believes and norms of the people, like science and arts, and luxury, which corrupts all norms
(Rousseau 1964 [1750], pp. 12-21). Finally, the state should actively hinder the emergence of any
sub-society or interest group, making sure that general affairs are only decided among autonomous
citizens following their own personal interests (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 67).
2.3 Adam Smith
Adam Smith was the first scholar to build a coherent economic theory which is still relevant
today (Nonnenmacher 1989, p.144). He is a prominent representative of economic liberalism
(Nonnenmacher 1989, p.121), who emphases the importance of the unintended consequences of
individual actions for the society as a whole. Smith’s first important publication, the “Theory
of moral sentiments” is a social-psychological work, explaining the emergence of moral norms.
It was highly appreciated during his lifetime (Nonnenmacher 1989, p.161). The “Lectures on
Justice, Police, Revenue and Arms” is a report of lectures by Adam Smith. The report was made
by a student and already contained the substance of “An inquiry into the nature and causes of the
wealth of nations” (Smith 1896 [1763], p. xiv). The “Wealth of nations” is considered as the bible
of economic liberalism and is his most prominent work today (Nonnenmacher 1989, p.121). In the
wealth of nations, Smith elabourates the mechanism of the invisible hand. In this section, I first
describe Smith’s evolutionary perspective on society. According to Smith, the evolution of society
is triggered by two simple mechanisms and undergoes four major stages. Then, I discuss the
economic definition of the problem of social order, as well as its economic solution as suggested
by Smith.
2.3.1 The evolution of society
In contrast to Hobbes (section 2.1) and Rousseau (section 2.2), Smith argued that humans have
always been social beings. In the following, I will briefly describe Smiths evolutionary perspective
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on society.
Humans as social beings Unlike Hobbes (section 2.1) and Rousseau (section 2.2), Smith belie-
ved that humans had always lived in societies: “It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society,
was fitted by nature to that situation for which he was made.” (Smith 1986 [1759], p. 132). He
clearly negated the existence of a state of nature and discredited the idea that a social contract
laid the foundation for social order. Instead, he argued that there are two omnipresent factors in
human societies favouring the emergence of social order. The first factor is authority. Authority
may be based on age or superior abilities, which are the natural sources of authority, as well as on
wealth or descending from an important family, which are the social sources of authority (Smith
1896 [1763], pp. 2-12). Ultimately, “Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the
passions of the rich and the powerful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of society.”
(Smith 1986 [1759], p. 79). The second factor is utility: people form societies because they be-
nefit from it (Smith 1896 [1763], p. 10). Like Hobbes (section 2.1), Adam Smith claimed that
all people want to survive and that survival is a natural right. He furthermore added freedom as
a second natural right (Smith 1896 [1763], p. 8). The ability to guarantee the natural rights of
individuals is the criteria Smith uses to evaluate a given society.
The material foundation of society Although humans have always lived in societies, these
evolve during time. Changes in production processes and the resulting improvement of living con-
ditions strongly influence the type of government and society. The driving factors behind these
economic processes are the division of labour and the accumulation of wealth. Societies thereby
evolve from hunter and fisher societies, the first human societies, to commercial societies, conti-
nually enhancing the ability of societies to provide themselves with necessaries and conveniences:
“As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and luxury, so the industry which
procures the former, must necessarily be prior to that which ministers to the latter.” (Smith 1993
[1776], p. 228).
Hunter and fisher societies Hunter and fisher societies form the first type of human societies.
People in hunter and fisher societies live from hunting, fishing and gathering. They live in poor
economic conditions and are just able to meet their most basic needs. In this type of society, “[...]
there is properly no government at all. [...] they live according to the laws of nature.” (Smith
1896 [1763], pp. 14-15). This is due to the fact that these societies are not able to generate any
economic surplus and accumulate wealth. Governments however exist in order to secure wealth
“[...] and to defend the rich from the poor.” (Smith 1896 [1763], p. 15). Without wealth, there are
no crimes of property. In the hunter and fisher societies, individuals care for themselves and live in
freedom and security. The legislative, judicial and executive powers belong to the people (Smith
1896 [1763], p. 17). Unfortunately, hunters and fishers are extremely poor, and the natural rights
of individuals depend on favourable conditions. In times of need, the natural rights of the weak
are not preserved any more: Smith gives examples of hunter and fisher societies who abandon, or
even kill, the weak members of the society out of pure necessity (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 8).
Pastoralist societies The domestication of animals lays the foundation for the emergence of the
first regular governments. The appropriation of cattle allows to accumulate wealth and those with
the biggest herds have more wealth than others. This inequality of wealth provides the wealthiest
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with power over the rest: as the only way to spend their wealth is by giving presents to the less
wealthy, they are able to creat a relationship of dependency and to rule over them. The chieftains
of pastoralist societies have dictatorial powers. Although pastoralist societies are able to clearly
improve the living standards and the likelihood of survival of their members, the subjects entirely
depend on the will of the chieftains and have no freedom (Smith 1896 [1763], p. 16).
Farmer societies The final two stages of the evolution of societies start with the cultivation
of the soil. In societies of farmers, the division of labour leads to significant increases in the
production of food. Being able to sell the surplus, the people accumulate so much wealth that
they eventually start to build fortified towns to protect themselves and their moveable goods from
invaders. The towns grow and become marketplaces. Craftsmen, artists and scientists pursue
their business there. In the towns, the chieftains from the countryside are unable to support their
authority and the first republican governments emerge there (Smith 1896 [1763], pp. 22-23). In
the countryside however, the chieftains keep their absolute powers: “[...] every great landlord was
a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some respects
their legislator in peace, and their leader in war.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 234). As long as the
most important economic activity is agriculture, the chieftains in the countryside are predominant,
hindering further economic progress in the countryside and the society as a whole remains under
their authoritarian regime (Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 234-238).
The commercial society This changes when the economic importance of the towns increases
even further. Through trade and manufacturing, towns accumulate so much wealth that they are
able to influence the rest of the society. First, town business expands into the countryside and forms
alliances with landowners. Second, trade and manufacturing activities supply the landowners with
plenty of goods. Instead of spending their wealth on the support of their subjects, the landowners
start to spend their wealth for luxury and manufactured goods. In this way, they further promote
trade and manufacturing and provide income to craftsmen, artificers and tradesmen. Manufacture
and commerce thus gradually lead to good government, social order, as well as security and liberty
for all individuals of society (Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 259-266). In the commercial society, there
are no subjects any more, but only free men trading goods and services among each other:
“When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a
very small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can supply. He
supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce
of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of
the produce of other men’s labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by
exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to
be what is properly a commercial society.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 31).
As has been shown in this section, Smith has a materialistic view on society. On the other hand,
similarly to Hobbes (2.1), he also adopts the idea of natural rights. Besides of the natural right to
self-preservation, humans also have the natural right to freedom. As long as both are preserved,
social order can be supported. However, when one of both is lacking, social order cannot be
maintained. Eventually, enduring social order will be reached in the commercial society.
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2.3.2 The economic solution to the problem of social order
According to Smith, the problem of social order is a function of the production and the allocation
of wealth: social order cannot be sustained as long as the optimal production and allocation of
wealth is not reached. He argues that humans do cooperate on a regular basis because it is in their
best interest. It follows that the self-interest of humans, combined with a predisposition to barter,
lays the foundation for social order. This view is completely contrary to Hobbes (section 2.1) and
Rousseau (section 2.2), which both argued that human selfishness was detrimental to society.
The economic human nature In contrast to Hobbes (section 2.1) and Rousseau (section 2.2),
Smith argued that the egoistic interests of humans were fostering, not hindering, society. From his
point of view, the problem of order is a problem of scarce resources, not of the human nature. This
becomes obvious when considering the hunter and fisher societies: in these societies, humans live
according to their natural rights, as long as the living conditions are favourable (section 2.3.1).
The economic solution to the problem of order therefore aims at enhancing the wealth of the
society, while granting the natural rights to the people living in a society. The human nature even
supports the economic solution, because humans care best for themselves (Smith 1986 [1759], p.
127), have a continual desire to improve their condition (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 203) and have
the predisposition to trade one thing for another. This propensity to trade with others is unique in
humans and allows for the division of labour:
“Without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every man must have
procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All
must have had the same duties to perform, and the same work to do.” (Smith 1993
[1776], p. 24).
The exchange of goods and services occurs by mutual consent, where everyone seeks his own
advantage: “Give me that which I want and you shall have this which you want.” (Smith 1993
[1776], p. 22). Ultimately, the division of labour is based on the human characteristics mentioned
above.
The division of labour Smith puts such a focus on the division of labour, as it allows to sig-
nificantly increase the output of a man’s labour. He elabourates that a worker is able to produce
about 20 pins a day by working on his own. In a simple factory, where the 18 distinct operations
needed to produce a pin are divided among ten workers, the daily output of a worker is increased
to 4800 pins due to the division of labour (Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 12-13). When every member of
a society specializes on the production of what he does best, providing his produce for exchange
to all others, “[...] the most dissimilar geniuses are of use to one another [...]” (Smith 1993 [1776],
pp. 12-13). This exchange among members of a society leads to wealth among all members of a
society:
“It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in con-
sequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, that
universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people. Every work-
man has a great quantity of his own work to dispose of beyond what he himself has
occasion for.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 18)
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The market The exchange of the product of labour takes place on the market. In order to be able
to exchange a product, people need to agree about the exchangeable value of the product. In order
to increase the efficiency of this exchange, the products are exchanged for money. The nominal
value of a product is the price in monetary units that determines its exchangeable value. Every
product has a natural price. This natural price equals the cost of its production, which comprises
the wages for the workers, the rent for the owners of the buildings or lands, and the profit for
the capital employed (Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 34-50). The society therefore consists of people
primarily living of the wages, people primarily living from the rents, and people primarily living
from the benefits. Smith refers to these groups of people as the three orders (Smith 1993 [1776],
p. 155) or classes (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 386) of society. The market price is the actual price
at which a product is sold on the market. This price is determined by the quantity of a product
which is brought to the market and the demand of those people willing to pay its natural price.
If the quantity falls short of the demand, the market price rises above the natural price. If the
quantity exceeds the demand, the market price sinks below the natural price. If the quantity is just
enough to supply the demand, the market price coincides with the natural price. In the long run,
the market price always tends towards the natural price because of the reactions of the involved
actors. When the market price is higher than the natural price, more producers enter the market
to make profit and the quantity increases, leading to lower market prices. When the market price
is lower than the natural price, producers leave the market as they lose money and the quantity
decreases, leading to higher market prices (Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 54-56). Actors on the market
decide in which sectors to be involved solely on the basis of the gains which can be obtained. They
try to maximize these gains, and by doing so, they maximize the wealth of the society as a whole,
because on aggregate, this behaviour leads to an equality between market and natural prices and
an optimal allocation of available resources.
Using the market to rule The magnitude of the extent in wealth, which is generated through
the division of labour is limited by the size of the market (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 26). In order to
benefit from the whole potential of the division of labour, a society needs to ensure that the market
is free and maximally extended. This means that no restriction to trade is established (Smith 1993
[1776], p. 295), that no sector is supported or constrained by the state (Smith 1993 [1776], p.
293), that no monopoly is allowed (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 358) and that interests of companies do
not influence government decisions (Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 368-373). All these measures would
influence the market price and lead to a misallocation of resources.
When interferences in the market are omitted, a system of natural liberty is established in which
all men are free to pursue their own interests, as long as they do not act against the law. In such
a system of natural liberty, the sovereign has three duties. First, the sovereign has to protect the
society from the invasion and violence of other societies by establishing a military force. Second,
the sovereign needs to establish an administration of justice to protect the members of society
from oppression and injustice by other members of society. Third, the sovereign needs to provide
the society with public institutions and public works. Those are characterized by the fact that
the whole society benefits from them, while no individual would be able to provide them. Those
public institutions and works are mainly provided in order to facilitate the commerce and include
infrastructure like roads, canals, bridges, harbours, as well as post offices, and educational facilities
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(Smith 1993 [1776], pp. 391-433). The whole economic project of Smith can be narrowed down
to one sentence:
“The establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of perfect equality, is
the very simple secret which most effectually secures the highest degree of prosperity
to all the three classes.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p.386).
Because the free market allows for the maximal amount of wealth and its optimal allocation,
the market mechanism can be used to support social order. Adopting a free market economy is
therefore one of the conditions for social order. The other condition lays in a state that protects its
citizens from wars and crimes. Consequently, the last stage of Smiths evolution of societies is the
commercial society that guarantees both freedom and safety for its citizens.
2.3.3 The normative integration of individuals into society
Although Smith emphasized the importance of self-interests for the functioning of a society (section
2.3.2), he argued that humans would still need to behave according to normative rules for social
order to prevail. These rules would then keep reckless and harmful egoism under control. Interes-
tingly, similarly to the invisible hand that balances the different materialistic interests of individu-
als on the market, the same mechanism works to balance the different normative values of people
in society.
Sympathy In a given situation, the people not involved, the spectators, analyse the situation from
the point of view of the involved individuals, the actors, and even feel their passions. This ability
is called sympathy: “Sympathy, [...], may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use
of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.” (Smith 1986 [1759], p. 4). When
spectators analyse the situation actors are involved in, they may judge their actions and passions.
However, their judgement is never objective, as they are always guided by their own passions,
standards and faculties (Smith 1986 [1759], pp. 14-19). The criteria used to judge the behaviour
of actors involved in a specific situation is propriety:
“In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the
affection seems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety
or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action.” (Smith 1986
[1759], p. 18).
If the passion and behaviour of an actor in a situation correspond to the passion and behaviour a
spectator would have in the same situation, they are judged as proper. If not, they are judged as
improper. For the actors, it is crucial to feel in harmony with the spectators: “Compared with the
contempt of mankind, all other evils are easily supported.” (Smith 1986 [1759], p. 96). Although
humans have the ability to sympathize with others, a spectator will never be able to reconstruct
and feel a situation in exactly the same way as an actor, and the actors are well aware of this.
They therefore need to sympathize with the spectators too, adapting their passion and behaviour
in order to have the sympathy of the spectators (Smith 1986 [1759], pp. 24-25). The capacity
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of individuals to sympathize with other individuals depends strongly on their mutual relationship
(Smith 1986 [1759], pp. 188-189). As the judgement of a spectator not only depends on his own
feelings, standards and faculties, but also on his relationship with the actor, no judgement of a
spectator can ever be truly objective.
The impartial spectator The same behaviour might be judged in a completely different way by
different spectators: “In order to defend ourselves from such partial judgments, we soon learn to
set up in our own minds a judge between ourselves and those we live with.” (Smith 1986 [1759], p.
188). This judge, called the impartial spectator, is entirely objective, equitable and honest. Actors
therefore imagine how the impartial spectator would judge their passion and behaviour in a specific
situation, instead of sympathizing with spectators. If they believe the impartial spectator would
approve of their behaviour, then their behaviour must be proper, independent of what spectators
might believe. If, on the contrary, the impartial spectator must disagree with their behaviour, then
it is improper to act this way (Smith 1986 [1759], pp. 188-189). Unfortunately, such rational and
objective reasoning is nearly impossible, because individuals are always biased by their self-love,
their own sentiments, and experiences (Smith 1986 [1759], p. 199).
Norms emerge out of daily interactions This is why people lay down general rules to avoid
any behaviour which is punishable, contemptible or odious and instead foster behaviour which
is approvable and favourable. By following these rules, they can be sure of always acting in the
proper way. Those rules are built by observing, for all possible kinds of situations, the judgements
triggered by different kinds of behaviour. When this is done, the proper behaviour for all different
kinds of situations is chosen as a general rule, and “[...] fixed in our mind by habitual reflection
[...]” (Smith 1986 [1759], p. 204). Those rules have an enormous relevance for human societies
as they shape the behaviour of people and correct the bias which self-love incorporates into the
decision of what is proper to do in a specific situation. It is only because of these rules that people
become trustworthy and predictable. The sense of duty, which results from these rules, is “[...]
the most essential difference between a man of principle and honour and a worthless fellow.”
(Smith 1986 [1759], p. 209). These rules of morality are like divine laws and so important for the
working of societies, that it seems natural to enforce them with the help of god (Smith 1986 [1759],
pp. 210-212). Society would not be able to sustain without such laws : “But upon the tolerable
observance of these duties, depends the very existence of human society, which would crumble
into nothing if mankind were not generally impressed with a reverence for those important rules
of conduct.” (Smith 1986 [1759], p.210). In the commercial society, where everyone is supposed
to act selfishly for his own benefit, selfish behaviour, which is judged as inappropriate, becomes
sanctioned, as everyone follows a fairness norm:
“In the race for wealth and honours, and preference, he may run as hard as he can,
and strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But
if he should hustle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is
entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of.” (Smith
1986 [1759], p. 128).
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2.4 Conclusion: philosophical foundation
Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith used a similar approach in their works on political philosophy. They
compared societies at different stages of development and made conclusions about the reasons
leading to the differences they were interested in. However, apart from this similarity of their
approaches, the scholars differed in fundamental ways. Most importantly, the works of the scholars
are not mutually compatible. Let us for example have a look at their diverging views related to
the natural rights of humans. According to Hobbes, humans have only one natural right: self-
preservation. This exclusive focus on self-preservation justifies the use of coercive power and
the rule of an absolutist government with dictatorial powers as long as the bodily integrity of the
citizens is guaranteed. The reference to natural rights allows social institutions to be justified
by reflecting a natural order. Smith also makes use of natural rights to justify certain types of
social institutions. In contrast to Hobbes, he argues that humans have two natural rights: self-
preservation and freedom. The Leviathan proposed by Hobbes is not justifiable if one takes into
account that humans also have the natural right of freedom, since the Leviathan is intended to
rule by putting massive limitations on the freedom of people. Since self-preservation and freedom
are both natural rights, strong limitations need to be put in place to restrict the actions of the
Leviathan to a necessary minimum level. At the same time, the invisible hand of the market
guarantees for a maximum level of freedom. Finally, from Rousseau’s point of view, there are no
natural rights at all. Social institutions are therefore conventions and do not represent the natural
order in any way. In principle, this social constructivist view on society allows for the justification
of a wide range of social institutions. However, Rousseau’s negative assumption regarding the
selfish nature of humans in the natural state of society, led him to the conclusion that society will
always end in despotism. The three scholars also had fundamentally differing views on the role
of the individual’s self-interest for society, the historical development of societies, the problem
of social order, as well as the institutional arrangements needed as a solution to the problem of
social order. Based on these fundamental differences, the three scholars can be categorized into
three broad dogmatic traditions with regard to the problem of social order: first, social order
through an absolutist regime, with Hobbes as the main representative; second, social order through
a collectivistic regime, with Rousseau as a main representative; third, social order through the
balancing of individual interests, with Smith as a main representative. From a sociological point
of view, the work of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith are of high interest for two reasons. First,
their comparative approach, although not methodologically sound, is compelling. Assuming there
is a common human nature, it makes sense to study people from different cultures that seem
very different at first sight. Having detected the factors responsible for the observed differences
allows then to discern what they have in common. This must be the human nature. Second, the
scholars focused on social institutions to explain differences in humans and societies. This is
a fundamental sociological explanation. Their insights even allow to deduce hypotheses. From
Hobbes’ point of view, the key social institution is a coercive government: people under the rule
of such a government should be pacified and therefore more cooperative and trustful than people
lacking such a government. From Rousseau’s point of view, the key for social order is normative
homogeneity, which is influenced by private property and the composition of the people of society.
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A homogeneous society with low levels of inequality should be better positioned to enforce the rule
of law and to control the government than a heterogeneous society with high levels of inequality.
Finally, from the perspective of Smith, the main social institution to promote social order is the
free market. People integrated in a free market economy should be more pacified and therefore
more cooperative and trustful than people not integrated in a free market economy. At heart,
these institutional explanations for human sets of behaviour are purely sociological and therefore
a good starting point for a sociological study. Unfortunately, as long as the whole dogmatic rat-tail
of the scholars is kept, it is not possible to extract single aspects of their work and consider those
together in a unified framework. In the next chapter 3, I discuss how game theory can be used
to incorporate the different concepts proposed by Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith into one common
theoretical framework.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical foundation
As discussed in the chapter 2 on my philosophical foundation, the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and
Smith are highly influential and have a clearly sociological core. It is, however, difficult to assess
the scientific value of their work. This is due to the fact that their key insights are mostly based on
dogmatic arguments and unverifiable assumptions. As a consequence, their works are only partly
mutually compatible and their legacy rests mainly on the influence of dogmatic thoughts that are
still important in the realms of politics, economics, philosophy, as well as social sciences.
On the other hand, the political philosophical problem of social order, as discussed by Hobbes,
Rousseau and Smith, and its solutions are still of high relevance in social sciences, being the sub-
ject of game-theoretical analyses. In these analyses, the problem of social order is reformulated
and centres around a situation involving a minimum of assumptions and parameters that can be
measured and tested. Following this reformulation, the political philosophical problem of social
order, which is essentially about the constant threat of violence and instability a society faces, is re-
formulated into the problem of cooperation, which centres around the constant threat of defection
occurring in strategic interactions.
In this chapter, I provide a brief description of game theory and the game-theoretical concepts
which are important for the understanding of my work. I describe and discuss the game-theoretical
tools used to formalize the concepts and ideas of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith and incorporate
those into one common game-theoretical framework. This is mainly done by sticking to a small set
of basic assumptions and renouncing on key dogmatic arguments found in the works of the scho-
lars. I close this chapter by discussing the consequences of the game-theoretical formalization
of the problem of social order and concepts discussed by Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. On the
one hand, the conclusions reached by applying this formalization are not always compatible with
the original concepts formulated by the three classical scholars. On the other hand, this formali-
zation allows to incorporate the different concepts of the three classical scholars in one common
theoretical framework, allowing to deduce precise and falsifiable theoretical predictions.
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3.1 The equilibrium as a formalization of Smith’s invisible hand
In his work, Smith (section 2.3) described how the actions of individuals, following nothing but
their own self-interest, leads to unintended results at the aggregated level of society. In a free
market economy, for example, individuals looking to maximize their individual gain, at the same
time also maximize the wealth of the whole society:
“But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the exchan-
geable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is precisely the
same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual, therefore, endeavors
as much he can both to employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so
to direct that industry that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual
necessarily labors to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He
generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much
he is promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry,
he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no
part of his intention.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 292).
By acting in this way, they unconsciously favour the rule of law and strengthen the security and
freedom of all individuals:
“A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness, was in this man-
ner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not the least intention to
serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity was the sole motive of the great
proprietors. The merchants and artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely from
a view to their own interest, and in pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning
a penny wherever a penny was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or
foresight of that great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the
other, was gradually bringing about.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 268)
Selfish motives are even responsible for the most altruistic acts:
“It is not the love of our neighbour, it is not the love of mankind, which upon
many occasions prompts us to the practice of those divine virtues. It is a stronger
love, a more powerful affection which generally takes place upon such occasions, the
love of what is honourable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, and superiority of
our own characters.” (Smith 1986 [1759], pp. 193-194)
In this context, social norms emerge out of the daily interactions between the individuals of the
society:
“The general rules which determine what actions are, and what are not, the objects
of each of those sentiments, can be formed no other way than by observing what
actions actually and in fact excite them.” (Smith 1986 [1759], p. 204)
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The best result for society as a whole is reached when everyone pursues his own interest: “By
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when
he really intends to promote it” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 292).
Adam Smith’s assumptions about the rationality of human individuals and the concept he uses
(the invisible hand) to explain how social institutions and social order emerge from aggregated
individual behaviour are central elements in game theory. In the rest of this section, I describe
how these concepts are incorporated in a game theoretical analysis.
3.1.1 Orthodox game theory
Here, I briefly summarize the basics of game theory which are important to understand my work.
More can be found, for example, in Myerson 2004.
Orthodox game theory provides a mathematical framework to analyse situations involving multiple
actors making decisions that have an effect on one another’s welfare. In orthodox game theory, a
game describes any social situation involving strategic interactions between multiple actors. The
actors are called players. The decisions made by players in games are solely based on their utility
payoffs. Players maximize their expected utility payoff and are, in this sense, rational. Players
are furthermore intelligent: they can make the same inferences about the situation as any external
observers (Myerson 2004, pp. 1-4). The different ways how players can act in a game are called
moves. A strategy of a player then consists of a rule determining which move to play (Myerson
2004, pp. 41-44). When randomization is used between different pure strategies, the rule is called
a mixed strategy (Myerson 2004, p. 156), when no randomization occurs, it is a pure strategy
(Myerson 2004, p. 91). I am only going to consider pure strategies in this work. Games can be
represented in different ways (Myerson 2004, pp. 37-51). The most convenient way to describe
a game is the normal representation of a game in a strategic form. In this representation, the
players, their moves, as well as their utility payoffs are all shown in a tabular form. For example,
in the pricing game (table 1), player 1 and his moves are shown in the rows, and player 2 and
his moves are shown in the columns. The payoffs resulting from the different combinations of
moves are shown in the cells. The first number in each cell is the payoff of player 1, and the
second number in each cell shows the payoff of player 2. All information shown in this table is
common knowledge. This means, that “[...] every player knows that every player knows it, and
so on [..]” (Myerson 2004, p. 64). Players then make their strategic decisions independently and
simultaneously (Myerson 2004, p. 50).
3.1.2 Competition on a free market
The pricing game (table 1) is used to model the effect of competition on market prices (Moorthy
1985). In this game, two identical airlines, player 1 and player 2, serve the same route and compete
for customers in a free market. The pure strategies of both players are either to sell tickets for
200$ or for 300$. The consumers base their choices only on the price, favouring lower prices. The
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players have two moves: they can offer flight tickets for 200$ or for 300$. When both players offer
tickets for 300$, they both earn 10,000$. When player 1 sells his tickets for 200$, while player
2 offers tickets for 300$, player 1 earns 13,000$ and player 2 earns 4000$. When player 1 offers
tickets for 300$ while player 2 asks 200$ for the flight, player 1 earns 4000$ and player 2 earns
13,000$. When both players sell their tickets for 200$, they both earn 8’000$.
Table 1: The pricing game (Moorthy 1985, p. 264 ).
Player 2:
Ticket for 300 $
Player 2:
Ticket for 200 $
Player 1:
Ticket for 300 $
10,000$; 10,000$ 4000$; 13,000$
Player 1:
Ticket for 200 $
13,000$; 4000$ 8000$; 8000$
Player 1 will choose his strategy based on his belief of which move player 2 will choose. If
player 1 believes that player 2 will offer tickets for 300$, player 1 would maximize his expected
payoff by offering tickets for 200$. If player 1 believes that player 2 will offer tickets for 200$,
player 1 would maximize his expected payoff by also offering tickets for 200$. For player 1,
offering tickets for 200$ is always the better move, independently of player 2’s move: it is the best
response (Myerson 2004, p. 89) to all moves of player 2. Player 2 will reason in the same way as
player 1 and also offer tickets for 200$. In the pricing game, both players will choose the strategy
to offer tickets for 200$. Only following their own egoistic interests, the competition between the
two airlines leads to low prices for the consumers. This simple analysis highlights the importance
of competition in a free market for the welfare of consumers and society as a whole, supporting
Smith’s arguments in favour of a free market (section 2.3.2).
3.1.3 Nash equilibrium
In the pricing game (table 1), the strategy profile that both players choose 200$ is a Nash equi-
librium. A Nash equilibrium is characterized by the fact that no player can profit by deviating
unilaterally from the predicted equilibrium strategy. Not all games have a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies and some games may even have multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria. But in all
games with a finite number of pure strategies and a finite number of players, there exists at least
one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (Myerson 2004, pp. 93-96). The Nash equilibrium is one of
the most important concepts in game theory: if we assume that players are rational and intelligent,
as long as there is a Nash equilibrium in the game, they will have to act like predicted by the
equilibrium. Otherwise, assumptions about non-rational behaviour are needed (Myerson 2004, p.
105). The fact that no player has an interest in deviating unilaterally from the equilibrium also
means that the state emerging from an equilibrium is self-enforcing (Myerson 2004, p. 250). In
our example on the pricing game (table 1), there is no need for any external authority to enforce
the lower price, because it is in the best interest of the players to offer tickets for the lower price.
However, sometimes it may be challenging for the players to coordinate on an equilibrium (Clark
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et al. 2001, pp. 495-496). The game-theoretical concept of a Nash equilibrium is a formalization
of Adam Smith’s metaphor of the “invisible hand”. This is well described in the following quote:
“Nothing enforces such a self-policing social contract beyond the enlightened
self-interest of those who regard themselves as a party to it. Such duties and obli-
gations as are built into the contract are honored, not because members of society are
committed in some way to honor them, but because it is in the interest of each indivi-
dual citizen with the power to disrupt the contract not to do so, unless someone else
chooses to act against his own best interests by deviating first. The social contract the-
refore operates by consent and so does not need to rely on any actual or hypothetical
enforcement mechanism. In game-theoretic terms, it consists simply of an agreement
to coordinate on an equilibrium.” (Binmore 1994, p. 30, italics as in the original)
3.1.4 Pareto efficiency
While consumers surely prefer lower prices to higher prices, the situation for the airlines is a
different one. In fact, both airlines would be better off if they both offered their tickets for 300$.
A criteria used for assessing the efficiency of allocations is Pareto efficiency. A given allocation
is strongly Pareto efficient if there is no possible alternative allocation that would make at least
one player better off, while at the same time not diminishing the welfare of any other players.
Allocations are weakly Pareto efficient if there is no possible alternative allocation that would
increase the welfare of both players (Myerson 2004, p. 378). In the pricing game (table 1), with
both players offering tickets for 300$, there is a Pareto improvement to both players offering tickets
for 200$. The Nash equilibrium in the pricing game (table 1) is therefore not Pareto efficient.
3.1.5 Social dilemmas
Situations with equilibrium strategies leading to non-Pareto efficient allocations are classified as
social dilemmas. In social dilemma situations, people have no other option than to act in a dis-
advantageous or detrimental way: "A group of people facing a social dilemma may completely
understand the situation, may appreciate how each of their actions contribute to a disastrous out-
come, and still be unable to do anything about it." (Kollock 1998, p. 184-185). Social dilemmas
can be formalized as two-person games with the two moves to cooperate or to defect. The four
different outcomes in social dilemmas are R (reward) for mutual cooperation, P (punishment) for
mutual defection, S (sucker) for cooperation when the other player defects and T (temptation) for
defection when the other player cooperates (T > R > P > S). In social dilemma situations mutual
cooperation is always a Pareto improvement to mutual defection (R > P). When mutual coopera-
tion is undermined by the fear of the players (P > S), the situation is modelled as a stag hunt game
(section 3.3). When mutual cooperation is undermined by the greed of the players (T > R), the
situation is modelled as a chicken game. When fear and greed are present, as in our pricing game,
the situation is modelled as a prisoner’s dilemma (section 3.2) (Macy and Flache 2002, p. 7229).
40
3.1. THE EQUILIBRIUM AS A FORMALIZATION OF SMITH’S INVISIBLE HAND
Social dilemmas are game-theoretical models for the problem of social order. Of course, only a
fraction of situations that can be potentially described by a game-theoretical social dilemma are
characterized by political unrest or violence present in a political problem of social order. Our
example in the pricing game (table 1), for example, is not what most people would have in mind
when thinking of a social dilemma. However, most political problems of social order can be
described in the terms of a game-theoretical social dilemma.
3.1.6 Economic goods
The essential feature of the problem of social order, as characterized by Adam Smith, is the subop-
timal allocation of economic goods. As long as the allocation of economic goods is suboptimal,
social order cannot be lasting. Smith argued that the free market is optimal in allocating economic
goods among individuals of a society. Therefore, societies should adopt free market economic
systems (section 2.3.2).
However, the market mechanism can only work in situations where the “exclusion principle” ap-
plies. This means that the consumption of a good by a certain individual depends on the ability of
this individual to pay for the good. If this requirement is not met, the market mechanism fails to
allocate the economic good in an optimal way. Two criteria can be used to determine whether the
“exclusion principle” applies to a good. First, the consumption of the good needs to be rival. This
means that the consumption of the good by one individual leads to a decrease in the benefit which
can be obtained by other individuals by consuming the good. Second, it must be possible to grant
property rights to the good and exclude individuals without property rights from its consumption
(table 2). When both conditions apply, the market mechanism works. This is the case for private
goods, where the allocation through the market is optimal (Samuelson 1954, p. 388). For the other
three types of goods (common goods, club goods and public goods), also called social goods, the
market mechanism fails (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989, pp. 42-45).
Table 2: The four types of economic goods (adapted from Musgrave and Musgrave (1989, p. 44)).
Exclusion:
Feasible
Exclusion:
Not feasible
Consumption:
Rival
private
good:
shoes, car
common good:
Forest, wild
salmon
Consumption:
Not rival
club good:
Pay TV, gym
public good:
national defense,
clean air
In the case of public goods, not only is the consumption non-rival, but it is also not feasible to
grant property rights on the good. The provision of a public good is therefore a social dilemma
(section 3.4). This has already been recognized by Smith. He argued that the incentive structure
underlying the production of public goods would not favour its provision on the free market. The
provision of public goods is therefore one of the main duties of governments:
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“The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth is that of erecting and
maintaining those publick institutions and those publick works, which, though they
may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, are, however, of such a
nature, that the profit could never repay the expence to any individual or small number
of individuals, and which it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual or small
number of individuals should erect or maintain.” (Smith 1993 [1776], p. 413).
The market mechanism also fails in the allocation of common and club goods. In the case of com-
mon goods, the consumption is rival, but no property rights to the good are granted. Individuals
exploiting a resource held in common, face a social dilemma (section 4.3). For club goods, the
consumption is non-rival but property rights can be granted.
As a result, the “invisible hand” of the market leads to the optimal allocation of goods only in the
case of private goods. For all other types of goods, the market mechanism leads to suboptimal
outcomes that can be characterized as social dilemmas since the individual rationality fails to
provide the optimal outcome in these situations.
3.1.7 Evolutionary game theory
Besides orthodox game theory, there exists also a branch of game theory that is mainly used in bio-
logy to model evolutionary processes. In this so-called evolutionary game theory, game-theoretical
tools are used to analyse the behaviour of actors involved in strategic interactions without making
use of assumptions of rationality and common knowledge. In fact, the actors in evolutionary game
theory have no choice. They always play the same pure strategy (Skyrms 2000, pp. 272-273).
In a seminal paper published in Nature in 1973, Maynard Smith and Price applied game-theoretical
tools to understand the behaviour of animals of the same species involved in conflicts: the aim of
the study was to uncover why individuals of the same animal species are most of the time observed
making use of ritualized tactics and inefficient weapons when fighting against each other (limited
war strategies), instead of using the maximally efficient fighting styles and weapons (maximal war
strategies). Introducing the key concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), they showed
that limited war strategies were superior to maximal war strategies: while being able to decrease
the payoff of individuals using maximal war strategies through retaliation, they were able to reduce
their own loss obtained through an uninjured retreat in favour of an aggressive individual by obtai-
ning access to future opportunities (Smith and Price 1973, pp. 15-16). The evolutionary approach
to game theory focuses on the composition of a population with pure strategies played by its in-
dividuals. At the beginning of the analysis, the first state, the population consists of a number of
haploid individuals all playing one pure strategy, which is genetically imprinted. The individuals
of the population encounter, play a given game with the imprinted strategy and produce offsprings
according to their payoffs resulting from the payoff matrix of the game. The offsprings play the
same strategies as their parents. After each encounter, a new state emerges, potentially changing
the population and its composition with strategies. In this framework, a state is an equilibrium
when all strategies used by individuals in the population have the same payoff. If the population
always returns to the same equilibrium state, after having been disturbed by the introduction of
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new strategies, the state is an evolutionary stable state (Taylor and Jonker 1978, pp. 146-149).
Interestingly, no single pure strategy can be an ESS, because its population can always be invaded
by a mutant-, or a combination of strategies. On the other hand, mixed strategies can be ESS
(Smith and Price 1973, p. 17; Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987, p. 59). Hence, “[...] no behaviorally
uniform population can be evolutionary stable.” (Smith and Price 1973, p. 17).
Although the orthodox and the evolutionary game theory may differ in their conclusions, especi-
ally when the evolutionary game theory allows dominated strategies to be played or even being
fixated on, both still follow a logic of payoff maximization (Skyrms 2000, pp.273- 275). Evolu-
tionary game theory allows to analyse how genetics influences the behaviour of individuals and
the outcomes at the population level. Assuming that each strategy represents a genetic variation,
the reproductive success of the different genes and their composition within the population can be
modelled with simple games. A whole branch of science, known as socio-biology, is devoted to
studying the genetic component of human social behaviour and makes use, among others, of the
evolutionary game theory (section 8.1.3).
3.2 Hobbes’ state of nature and the prisoner’s dilemma
In Hobbes (section 2.1), one of the unfortunate consequences of the state of nature for mankind is
that it undermines cooperation between people: "If a Covenant be made, [...], in the condition of
meer Nature, [...] he which performeth first, does but betry himselfe to his enemy; contrary to the
Right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p.
96). This is due to the fact that, in the state of nature, agreements are not binding and nobody can
be trusted: "[...] Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man
at all." (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 117). As a result, people are stuck in a state where everyone is
against everyone, not working together and living a miserable life: “And the life of man, solitary,
poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 89).
Hobbes’s state of nature has found a representation in game theory as the prisoner’s dilemma
(Binmore 1994, p. 118; Lomborg 1996, pp. 278-279). In the rest of this section, I describe and
discuss the prisoner’s dilemma and the different suggested solutions.
3.2.1 The prisoner’s dilemma
We have already been confronted with the structure underlying the prisoner’s dilemma in the
pricing game (table 1). The prisoner’s dilemma is used as a prime example to illustrate problems
arising in rational cooperation and has been the subject of innumerable studies (Binmore 1994,
pp. 102-103; Kollock 1998, pp. 185-186). In its original version, the prisoner’s dilemma is a two-
persons, one shot game where the two players have the options either to cooperate or to defect
(table 3). The payoffs are ranked in the following way: "Ti > Ri > Pi > Si +Ti < 2Ri,(i = 1,2)"
(Rapoport and Dale 1966, p. 269), leading to a situation where both players defect and are worse
off than if both players cooperated (Pi < Ri). Fear (Pi > Si) and greed (Ti > Ri) of the players are
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responsible for this outcome (Macy and Flache 2002, p. 7229). In the prisoner’s dilemma, mutual
defection is the only Nash equilibrium.
Table 3: Payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma.
Player 2:
Cooperation
Player 2:
Defection
Player 1:
Cooperation
R1; R2 S1; T2
Player 1:
Defection
T1; S2 P1; P2
Hobbes’s state of nature is characterized by the people’s fear to die a violent death (section 2.1.1).
The state of nature described by Hobbes is very drastic and dramatic. From my point of view,
the pricing game (table 1) is not a good illustration of Hobbes’ state of nature, although it has
its structure. The following example might better represent the Hobbesian spirit and serve as an
illustrative model of Hobbes’ state of nature. Assuming that two people, player 1 and player 2,
have the following possibilities to make a living: they could either work together (cooperation)
and catch a stag (4; 4), or they could go their own way (defection) and independently catch a hare
(3;3). Mutual cooperation would lead to a better state for both of them than mutual defection. In
order to be able to catch a stag, they would however have to divide the work. One player would
have to track and drive the stag and the other player would have to catch the stag. For both of
them, the best state would be to track and drive the stag, ambush the catcher and kill him. Then,
the tracker could take as much meat as possible and would not have to share the stag with the other
player. The catcher, on the other hand, would be dead. Knowing this, both would want to track
the stag: not being able to coordinate, they would fail in catching a stag. In order to survive, they
would have to rely on solitary hare hunting. Because of the fear and the greed of the people, in
the state of nature, no spontaneous cooperation between people can emerge. As a result, the living
conditions of humans cannot improve (table 4).
Table 4: Payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma (own example).
Player 2:
Cooperation
Player 2:
Defection
Player 1:
Cooperation
4; 4 0; 7
Player 2:
Defection
7; 0 3; 3
Although the prisoner’s dilemma is supposed to be a formalization of Hobbes’ state of nature, it
differs in important ways from it. Most importantly, it only assumes that humans are rational.
They simply want to maximize their outcome. In Hobbes, humans are however not only rational.
They are also impulsive, obsessive and voracious. These differences are important, because the
reduction of the state of nature to a problem of rational cooperation allows to find solutions which
would not be possible in Hobbes’ state of nature. In the next sections, I describe different ways of
how a cooperative equilibrium can be reached in the prisoner’s dilemma.
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3.2.2 The iterated prisoner’s dilemma
While in the one shot prisoner’s dilemma (the prisoner’s dilemma described in the prior section)
unconditional defection is the only rational strategy, when the prisoner’s dilemma is played re-
peatedly for an unknown number of times by the players (this is the infinitely iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD)), cooperation might emerge from a Nash equilibrium without leaving the frame-
work of the prisoner’s dilemma. This is possible, because then, the best strategy of one player
depends on the strategy of the other player (Myerson 2004, pp. 308-309). In this case, both
players have an ongoing relationship with a common history and future: "This makes possible
sophisticated strategies which use this history" (Axelrod 1980, p. 380). In fact, if the players are
patient enough, all average payoffs equal or above the mutual defection level can result from a
Nash equilibrium in the infinitely IPD. This is known from the folk theorems (Myerson 2004, pp.
331-332). Unfortunately, there is no clear rule to determine which Nash equilibrium should be
selected. This may lead to a situation, where two players choose strategies from different Nash
equilibria in the infinitely IPD and end up in a state which is not a Nash equilibrium (Lomborg
1996, p. 281). When the number of times the two players are going to play the prisoner’s dilemma
is known (this is the finitely IPD), defection remains however the only rational strategy (Myerson
2004, pp. 309-310).
3.2.3 Tit-for-tat and Pavlov
It is noteworthy that some strategies clearly perform better than others in the infinitely IPD. This
is shown by comparing the performance of different strategies playing the infinitely IPD against
each other (Axelrod 1980; Nowak and Sigmund 1993; Lomborg 1996). Probably the most famous
strategy in the infinitely IPD is tit-for-tat. This strategy starts the first round of the game by
cooperating and then always copies the move played by the other player in the previous round of
the game. Tit-for-tat was the best performing strategy in both infinitely IPD tournaments organized
by Axelrod. The success of tit-for-tat in the infinitely IPD tournaments is explained by the fact that
this strategy is nice (proposing cooperation at the beginning and never defecting first), provocable
(it sanctions defection from the other player) and forgiving (it cooperates again after an isolated
defection from the other player) (Axelrod 1980, pp. 380-394). Tit-for-tat illustrates how norms of
reciprocity can lead to cooperation between rational actors in the infinitely IPD by capitalizing on
the advantage cooperators get from interacting together, while not becoming over-exploited from
defectors. Another strategy, Pavlov, which performs well in the infinitely IPD, can be summarized
by win-stay and loose-shift. This strategy simply keeps the same move if it was successful in the
previous round (rewarded with R or T) and changes move if it worked badly (punished with P
or S). Pavlov is more robust to errors and mutations than tit-for-tat (Nowak and Sigmund 1993,
p. 58). It can be a cooperating strategy, like tit-for-tat, but unlike tit-for-tat, Pavlov also takes
advantage of an unconditional cooperator by exploiting him until the end of the game.
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3.2.4 The nucleus and the shield
Although some important aspects related to the emergence of cooperation in the infinitely IPD
can be worked out by focusing on single strategies, it should be highlighted that cooperation in
a population where all individuals play the same pure strategy is not evolutionary stable (Smith
and Price 1973, p. 17; Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987, p. 59). This means that in a population
of individuals playing the infinitely IPD, when cooperation emerges as an equilibrium from a
strategy which is played by all players, it is always possible that some alternative strategy might
prove itself superior and invade the population (Myerson 2004, p. 122). In the infinitely IPD, for
cooperation to be a stable state among individuals of a population, they need to play a variety of
different strategies. The most stable environment for cooperation is reached when the population
consists of a core of individuals playing very cooperative strategies, the nucleus, surrounded by
a periphery of individuals playing a diversity of more cautious, defecting strategies, the shield:
“Thus, the answer to Axelrod’s question, of what is the most robust strategy in the infinitely IPD
game, has never been a single strategy, but is instead a set of strategies internally partitioned
between a highly cooperative nucleus and a diverse and cautious shield. The partitioning into
nucleus and shield and the diversity inside the shield constitutes the social structure that evolves
to deal with a Hobbesian IPD world.” (Lomborg 1996, p. 298).
3.2.5 The shadow of the future
The introduction of uncertain future interactions, the shadow of the future, has profound implica-
tions for the prisoner’s dilemma.
In order to illustrate the strategic implications of repeated interactions among players within the
framework of infinitely IPD, let us consider that player 1 and player 2 have the options to either
defect in all rounds (ALLD) or to play tit-for-tat. In our example from table 4, the following equa-
tion helps us to determine at which probability (p) of another trial tit-for-tat and ALLD will do
equally well when playing against tit-for-tat: 4+ 4p1−p = 7+
3p
1−p (the left-hand-side of the equati-
ons considers the payoffs for tit-for-tat against tit-for-tat, while the right-hand-side considers the
payoffs for ALLD against tit-for-tat): with a probability of another trial of 0.75, neither strategy is
a best response to tit-for-tat (table 5).
Table 5: Tit-for-tat against ALLD in the infinitely IPD from table 4 with p=0.75 .
p=0.75 Player 2:
Ttit-for-tat
Player 2:
ALLD
Player 1:
Tit-for-tat
16; 16 9; 16
Player 1:
ALLD
16; 9 12; 12
With a probability of another trial being 0.75. Neither strategy is a best response to tit-for-tat.
At probabilities below 0.75 ALLD is a best response to tit-for-tat, not changing anything to the
structure of the prisoners dilemma (table 6).
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Table 6: Ttit-for-tat against ALLD in the infinitely IPD from table 4 with p=0.2 .
p=0.2 Player 2:
Tit-for-tat
Player 2:
ALLD
Player 1:
Tit-for-tat
5; 5 0.075; 7.75
Player 1:
ALLD
7.75; 0.075 3.75; 3.75
With a probability of another trial being 0.2, ALLD is clearly the best response to tit-for-tat.
When the probability is above 0.75, the best response to tit-for-tat is to play tit-for-tat as well (table
7).
Table 7: Tit-for-tat against ALLD in the infinitely IPD from table 4 with p=0.9 .
p=0.9 Player 2:
tit-for-tat
Player 2:
ALLD
Player 1:
tit-for-tat
40; 40 27; 34
Player 1:
ALLD
34; 27 30; 30
With a probability of another trial being 0.9, Tit-for-tat is clearly the best response to Tit-for-tat.
The introduction of a shadow of the future allows for the emergence of rational cooperation within
the framework of the prisoner’s dilemma. The structure of the prisoners dilemma in table 7 now
has the same structure as the stag hunt game (section 3.3), which is characterized by a coopera-
tive as well as a defecting equilibrium. Here, it is possible for cooperation to emerge from an
equilibrium strategy, directly resulting from the self-interest of individuals. In contrast to Hob-
bes’ state of nature, social order in the prisoner’s dilemma does not depend on a Leviathan. Most
importantly, by allowing the actors to interact for an uncertain number of times in the prisoner’s
dilemma, social order can result without coercion, simply from the self-interest of actors. This
conclusion is clearly not compatible with Hobbes’ description of the state of nature. I am going to
discuss the stag hunt game in more detail in the next section (section 3.3).
3.3 Rousseau and the stag hunt
In his book “De l’inégalité parmi les hommes”, Rousseau claims that humans gave up their inde-
pendent, self-sufficient lifestyle found in the natural state of man, since they could achieve more
with joint forces. However, by doing so, they put themselves at the mercy of others and risked to
get nothing at all:
“S’agissait-il de prendre un cerf, chacun sentait bien qu’il devait pour cela garder
fidèlement son poste; mais, si un lièvre venait à passer à la portée de l’un d’eux, il ne
faut pas douter qu’il ne le poursuivît sans scrupule, et qu’ayant atteint sa proie il ne se
souciât fort peu de faire manquer la leur à ses compagnons.” (Rousseau 1977 [1754],
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pp. 111-112).
Rousseau’s short story about the stag hunt describes the ambiguous relationship between the ra-
tionality of individuals and communities, which is at the heart of the game-theoretical modelling
of social dilemma situations. Not surprisingly, the story has found a game-theoretical counterpart
which is the topic of the following sections.
3.3.1 The stag hunt game
Rousseau’s story about the stag hunt has been adopted by game theorists as a tool to model the
evolution of social behaviour (Bergstrom 2002; Macy and Flache 2002; Skyrms 2004; Pacheco
et al. 2009; Perc and Szolnoki 2010). In it’s most basic form, the stag hunt game involves two
players (player 1 and player 2) with the options of either hunting stag or hunting hare (table 8).
Hunting stag has an expected payoff (Ri) higher than hunting hare, if both players hunt stag. If
only one player hunts stag, the expected payoff of the stag hunter (Si) is 0. Hunting hare has an
expected payoff (Pi) which is lower than hunting stag, but higher than 0 and not depending on the
action of the other player (Ri > Pi > Si). In some variations of the stag hunt game, the expected
payoff of the hare hunter is higher if the other player hunts stag (Ti) than if the other player also
hunts hare (Pi) (Ri > Ti > Pi > Si) (Skyrms 2004, pp.3-4). For the rest of this work, I will refer to
the first version of the stag hunt game, because it better captures Rousseau’s story.
Table 8: Payoff matrix of the basic stag hunt game.
Player 2: Hunt stag
(cooperate)
Player 2: Hunt
hare (defect)
Player 1: Hunt stag
(cooperate)
R1; R2 S1; P2
Player 1: Hunt
hare (defect)
P1; S2 P1; P2
In contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma (section 3.2), the stag hunt game has a cooperative Nash
equilibrium (both hunt stag) as well as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium (both hunt hare): when
player 1 hunts stag, it is always best for player 2 to also hunt stag and when player 1 hunts hare,
it is always best for player 2 to also hunt hare. This allows for the spontaneous emergence of
cooperation among rational actors. As the payoff of hunting hare does not depend on the strategy
of the other player, hunting hare minimizes the risk and is the risk-dominant equilibrium (Skyrms
2004, p.3). This equilibrium represents the state of nature, where humans do not cooperate (either
because they cannot trust each other, like in Hobbes’s state of nature (section 2.1.1), or because
they live a self-sufficient, independent life, like in Rousseau’s natural state of man (section 2.2.1)).
When the players coordinate on the defective equilibrium (both hunt hare), the stag hunt game
is a social dilemma, because the defecting equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by the cooperative
equilibrium (both hunt stag).
The cooperative equilibrium Pareto-dominates the non-cooperative equilibrium, since it leads to a
higher payoff for both players than the non-cooperative equilibrium. This equilibrium represents
48
3.3. ROUSSEAU AND THE STAG HUNT
a state where a social contract has been established between the two players (Binmore 1994, p.
121-122; Skyrms 2004, p. 9). It has been shown in the previous section (table 7) that the problem
of cooperation in the infinitely IPD can be transformed into the problem of cooperation in the stag
hunt game (Skyrms 2004, p. 9; Bergstrom 2002, pp. 73-74). In this case, the stag hunt game is no
social dilemma, as the cooperative equilibrium (both hunt stag) is Pareto efficient.
The game-theoretical concepts used to transform the Hobbesian state of nature (the prisoner’s
dilemma) into Rousseau’s model for societal development at the lowest levels of his model of hu-
man evolution (the stag hunt game) misrepresent the thoughts of Hobbes and Rousseau in some
important aspects. On the one hand, as discussed in the previous section 3.2.1, Hobbes did not
allow for such a simple solution to the problem of social order in his work. On the other hand,
Rousseau used his story as an explanation for the reason why people moved from a solitary life-
style in the natural state of man to a life in communities at the lowest level of the development
of human societies. According to Rousseau, this first step of community building follows directly
from the self-interest of humans and is no problem of social order at all. The problem of social
order however emerges as soon as social institutions have been built and becomes existential at the
end of the evolution of societies, where humans struggle for wealth and the control of the means
of power (section 2.2). The stag hunt game should therefore not be seen as a general model for the
evolution of societies, but only for the first step of this evolution.
3.3.2 The problem of cooperation in the stag hunt game
The problem of cooperation in the stag hunt game is a social dilemma of limited dimension. The
condition needed to reach the Pareto efficient equilibrium is trust. For player 1 to hunt stag, he
needs to trust that player 2 will also hunt stag. In the stag hunt game from table 9, player 1 needs
to believe that player 2 hunts stag with a probability higher than 0.75 in order to also hunt stag
(R1∗p > P1∗p+P1∗ (1−p) (Binmore 1994, p. 123)).
Table 9: Payoff matrix of the stag hunt game (Bergstrom 2002, p.70).
Player 2: Hunt stag
(cooperate)
Player 2: Hunt
hare
(defect)
Player 1: Hunt stag
(cooperate)
4; 4 0; 3
Player 1: Hunt
hare
(defect)
3; 0 3; 3
When people prefer not to take the risk and hunt hare (defective equilibrium), the only way they
can start hunting stag (cooperative equilibrium) is by changing their beliefs about the actions of
others. Hunting stag must stop being considered as a risky enterprise (Skyrms 2004, p. 10).
Social norms can help to reach this goal: as noted by Adam Smith, norms of morality make
people become predictable and trustworthy (section 2.3.3). Rousseau himself puts a strong focus
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on the importance of social norms for the enforcement of a social contract (section 2.2.4): when
everyone follows the general will to hunt a stag, there is no reason to believe that anyone will
hunt hare. Rousseau’s view on the normative education of people is very radical and considered
as “brainwashing” by Binmore (1994, p. 135). In fact, when all people are brainwashed to hunt
stag, the game would change its structure, as it would entirely remove the defecting strategy to
hunt hare.
However, even without considering socialization and normative education (“brainwashing”), there
are mechanisms which can lead to the emergence of stag hunting norms within the framework of
the stag hunt game. First, one possibility is to consider the spatial structure where the interactions
of players take place. When there is a small cluster of stag hunters within a broader population
of hare hunters, the hare hunters neighbouring the stag hunters’ cluster might become tempted to
imitate the stag hunters in order to also gain the same higher payoffs. This means a shift from
a strategy which focuses on playing the best response against your neighbourhood to a strategy
which focuses on imitating the most successful strategy played in your neighbourhood: “[...] we
can say that local interaction opens up possibilities of cooperation that do not exist in a more
traditional setting, and that imitation dynamics is often more conducive to cooperation than best-
response dynamics.” (Skyrms 2004, p. 41). Then, introducing reinforcement learning, the players
can choose with which neighbours to play, based on past experiences. Stag hunters will play
exclusively with other stag hunters, while hare hunters will only have the option to play with hare
hunters. In the long run, stag hunters will prosper while hare hunters will lag behind (Skyrms
2004, pp. 95-99). Finally, the exchange of information by actors prior to their interactions can
lead the players to choose the stag hunting strategy. This is the case, even for so called “cheap
talk” (cost-free communication) (Skyrms 2004, pp. 67-73).
In contrast to the prisoner’s dilemma, a cooperative equilibrium in the stag hunt game can be re-
ached in the one-shot stag hunt game. The stag hunt game explicitly allows for the spontaneous
emergence of cooperation among rational actors as an equilibrium. The necessary condition is
trust. Here, two main dogmatic differences between Hobbes and Rousseau become obvious. Hob-
bes denies the possibility that trust even matters in the state of nature. The solution to the problem
of social order can only be achieved through an all-powerful state that counteracts the self-interests
of individuals. Trust can only emerge once the people have transfered their rights and power to an
external authority, opening the path to a civilized society. According to Rousseau, the problem of
social order is a product of life in society: once people have entirely become interdependent, due
to private property and division of labour, the problem of social order becomes existential. The
only solution is an all-powerful state with the people as the sovereign. Unfortunately, also this
solution is doomed to fail: eventually, some selfish individuals take control of the state and the pe-
ople lose their sovereignty. In Hobbes as well as in Rousseau, the reason for the problem of social
order is the selfishness of humans. In Hobbes, the selfishness of humans hinders the emergence of
a society. In Rousseau, the selfishness of humans threatens the stability of a society.
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3.4 Public goods and free riding
Without doubt, the state is the key to social order. In Smith, the state makes sure that the free
market channels the constructive power of human selfishness and provides the public goods that
the free market does not. In Hobbes and Rousseau, the state is the public good necessary to protect
humanity from human selfishness. As a result, state institutions and services are probably the most
important public goods. As a quick reminder, public goods are goods which are enjoyed in the
same way by all individuals of a group. This means that the consumption of the good by one
individual of the group does not lead to a fewer amount of the good for other individuals of the
group (Samuelson 1954, p. 387). Furthermore, no member can be excluded from consuming the
good (table 2). Interestingly, individuals involved in the provision of a public good face a social
dilemma. In the further part of this section, I discuss the structure of the social dilemma underlying
the provision of public goods and solutions available to support the provision of public goods.
3.4.1 The state as a public good
In the “social contract”, Rousseau characterizes the state as a public good to its citizens. All
citizens contribute to the state by providing everything they have (Rousseau 1966 [1762], pp. 51-
52). As a result, the citizens receive protection and security from the state: “[...] on ne peut
offenser un des membres sans attaquer le corps [...]” (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 54). However,
the citizens would be best off if they did not contribute to the state, but still benefitted from its
protection, and by acting in this way, the state would not be erected:
“En effet chaque individu peut comme homme avoir une volonté particulière con-
traire ou dissemblable à la volonté générale qu’il a comme citoyen. Son intérêt par-
ticulier peut lui parler tout autrement que l’intérêt commun; son existence absolue et
naturellement indépendante peut lui faire envisager ce qu’il doit à la cause commune
comme une contribution gratuite, dont la perte sera moins nuisible aux autres que le
payement n’en est onéreux pour lui, et regardant la personne morale qui constitue
l’État comme un être de raison parce que ce n’est pas un homme, il jouirait des droits
du citoyen sans vouloir remplir les devoirs du sujet; injustice dont le progrès causerait
la ruine du corps politique.” (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 54)
Rousseau’s reasoning concerning the erection of a public body by selfish subjects describes the
reasoning of rational actors when deciding on their contribution to a public good. Individuals
trying to achieve their rational self-interest will reach a suboptimal outcome, because by failing
to contribute to the provision of the public good, the individuals will not receive the benefit of the
public good, which would have exceeded the costs necessary to help purchasing the public good
for the whole population. They fail to provide the public good, because it is in their best interest to
let the others provide the good and only profit from it. Behaviour which is driven by such a type
of reasoning is known as free riding.
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3.4.2 Free riding
Free riding behaviour can well be modelled with a simplified 10-persons game, where an indivi-
dual plays against a collective to provide a public good (table 10). While the common interest
of the group is to provide the public good, which is worth twice its cost, the individual wants to
maximize his payoff. The payoffs are calculated as benefits less costs. In this game, the individual
and the collective either cooperate in the provision of the public good, by paying one unit, or de-
fect, by not paying the necessary unit. By analysing the individual’s payoffs in the individual vs.
the collective game (table 10) and comparing them with the payoffs in the prisoner’s dilemma (ta-
ble 3), it becomes clear that the motives of the individual to provide a public good are the same as
in the prisoner’s dilemma: the individual is always best off when not contributing to the collective
good, independently of the collective’s move. As all individuals of the group see the game matrix
from the point of view of the individual and since the collective’s action is made up of aggregated
individual behaviour, the public good will not be provided. Not contributing to the public good is
known as free riding (Marwell and Ames 1981, p. 296).
Table 10: Payoff matrix of the individual vs. collective game.
Collective:
Contribute
(cooperate)
Collective:
Do not contribute
(defect)
Individual:
Contribute
(cooperate)
1; 1 -0.8; 0.2
Individual:
Do not contribute
(defect)
1.8; 0.8 0; 0
Per capita average of collective payoffs (Hardin 1971, p. 473)
3.4.3 Group characteristics and public good provision
However, the conclusion that rational actors will never contribute to a public good is not necessa-
rily true. According to a range of theoretical considerations, the characteristics of a group strongly
influence its capacity to provide collective goods to its members.
In his work on collective action, Olson argues that the provision of a public good depends on the
cost of the public good C, the level of the public good T , the size of the group Sg, the individual
gain Vi and the group gain Vg: the public good will be provided as soons as the total cost of the
public good is exceeded by the individual gain (Vi/Vg > C/Vg). The optimal allocation of the
public good is reached when the cost of the public good and the gain to the group increase at
the same rate (dVg/dT = dC/dT ) (Olson 1971, pp. 23-24). Accordingly, group size and group
inequality are two group characteristics that should positively influence the capacity of groups to
provide public goods. This is due to the fact that the likelihood to find individuals who are willing
to provide the public good independent of others decreases with group size and increases with
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group inequality. Due to its inherent logic, the public good will usually not be provided, and if so,
not in an optimal way (Olson 1971, pp. 28-29).
Similarly, homogeneity of preferences within individuals of a group positively influences the pro-
vision of public goods. This is shown by applying the theorem of the median voter (Black 1948) to
the public good provision. Assuming that a committee votes on a specific issue with a multitude
of options, that each member of the committee is able to rank these options in a clear order of
preferences (Black 1948, p. 23), and that a simple majority rule is used to make a decision (Black
1948, p. 25), the theorem of the median voter states that the option which is favoured by the me-
dian voter will be adopted by the committee (Black 1948, p. 28). In the case of the provision of
a public good, the members of the committee decide by majority rule on the size and the type of
the public good to provide. The result of this vote will coincide with the preference of the median
voter. The more homogeneous the preferences of the voters, the shorter the median distance from
the median voter. When the preferences among the voters are entirely homogeneous, there is only
one opinion, and the optimal amount of the public good will be provided (Alesina et al. 1999, pp.
1249-1251).
Finally, according to Putnam, group homogeneity in general should favour the capacity of a group
to provide a public good. The social capital of individuals is made up of ties to similar people
(bonding social capital) and ties to un-similar people (bridging social capital). Group homogeneity
positively affects both, the bridging and the bonding of individuals’ social capital. In this way, the
social capital of individuals is increased by group homogeneity. This is known from the constrict
theory (Putnam 2007, pp. 138-144). As a result, homogeneous groups have a high cohesion and
are well suited to overcome social dilemma.
Interestingly, prominent micro theoretical models of human behaviour suggest that group homo-
geneity and inequality influence the provision of public goods. According to those, homogeneity
should positively influence public good provision. Based on his philosophy of the general will,
Rousseau concludes the same. But then, micro-economic theory teaches that income inequality
positively influences public good provision. This hypothesis is contrary to Rousseau’s thoughts
on the functioning of the general will (section 2.2).
Although public good provision is a social dilemma, it is clear that no developed economy would
function without public goods. Even the free market depends on public goods: “Almost any
government is economically beneficial to its citizens, in that the law and order it provides is a
prerequisite of all civilized economic activity.” (Olson 1971, p. 13). As a result, societies have
proven that they are able to overcome the social dilemma underlying the provision of public goods
in many instances. Until now, I have only discussed solutions to overcome social dilemma that
essentially increase the benefit, of or the preference for cooperation. Some very effective means
available to support cooperation in social dilemma are however based on punishment (Olson 1971,
p. 13; Olson 1971, p. 44; Boyd and Richerson 1992, p. 185). The enforcement of social order
through punishment is the topic of the next section.
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3.5 Punishment
So far, I have elabourated concepts enhancing cooperation in social dilemmas which are based on
mechanisms increasing the payoffs which individuals can obtain through cooperation (section 3.2,
section 3.3). Those mechanisms mainly rely on reciprocity (section 3.2.3). However, there is also
the possibility to enforce cooperation in social dilemmas by decreasing the payoffs individuals
can obtain through defection. This is possible through punishment. From a game-theoretical
perspective, punishment is a retaliatory infliction of payoff reduction (Clutton-Brock and Parker
1995, p. 209). This idea is central in Hobbes’ work (section 2.1), but also plays an important role
in Rousseau (section 2.2) and Smith (section 2.3). The study of punishment is of high relevance for
sociology, since punishment is closely linked to the concept of a norm. The relationship between
punishment and norms is described by Homans in the following way:
“A norm, then, is an idea in the minds of the members of a group, an idea that can
be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should
do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances [...] A statement of
the kind described is a norm only if any departure of real behavior from the norm is
followed by some punishment.” (Homans 1950, p. 123).
Tit-for-tat (section 3.2) has a retaliatory element implemented in its strategy. When tit-for-tat is
the sucker in a given round, it will defect in the next round. This is however no punishment in a
pure sense of the word: it only prevents the opponent to continue exploiting one’s good will by
withdrawing cooperation, not directly altering the payoffs of the other player through some form
of retribution. Cooperation which is enforced through punishment differs from cooperation which
is enforced through reciprocity because it works in bigger groups (Boyd and Richerson 1992, p.
185).
What follows is a discussion of a number of solutions to the problem of social order that are based
on punishment. In decentralized punishment regimes, the punishment is imposed autonomously by
any individual. In centralized punishment regimes, the enforcement of punishment is transferred
to a central authority. Usually, this authority is the state.
3.5.1 Decentralized punishment
Vengeance
When punishment is imposed by an individual who did suffer directly by the action of another
individual, we speak of second party punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004, 64). Vengeance is
one example for second party punishment and comprises a threat to inflict harm when one gets
hurt. This can be modelled the following way: players can inflict harm at personal cost to other
players. The incurred cost on the opponent player is (v), with marginal cost between 0 and 1 (c).
When a player receives the payoff of a sucker, inflicting harm on the defecting player generates
a utility bonus (table 11). Vengeance can be introduced to the prisoner’s dilemma and changes
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the payoffs of the players (Friedman and Singh 2001, pp. 3-4). In the prisoner’s dilemma from
table 4, when v > 3∗ c, mutual cooperation becomes a Nash equilibrium: “Thus the threat of
vengeance can deter defection and support fully cooperative, socially efficient behavior (C,C) as a
Nash equilibrium.” (Friedman and Singh 2001, p.5).
Table 11: The prisoner’s dilemma from table 4 with vengeance.
Player 2:
Cooperation
Player 2:
Defection
Player 1:
Cooperation
4; 4 0-v; 7- vc
Player 1:
Defection
7- vc ; 0-v 3; 3
The incurred cost of vengeance for the opponent is v, with marginal costs, c, between 0 and 1
(adapted from Friedman and Singh 2001, p.4)
Third party punishment
When punishment is imposed by an individual who did not suffer directly by the action of another
individual, we speak of third-party punishment. Third-party punishment applies to a much larger
set of norm violations than second party punishment, because often, when a norm violation occurs,
nobody is hurt directly. Furthermore, when the violation of a norm by an individual concerns a
whole group, the damage resulting from the norm violation might be negligible to a particular
member of the group (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004, p. 64). In the infinitely IPD, I have elabourated
that no pure strategy can be evolutionary stable and support cooperation (section 3.2). However,
this fact is only true as long as dyadic strategies are taken into consideration. In a group of 10
players playing the infinitely IPD, when player 1 uses a strategy that only considers the actions
of one particular other player, player 2 for example, his strategy is dyadic. Tit-for-tat and Pavlov
(section 3.2) are dyadic strategies. If player 1 uses instead a strategy that considers the actions of
more than one other player, his strategy is social (Bendor and Swistak 2001, p. 1512). When social
strategies are considered, (at least) one pure strategy exists, which is evolutionary stable and which
can support a cooperative equilibrium in a population playing the infinitely IPD. This strategy is
called conformity (CNF). CNF starts each round of the infinitely IPD by classifying all other
players either as friends or foes. In the first round of the game, all other players are friends. Then
all players who cooperate with friends or defect against foes in a given round become friends in the
next round. The players who cooperate with foes or defect against friends in a given round become
foes in the next round. CNF always cooperates with friends and defects against foes (Bendor and
Swistak, 2001, pp. 1514-1516). The fact that CNF can support a stable cooperative state within
a population playing the infinitely IPD highlights the importance of norm enforcement through
third-party punishment for cooperation within groups (Bendor and Swistak 2001, p. 1533).
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Ostracism
In section 3.4, I explained that groups had to resort to some kind of coercive mechanisms in
order to ensure that the members of the group succeed in providing a public good. Rousseau, for
example, argued that when a state is erected, all people that live in the territory of the state, but
failed or were not willing to contribute to it, had to leave the territory of the state (Rousseau 1966
[1762], p. 96; Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 148). This most basic form of punishment is known as
ostracism and is a common and harsh form of punishment in humans (Mahdi 1986, pp. 147-148;
Hirschleifer and Rasmusen 1989, pp. 103-105). When an opportunity for ostracism is introduced
within a group of players playing the IPD, cooperation can result as an equilibrium strategy even
in the finitely IPD (Hirschleifer and Rasmusen 1989, pp. 93-97).
Second-order free riding
Usually, groups resort to less extreme forms of punishment than ostracism to ensure that their
members contribute to the public good. For example, each member of a group could sanction
defecting members of the group by reducing their payoff at personal costs (Fehr and Gächter
2000, p. 980). This form of punishment is called diffused, because it is done in an uncoordinated
way by any member of the group. By doing so, they reduce the payoff of the defecting player,
but have to dedicate a part of their own payoff to account for the costs of punishment. Since
punishment is costly to the punisher, players are always better off if they do not punish. Rational
players are therefore not expected to punish (Fehr and Gächter 2000, pp. 982-983). A group
which builds a sanctioning system to enforce a norm requiring cooperation, provides a public
good (section 3.4) to its members: all members of the group are better off with the sanctioning
system than without, independently of whether they contributed to it or not. This is known as the
second-order free-rider problem (Heckathorn 1989, pp. 79-80). On the other hand, an opportunity
to punish defecting members can support full cooperation in the provision of a public good (Fehr
and Gächter 2000, p. 987).
Altruistic punishment
The second-order free-rider problem can be solved by assuming that enough members of the group
have a predisposition for altruistic punishment: they do punish norm deviation, even if this pu-
nishment does not yield any material benefit for the punishers, but is costly (Fehr and Gächter
2002, p. 137). Altruistic punishment can be the result of a strong emotional reaction to free ri-
ding: the negative emotions among cooperators caused by free-riders trigger punishment (Fehr
and Gächter 2002, p. 139), which in turn leads to a rewarding feeling (de Quervain et al. 2004,
pp. 1256-1257). Because second-order free-riders (those who do not punish non-cooperators, but
cooperate in the main activity) are better off than punishers who also cooperate in the main acti-
vity, a third-order, where non-punishers are punished, can be introduced to stabilize punishment.
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This, however, also introduces a third-order free-rider problem:
“Do people really punish people who fail to punish other non-punishers, and do
people punish people who fail to punish people, who fail to punish non-punishers of
defectors and so on, ad infnitum? Although the infinite recursion is cogent, it seems
like a mathematical trick.” (Henrich and Boyd 2001, p. 80, italics as in the original).
However, when there are punishers in a group and punishment is sufficiently costly to decrease
the payoffs for defectors below the payoffs for cooperators, defections will only occur on very
rare occasions. In this case, the payoffs of second-order free-riders and punishers will not differ
substantially. Occasions in which a second-order free-rider needs to be punished are even less li-
keyl and the difference between punishers and non-punishers will decrease the more we ascend to
higher-order punishing. Eventually, at some stage this difference becomes 0. From this stage on,
punishment can transmit back and stabilize cooperation at the first order (Henrich and Boyd 2001,
p. 81). As long as members of a group stabilized at a cooperative equilibrium have higher payoffs
than members of a group stabilized at a non-cooperative equilibrium (this is the case as long as the
costs of punishment and cooperation are smaller than the benefits of cooperation), individuals from
non-cooperative groups might start to imitate individuals from cooperative groups. In this way,
a group beneficial behaviour from one group can be transmitted to other groups through cultural
group selection. Once the cooperative equilibrium has become widespread among human socie-
ties, natural selection could further stabilize this cooperative equilibrium by favouring genes that
initiate punishment and cooperation. Such individuals would have a higher fitness than individuals
without those genes, because they would not suffer from punishment (Henrich and Boyd 2001, pp.
86-87). Due to such co-evolutionary processes, a predisposition for altruistic punishment could
indeed find its way into the human genome. It is noteworthy that such co-evolutionary processes
could be relevant in the evolution of any types of strategies discussed in this chapter and are not
restricted to altruistic punishment.
We have seen in this section that the diffuse threat of punishment by any individual can enforce
cooperation in social dilemma situations. This is a surprising finding. All classical scholars high-
lighted the need for a centralized punishment authority (chapter 2). In Hobbes, the reason for the
failure of social order in the state of nature was the fact that no trust could emerge in a state of
anarchy, where everyone had the right to make use of violence. Interestingly, a game-theoretical
analysis reveals the opposite insight: "In a world not quite Hobbesian, a threat of all against all
might, ironically, help overcome distrust." (Hardin 1971, p. 479).
3.5.2 Centralized punishment
While diffused altruistic third-party punishment (section 3.5.1) and decentralized punishment in
general is certainly an important aspect for the working of societies, humans also tend to rely on
centralized institutions for punishment. These institutions reflect the Leviathan as suggested by
Hobbes (section 2.1.2) and depend on the erection of a monopoly of violence in society. Although
some societies manage to enforce social order without centralized institutions for punishment,
those societies are characterized by low levels of differentiation and complexity. Complex and
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highly differentiated societies always rely on centralized institutions for punishment. As sugge-
sted by Hobbes (section 2.1), those institutions are the foundation for erecting any complex and
differentiated society. They induce people to restrain and control themselves, guaranteeing that
everyone plays according to the rules (Elias 1997 [1939], pp. 326-336).
“But in civill estate, where there is a Power set up to constrain those that would
otherwise violate their faith, that feare is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he
which by the Covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do." (Hobbes, 2012 [1651],
p. 96)
Under the auspices of the Leviathan, the prisoner’s dilemma (section 3.2.1) is defused, because
defection becomes too costly and is no option any more. When punishment occurs in a coordinated
manner, second-order free-riding (section 3.5.1) is not relevant (Boyd et al. 2010, p. 620). This
is especially the case when there is only one punisher in a given society (Boyd and Richerson
1992, p. 183). Because central institutions are more prone to overcome coordination failures and
second-order free-riding problems, they are more efficient in punishing than decentralized forms
of punishment (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011, p. 11023).
3.6 Conclusion: theoretical foundation
In this chapter, I showed how the problem of social order and solutions suggested in Hobbes,
Rousseau and Smith can be reformulated in order to allow for a game-theoretical analysis. This
approach, however, strongly simplifies the underlying structure and the philosophical arguments
of the scholars. More specifically, it is assumed that humans are rational and intelligent utility
maximizers that are confronted with the options of either cooperating or defecting in a specific
situation. Then, the option which guarantees the maximal expected utility is chosen. The problem
of social order analysed in game theory is a problem of rational cooperation. The assumptions
made are those of rationality. The game-theoretical analysis of the problem of social order, as
discussed in orthodox game theory, is therefore a formalization of the problem of social order from
Smith’s perspective. In most situations, the diverging self-interests of individuals are balanced
by an invisible hand, leading to equilibrium states that are characterized as being optimal and
self-enforced. This means that no other outcome would be better, and that no individual has an
incentive to deviate unilaterally from the state of equilibrium. In some situations, however, the self-
interests of individuals lead to outcomes that are not optimal. These situations are characterized
as social dilemmas and are the game-theoretical equivalent to the political-philosophical problem
of social order.
At first glance, this representation of the problem of social order seems not to fit well with the
political-philosophical problem of social order introduced by Hobbes and adapted by Rousseau.
Both scholars did not agree with the doctrine of the balance of diverging interests. From their
point of view, diverging interests would ultimately lead to violent conflicts among the parties
involved, with the winner being the most powerful party. The problem of social order is therefore
not limited to a narrow set of situations where the rationality of individuals fails in generating the
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optimal outcome, but lies at the heart of society. Their solutions to the problem of social order
therefore centre around the elimination of the divergence in individual interests. In Hobbes, the
solution is an absolute ruler, in Rousseau, a collectivistic regime.
At second glance, the structure underlying most, if not all, political conflicts can be described
with a game theoretical social-dilemma. This allows to make clear predictions about the expected
outcome if the actors involved behave in a rational way as expected. This approach furthermore
allows to put the assumptions of rationality to an empirical test and to make predictions about
different mechanisms that should allow to overcome the social dilemma. The game-theoretical
analysis of social dilemma is therefore a fruitful approach to the scientific analysis of the problem
of social order. While opting for a dogmatic approach close to Smith, it nevertheless gives up a
vast amount of assumptions and dogmatic arguments found in the works of the classical scholars
and sticks to a limited set of assumptions and parameters that can be quantified and put to an
empirical test in the context of a scientific study. Finally, accepting certain limitations, the concepts
of Hobbes and Rousseau can nevertheless be incorporated to some extent in a game-theoretical
framework.
In the next chapter, I will focus on one specific social dilemma known as the tragedy of the com-
mons. The tragedy of the commons has been highly influential and convinced many people that
humans will eventually over-exploit all resources they are depending on, leading to their collapse.
I will give a detailed overview of global and historical patterns of natural resource use, discuss the
extent to which natural resource use is a social dilemma and apply concepts of Hobbes, Rousseau
and Smith, as well as the game theoretical tools introduced in this chapter to discuss mechanisms
suggested to reach sustainability in natural resource use and fairness in natural resource allocation.
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Chapter 4
Natural resource use: a problem of
social order
Natural resources lay the material foundation of any society. First, like all other organisms, humans
rely on natural resources for their survival. Second, human societies rely on natural resources for
their growth and development. Since most natural resources are limited, natural resource-led
development however risks ending in tragedy, because once key resources become overexploited,
society will collapse. Such collapses have occurred frequently in human history and are the result
of a social dilemma: individuals following their rational self-interest overexploit the resources
they rely on and as a result dig their own grave.
In the first two sections, I describe the historical and global patterns of natural resource use. I
briefly discuss the specific pattern observed in the different historical era of natural resource use
and draw conclusions on the factors determining whether an overexploitation of natural resources
will lead to a societal collapse or not. Humans not only rely on minerals and fuels for their survival,
but also on wild plants, wild animals, as well as ecosystem services. I evaluate and discuss the
importance of wildlife and ecosystem services for humans and difficulties arising when evaluating
their economic values. In the third section, I discuss the tragedy of the commons, the social
dilemma used to model the overexploitation of a natural resource held in common, as well as its
relevance for contemporary society.
Although the tragedy of the commons has convinced numerous people that humans will eventually
destroy the material basis they rely on, it is obvious that a sustainable natural resource use is
possible. While a collapse of society, the most serious threat to social order, may happen due
to the overexploitation of a key resource, different mechanisms have been suggested to achieve
sustainability in natural resource use. Social order is not only threatened by the overexploitation
of natural resources, but also by the unfair allocation of natural resources. Here again, a number
of mechanisms have been suggested to favour the fair allocation of natural resources. In the fourth
section, I discuss different mechanisms from the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith that are
supposed to support the sustainability of natural resource use, as well as the fair allocation of
natural resources. Based on these mechanisms, I deduce hypotheses which lay the theoretical
foundation for my two empirical studies in chapters 7 and 8.
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4.1 Natural resources and human societies
Natural resources are a key factor for the development and the wealth of societies. In this section, I
first briefly discuss the concept of natural-resource-based economic development. Then, I present
a summary of the patterns of global and historic natural resource use, as well as factors determining
whether a society will collapse due to the over-exploitation of natural resources or not. I conclude
this section by discussing the relationship between natural resource use and population growth.
4.1.1 Natural-resource-based economic development
Natural resources are all raw materials provided by the earth and used by humans. Typically,
the term encompasses sunlight, wind, water, soils, minerals, fuels, animals and plants. Natural
resources are either available in form of exhaustible stocks (as is the case for minerals), or in a
continually renewable manner (as is the case for animals) (Glavic and Lukman 2007, p. 1876).
All living beings rely on the exploitation of natural resources for their survival. The fertility of
individuals is furthermore a function of the controllability, richness and predictability of important
natural resources. Of course, these general facts apply to humans as well (Low and Heinen 1993,
pp. 9-10).
However, natural resources also strongly influence human societies, as they lay their material
foundation and enable economic growth and development. Following Schumpeter, any good is
basically made up of natural resources (land), labour or a combination of both. Land and labour
are thus the two original productive factors (2012 [1911], pp. 17-19). Economic growth and
development then result as a change in the way how land and labour are combined. Changes
in the combination of labour and land can occur, for example, when a society gains access to a
new source of raw materials (Schumpeter 2012 [1911], p. 66). This aspect of economic develop-
ment, natural-resource-based economic development, has been one of the driving forces of human
history (Barbier 2005; Barbier 2011). From the perspective of natural-resource-based economic
development, the human history can roughly be divided in five key historical periods (Barbier
2005, pp. 106-107).
4.1.2 The era of hunting and gathering
The first historical period of natural-resource-based economic development, the era of hunting
and gathering, lasted from the emergence of humans (around 7 million years ago) to about 8500
BC. During this period, all humans survived exclusively by gathering wild plants and hunting
wild animals (Barbier 2005, p. 107). Human population size was low, with an estimated 500,000
people living on earth in 40,000 BC. This figure increased to about 6 million humans in 10,000
BC (figure 1), corresponding to an average population growth of 0.008% per year. During the era
of hunting and gathering, population size and growth was very low and the overexploitation of
natural resources was no threat to society. Only very little is definitely known for this period of
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time, but it seems that the impact of humans on natural resources was very limited. This changed
however during the agricultural transition phase.
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Figure 1: Historical development of population size at continental and global level.
The figure is based on a table from Barbier (2005, p. 109). Western offshoots include the USA,
Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
4.1.3 The agricultural transition phase
The second historical period of natural-resource-based economic development, the agricultural
transition phase, was determined by the most important economic development in human history.
During this period, which lasted around 8600 years, from 8500 BC to 100 AD, humans funda-
mentally changed their lifestyle: after completing the agricultural transition, they mainly relied
on domesticated animals and grown plants for their survival. This fundamental economic change
took several millenia to spread across the whole world, with all regions of the world making similar
agricultural transitions. The human population grew to 230 million individuals, corresponding to
an average population growth of 0.037% per year (Barbier 2005, pp. 107-108, figure 1). The agri-
cultural transition also resulted in the creation of the first towns, and in a core-periphery economic
system, where an urbanized, industrial and dominant core traded manufactured goods for primary
products and raw materials from less-developed and less-dominant periphery regions. This core-
periphery economic system has persisted to this day (Barbier 2005, p. 111). The beginning of
the agricultural transition phase goes along with the extinction of the megafauna. The megafauna
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encompasses all large animals weighing more than 44 kg. With few exceptions, most of the me-
gafauna had disappeared from earth until 10,000 years ago (Barnosky et al. 2004, p. 70; Koch
and Barnosky 2006, p. 216). Although the exact reasons of this extinction are not entirely clear,
scholars agree that humans played a decisive role (Alroy 2001; Barnosky et al. 2004; Surovell
et al. 2005; Koch and Barnosky 2006). It is even possible that the extinction of the megafauna was
triggered by the agricultural transition (Smith 1975). In any case, the extinction of the megafauna,
which was a key resource to hunters and gatherers, did not result in a collapse of the human socie-
ties at that time, but was instead followed by a further development of the economic system. This
was however only possible because the basic agricultural techniques were already well known at
that time (Barbier 2005, p. 113). The extinction of the megafauna, which occurred during the agri-
cultural transition phase, is an example for a massive overexploitation of a key natural resource.
The only reason why this overexploitation did not end in a societal collapse was that humans were
able to resort to other ways of subsistence.
4.1.4 The era of Malthusian stagnation
The third historical period of natural-resource-based economic development, “the era of Malthu-
sian stagnation” (Barbier 2005, p. 113), was characterized by low population- and low economic
growth. In this 900-years period (from 100 AD to 1000 AD), the world population grew on average
by 0.01% per year and the GDP per capita stayed more or less constant. The world population had
reached about 270 million people in the year 1000 (Barbier 2005, pp. 114-115, figures 1 and 2).
Although important technological innovations were made during the Malthusian stagnation phase,
strongly improving the efficiency of agricultural economies, these only led to small increases in
population growth. Malthusian resource-based economic systems are characterized by two con-
ditions: first, at least one factor of production is fixed and essential; second, an increase in real
income leads to an increase in population growth, dissipating the initial income gain. As a conse-
quence, Malthusian economic systems lead to constant populations and per capita incomes. Under
favourable conditions, increases in the efficiency of the production simply result in increased pro-
duction outputs and population levels, not substantially altering the per capita income. Under
unfavourable conditions, the increased population- and production levels, triggered through incre-
ases in productive efficiency, are not sustained by the resource base. A cycle of resource depletion
and population decline follows the initial increase in population and production (Barbier 2005, pp.
115-116). Boom and bust cycles, characterized by initial population growth, resource depletion
and population ultimately declining, are relevant for all economic systems relying on renewable
resources. Such cycles can create violent conflicts over the relevant resource and have frequently
been observed in human history (Brander and Taylor 1998, pp. 134-135).
The boom and bust cycles described above can be observed when societies overexploit natural re-
sources. These patterns have been recurrent from the emergence of the first city states in 3000 BC
to the rise of the world economy in 1000 AD. Only important trade activities, which emerged later
on, allowed societies to decouple the local population from the local stock of natural resources.
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Figure 2: Historical development of GDP per capita at continental and global level.
The figure is based on a table from Barbier (2005, p. 114). Western offshoots include the USA,
Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
4.1.5 The emergence of the world economy
The fourth historical period of natural-resource-based economic development, “the emergence
of the world economy (from 1000 to 1500)” (Barbier 2005, p. 117) was characterized by the
emergence and the expansion of international trade between regions and countries and marked
the beginning of the world economy. This development put an end to the period of Malthusian
stagnation, significantly increasing average annual population growth and GDP per capita. During
this period of time, the world population increased at an annual average rate of 0.1%, reaching
438 million in 1500 and the GDP per capita grew from 436$ to 566$ per person (figures 1 and
2). International trade altered the Malthusian equilibrium between per capita income and popula-
tion growth by allowing economies to gain access to their essential production factors from other
regions of the world. This made population growth beyond the regional resource base possible.
China and the Islamic world became the dominant economic world regions between around 1000
and 1500 (the North). While they controlled the leading manufacturing industries, the other re-
gions of the world, mainly Russia, Western Europe and Africa (the South), provided them with
the necessary raw materials. Although the dominant regions have changed over time, with Europe
and the other Western nations increasingly becoming the dominant region (the North) after 1500,
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the world economy can generally be well described with a North-South model of unequal deve-
lopment, where one region specializes in providing the raw natural resources and the other region
specializes in manufacturing (Barbier 2005, pp. 117-123; Krugman 1979).
Although natural resource use continuously increased during the era of the emergence of the world
economy, the societies at that time were able to avoid collapses by importing the necessary natural
resources.
4.1.6 The great frontier and the rise of Western Europe
The fifth historical period of natural-resource-based economic development, “The Great Frontier
and the Rise of Western Europe (from 1500 to 1913)” (Barbier 2005, p. 124), was characterized by
the industrialization and the rise of Western Europe as the economically dominant world region,
the colonization of America and the use of coal as a cheap source of energy. Finding and exploiting
new untouched sources of natural resources, after having depleted the existing ones, became the
basis for economic development during and following this era (Barbier 2005, pp. 123-125). World
population size increased to 1.8 billion and the GDP per capita to 1525$ per person (figures 1 and
2).
In the following period, from 1913 to the present days, economic development and growth is still
determined to an important extent by the use of natural resources and is building upon the prin-
ciples of core and periphery-, world- and frontier economics. Population- and economic growth
rates remain at globally- and historically high levels. I would like to point out the following insig-
hts gained from the brief summary of global and historic patterns of natural resource use. First,
natural resources have continuously been exploited during human history. Second, they have been
overexploited at repeated occasions, with the severe consequence of a societal collapse. Third,
some societies have managed to avoid such societal collapses although having overexploited key
natural resources: they were either able to find a local substitute to the key natural resource, or
they were able to import the key natural resource through trade activites.
4.1.7 Global historic patterns of population and economic growth, as well as natu-
ral resource use
The brief overview of natural resource use patterns revealed that natural resources have always
been a key to societal development. Overall, there clearly is a relationship between GDP per
capita- and population growth. Both are relatively low (between 0 and 2.7) and strongly correlate
(figure 3). GDP per capita growth is an economic process that generates new productive activities,
allowing more individual consumption. GDP per capita growth cannot increase due to population
growth. Population growth, on the other hand, is strongly influenced by GDP per capita-, as well
as GDP growth. Low growth rates can have substantial effects when maintained over long periods
of time: cumulated annual average growth rates of 0.8% between 1700 and 2012 led to an increase
of the worlds population size by a factor of 10 (Piketty 2013, pp. 126-129).
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Figure 3: Historical development of average annual GDP per capita- and population growth rates.
The figure is based on own calculations and a table from Barbier (2005, p. 110). Western offshoots
include the USA, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
The use of natural resources continually increased over time (figure 4; Hylander and Meili 2003,
p. 17; Mudd 2007, p. 46; Mudd 2010, p. 12; Höök 2010, p. 34; Mudd 2012, p. 3; Yellishetty et al.
2011, p. 81; 4). This is, as discussed above, due to a demographic- as well an economic trend. New
raw materials are of crucial importance for the development of new technologies and economic
activities (for example Cobalt, rare earths and Lithium play a key role; figure 5). The industry is
therefore constantly looking for new sources of raw materials and recent, futuristically-sounding
projects involve the use of plants to gather rare earths, the mining of the deep sea (Federal Ministry
of Education and Research 2017) or space (Futurezone 2018). It is important to keep in mind that
only very few economic activities are really independent from natural resource use. Even the
modern economic sectors of “green technologies” or artificial intelligence, which are considered
to be either clean or entirely immaterial, rely on a substantial input of natural resources.
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Figure 4: Global historical production trends for coal and oil.
Coal (grey line) and oil (black line) production (million tons/year) from 1800 to 2010 (Höök 2010,
p. 34).
Figure 5: Global historical production trends for raw earths and Lithium.
Left) Rare earths production (gigagram/year) from 1950 to 2007, by producer (Du and Graedel
2011, p. 4096). Right) Lithium production (kilotons/year) from 1900 to 2000, by producer (Mohr
et al. 2012, p. 67).
The historical growth in population size and economic activity shaped the landscape of planet
earth, leading to the conversion of undisturbed ecosystems to cropland, pasture, or urban areas
(figure 6). While these three categories made up 0 % of the global land surface in the year 10,000
BC (Goldewijk et al. 2010, p. 75, Goldewijk et al. 2011, p. 571), cropland accounted for 10.6%,
pasture for 24.3% and urban areas for less than 0.5% of the global land surface in the year 2000
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(Goldewijk et al. 2010, p. 75, Goldewijk et al. 2011, p. 571). As will be discussed later in
this chapter, the conversion of undisturbed ecosystem into productive or residential areas has a
negative effect on the earth’s biodiversity and ecosystem services, which, on the other hand, lay
the foundation for human well-being.
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Figure 6: Global historical trends of human-induced land use change.
Top left) Global cropland surface (million square km) from year 0 to 2000 (red line is the linear
trend) (Goldewijk et al. 2011, p. 82). Top right) Global pasture surface (million square km) from
year 0 to 2000 (red line is the linear trend) (Goldewijk et al. 2011, p. 82). Bottom) Urban area
(square km) from 10,000 BC to 2000 AD (the figure is based on a table from Goldewijk et al.
(2010, p. 571))
4.2 Wildlife as a natural resource
Wildlife has been the most important natural resource for the survival of the human species since
its emergence. During most of its time on earth, the human species survived exclusively by ex-
ploiting wild animals and plants (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 1, Barbier 2005, p.
107). Wildlife encompasses all species of wild animals and plants that reproduce without human
intervention and whose habitat can regenerate without human intervention (Prescott-Allen and
Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 2). The contribution of wildlife to the human economy has a physical
as well as a psychological component. The physical component includes the provision of raw
materials, biological diversity and services. The psychological component includes the provision
68
4.2. WILDLIFE AS A NATURAL RESOURCE
of recreational , scientific, cultural or religious use. The extent to which these different contribu-
tions can be economically quantified differs strongly. While the economic value of raw materials
can be easily assessed by taking into account market prices, this approach becomes more difficult
with a decreasing material component of the contribution and the availability of market prices
(Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, pp. 4-5).
It is very difficult to reliably quantify the economic value of wildlife. However, contrary to what
most people would think, wildlife is still an important natural resource, even for people in indus-
trialized countries. In this section, I first give a detailed summary of the results of a study with
a detailed estimate of the economic value of wildlife for the United States from 1976 to 1980.
Then, I focus on two key products, timber and fish, to describe the global historical pattern of
the exploitation of wildlife. Finally, I explain how a more general view on ecosystems can help
understanding the value of nature for the well-being and the economic wealth of human societies.
4.2.1 Quantifying the economic value of wildlife
Wildlife plays an important role for human economy. This is not only the case for the fraction of
the global human population still living as hunters and gatherers (Marlowe 2005, p. 56), but holds
also for modern industrialized economies. Between 1976 and 1980, the value of wildlife used by
the US-economy amounted to 30 billion US$: “$1 of every $22 generated in the United States
is attributable to wildlife–91 cents of that dollar comes from wild harvested resources, 7 cents
comes from wild-supported agriculture, and 2 cents from wildlife-based recreation.” (Prescott-
Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 409). It is important to highlight that this figure also includes
imported wildlife products. In their extensive analysis, the different quantifiable contributions
of the wildlife to the US economy are classified into 9 distinct categories (Prescott-Allen and
Prescott-Allen 1986). The most important category, logging (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen
1986, p. 410), is an economic activity mainly conducted to obtain pulp, fuel, timber, turpentine,
terpenes and rosin. In 1972, the US produced 11.81 billion cubic feet of timber worth 6.4 billion
US$. The authors estimated that 96% of this timber came from wild trees (Prescott-Allen and
Prescott-Allen 1986, pp. 9-11). Fishing was the second most important wildlife-based industry in
the US (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 410). Between 1976 and 1980, an average of
26.7 million tons of wild fish were taken annually by commercial landings in the US. This catch
was worth 1.8 billion US$. About half of this catch was used for the food industry and the rest
for other industrial purposes (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, pp. 49-50). After logging
and fishing, trapping and collecting is the third economic activity specialized in harvesting wild
species. This activity yields a variety of products ranging from ornamental items to pets. The
annual average value of skins and furs harvested in the US was 122 million US$ for the period
1976-1980. In the same period, the US imported ornamental and pet species with an annual
average value of about 346 million US$ (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, pp. 67-68).
The contribution of wildlife for food and industrial products is closely related to its harvesting.
Between 1976 and 1980, the United States imported and produced food and industrial products
from wildlife with an average annual value of 229 million US$. The most valuable domestic
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products were pecans (121.5 million US$), blueberries (48.8 million US$), maple syrup (13.6
million US$) and wild rice (4.2 million US$ (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, pp. 149-
150). The third most valuable contribution of wildlife to the US economy was made in form
of domestication and crop improvement (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 410). This
activity amounted to annual average values of 168.6 million US$ for new crops, 178.7 million
US$ for new livestock, 182.1 million US$ for new aquaculture species and 706.6 million US$
for new domesticated timber trees in the time period of 1976-1980 (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-
Allen 1986, p. 274). The fourth most important contribution of wildlife to the US economy was
made in form of recreational use (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 410). In 1980, the
53.9 million US Americans who fished on a regular basis spent 17.3 billion US$ on recreational
fishing and the 19.4 million US Americans who hunted on a regular basis spent 8.5 billion US$
on recreational hunting. A total of 94.6 million US Americans spent 6.6 billion US$ on non-
consumptive wildlife use. The economic value of harvested wild animals is not considered when
calculating the value generated through recreational hunting and -fishing. Only the expenses for
travelling and equipment are taken into consideration (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986,
pp. 363-364). Non-consumptive wildlife use includes activities such as feeding-, observing- and
photographing wildlife or visiting parks and natural areas (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986,
p. 382). The contribution of wildlife to the medical sector of the US is difficult to estimate.
First of all, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between plant-derived ingredients of wild- or
domesticated plants (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 100). Secondly, market prices for
important medicinal wild plants are difficult to access (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986,
p. 122). Nevertheless, wildlife plays an important role for modern medicine: about 1.5% of
the 15,871 active ingredients listed in the Canadian Drug Identification Code of 1981, and 3.7%
of the drugs considered as essential by the World Health Organization in 1979 originated from
wild plants (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 103 and Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen
1986, p. 141). An important contribution of wildlife to the medical sector of the US also came
in form of animals for medical research: in 1977, 34,000 nonhuman primates and 60,795 other
wild animals were used in health-related activities (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p.
144 and Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 148). Finally, wildlife contributed to the US
economy by delivering pollination and pest control services. The mean annual value of crops
imported or grown by the US whose production or propagation depended on wild pollinators was
1.34 billion US$ for the time period of 1976-1980 (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p.
356). Pests control based on wildlife furthermore allows farmers to cut their pesticide use and
make substantial savings (Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen 1986, p. 362).
This section aimed at giving a brief but extensive overview of the value of wildlife for modern
economies. The study presented here reveals that wildlife accounts for approximatly 5% of the
GDP of the most important industrialized nation. Of course, the current state of affairs might have
changed, since the period of time considered by Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1986) dates
already back 40 years, but I am not aware of a more recent similarly comprehensive investigation
of the macroeconomic value of wildlife for industrialized economies.
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4.2.2 Global historic pattern of wildlife use
The short summary of the contribution of wildlife to the US economy for the period of 1976-1980
has shown that wildlife plays an important economic role, even for industrialized societies. This
summary also revealed that wildlife affects a variety of aspects of the US economy. A look at
the historical development of the global output of the logging- and the fishing industry shows that
the exploitation of these two key wildlife resources clearly increased during the last centuries and
decades (figure 7).
Figure 7: Global historical production trends of the fishing and logging industry.
Left) Logging. Wood production (Petragram Carbon ^-1/year) from 1700 to 2000 (Hurtt et al.
2006, p. 1212). Right) Fishing. Catch of fish (million tonnes/year) from 1950 to 2006 (Watson
et al. 2013, p. 498).
4.2.3 Ecosystem services
The valuation of wildlife is a complex matter. However, by focusing solely on the economic value
of wildlife, ecological, social and cultural aspects are neglected (Pascual et al. 2017, p. 10). But
even the economic value of wildlife is made up of different components, that are in part mutually
exclusive. This is due to the fact that wildlife contributes to the human economy in two diffe-
rent ways. When wildlife is harvested or exploited as a resource, its value can be estimated by
considering the market value of the output generated through this economic activity. When the
same wildlife is left untouched, it contributes to the services of the ecosystem of which it is an
integral part. However, there are no market values for ecosystem services (TEEB for Business
Coalition/Trucost 2013, p. 14). In Schumpeters terminology (2012 [1911], pp. 17-19), ecosystem
services are economic goods provided by the land without requiring any labour. The services pro-
vided by the ecosystems can be classified as provisioning-, regulating-, supporting-, or cultural
services. Key ecosystem services encompass for example the purification and the regulation of
the flow of water, the regulation of air quality, the removal of pollutants from the atmosphere or
the provision of conditions for growing food (TEEB 2018). When exploiting wildlife, ecosystem
services may become disturbed or even destroyed at the same time. Only considering the market
value of the output generated through the exploitation of wildlife, without considering its effect
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on the targeted ecosystem services, leads to biased economic valuations of economic activities ex-
ploiting wildlife: the exploitation of wildlife is a valuable economic activity only when the value
of the output generated through its exploitation exceeds the induced losses in ecosystem servi-
ces. This can be expressed with an impact ratio as follows: “Direct environmental cost per unit
of revenue” (TEEB for Business Coalition/Trucost 2013, p. 8). Let us consider some examples
from 2009. Cattle ranching and farming in South America generated a total of 16.6 billion US$ in
revenues and destroyed ecosystem services worth 312.1 billion US$, leading to an impact ratio of
18.7. In Northern America, the same activity generated a total of 22.9 billion US$ and destroyed
ecosystem services worth 31.7 billion US$, leading to an impact ration of 1.4. Accordingly, cattle
ranching and farming was a more valuable economic activity in Northern America than in South
America. In none of the regions, did benefits however exceed costs. Soy bean farming in South
America, on the other hand, had an impact ratio of 0.9 and was therefore economically valuable
(TEEB for Business Coalition/Trucost 2013, p. 57). Following this approach, the authors estima-
ted that the global processing and production of the regional sectors considered in their analysis
destroyed ecosystems worth 7.3 trillion US$ in 2009. This analysis only included ecosystem ser-
vices related to water consumption, land use, air pollution, land and water pollution, greenhouse
gas emissions as well as waste (TEEB for Business Coalition/Trucost 2013, p. 8).
I showed in this section that nature plays a vital role for the well-being of humans. On the one
hand, wildlife is a natural resource that can be exploited by humans for their private consumption.
On the other hand, ecosystems provide services, such as clean air and water, that are essential for
the survival of humans. Although it can be argued that the importance of nature for the survival
of humans decreases with the economic development of societies, it is still a fact that the role of
nature for human well-being is essential at any stage of economic development.
4.3 Resource depletion as a social dilemma
Although natural resources play an undoubtedly essential role for human societies (sections 4.1
and 4.2), humans have repeatedly overexploited key natural resources. Prominent examples are
the deforestation of the Easter Island (Brander and Taylor 1998) or the desiccation of the Aral sea
(Micklin 2007). Societies that overexploit their natural resources risk to collapse. Such collapses
have occurred numerous times in the history of human societies (Brander and Taylor 1998; Dia-
mond 2005; Barbier 2011). In this section I first describe the uniquely high natural resource use
of contemporary human societies and discuss threats to human well-being that are occurring due
to this heavy use of natural resources. In the second part of this section, I discuss the tragedy of
the commons, its structure and assumption, and the use of this social dilemma as a model for the
overexploitation of natural resources by humans.
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4.3.1 Contemporary natural resources use
The situation of contemporary societies is unique from a historical perspective. World population
size and economic production are at record heights, and actual trends indicate that both will keep
growing in the near future (section 4.1). Continuous growth at high levels of population size and
economic activity has led scholars to question the sustainability of this growth: “How may the
expanding global population and material economy interact with and adapt to the earth’s limited
carrying capacity over the coming decades?” (Meadows et al. 2004, p. 137, italics as in the
original). The authors of “Limits to Growth: The 30 Year Update”, concluded that contemporary
societies would collapse if they continued to grow as in the past decades (Meadows et al. 2004,
pp. 167-179). The question of the earths carrying capacity has however been subject to debates,
with other scholars arguing that the carrying capacity is not rigid and as strongly determined by
economic and social considerations, individual and collective choices, as by natural limits (Cohen
1995, p. 343, Seidl and Tisdell 1999, pp. 403-404). While the debates about natural limits to
human population growth and a collapse of contemporary societies are highly speculative, there
seems to be a consent among scholars that, overall, key natural resources are becoming scarce:
“That world oil production is set to pass a peak is now a reasonably accepted concept, although its
date is far from consensual.” (de Almeida and Silva 2009, p. 1267). Peak oil describes the point
in time when supply in conventional oil will begin to decrease. This will have a tremendous effect
on economic output because of the key role oil plays for contemporary economies: oil serves as a
feedstock and fuel in industry and transportation (Murphy and Hall 2011, p. 52). Some estimates
suggest that a decline in world oil supply by 1% would directly translate into a 1% decline in
GDP per capita (Hirsch 2008, p. 888). Besides peak oil, there is also peak minerals. The fact that
a resource becomes rare, after having been exploited during an extended period of time, usually
implies that easily accessible, high quality parts of the resource have already been harvested. This
has two consequences. First, more effort is needed in order to obtain the same amount of the
resource. Second, the quality of the harvested resource decreases (Prior et al. 2012, p. 578). Over
the last decades, this pattern has been observed for oil, key minerals and fish (Prior et al. 2012, pp.
579-580; Watson et al. 2013, p. 498; Saellh et al. 2015, p. 433; Court and Fizaine 2017, p. 152).
The continued growth in human population and economic activities has a strong impact on the
ecosystems of the world. The irrigated area, for example, increased from 63 million hectares in
1900 to 306 million hectares in 2005 (Siebert et al. 2015, p. 1530). The increased use of freshwa-
ter not only altered the natural flow of rivers, but also led to an increased pollution of freshwater
resources: the main sources of pollution are agriculture, mining, hazardous waste, urban waste-
water as well as natural-, geogenic- and biogenic contaminants (Schwarzenbach et al. 2010, p.
114). As a result, most freshwater sources are polluted to some extent: in Germany, only 6.7% of
all 8995 evaluated rivers were classified as in good or very good ecological shape by the German
ministry for environment (Bundesministerium fuer Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit
2018, p. 3). The pollution is however not restricted to rivers: since the middle of the 20th cen-
tury, pollution led to the emergence of more than 500 coastal sites with oxygen concentrations
low enough to negatively affect the abundance and distribution of animal populations in the sea
(Breitburg et al. 2018, p. 1). The oceans are furthermore also contaminated with plastic: a study
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in 2014 estimated that an amount of plastic weighting more than 250,000 tons was floating on the
water surface. This plastic, eaten by birds and fish enters the food chain with unknown conse-
quences for the human population (Cressey 2016, pp. 264-265). Overall, 60% of the plastic ever
produced is accumulating in landfills or in the environment (Geyer et al. 2017, p. 3). Pollution is
a direct threat to humans: about 16% of all deaths worldwide are related to the pollution of the
environment (Landrigan et al. 2017, p. 1). The terrestrial areas also have been exposed to human
pressure. 9.6% of the remaining wilderness areas have been lost in the two decades from 1990 to
2010 due to human activities. As a consequence, three of the 14 terrestrial biomes do not have
any significant wilderness anymore (Watson et al. 2016, pp. 1-2). During the period from 2000
to 2012, forest cover has decreased by 2.3 million square km. Setting off the forest cover gain
reached due to plantations, this translates into a loss of 16% of global forest cover during these 12
years. 32% of the forest cover loss occurred in tropical forests (Hansen et al. 2013, p. 850).
A mass-extinction of species has occurred during the last 500 years (Barnosky et al. 2011, p.
54). The pressure put on ecosystems by humans is certainly one driver of this mass-extinction
(Barnosky et al. 2011, p. 56). International trade has been one of the driving factors behind the
pressure put on ecosystems: the demand of developed countries for commodities in developing
countries can be linked to about 30% of global species threats (Lenzen et al. 2012, p. 109). Habitat
loss is however not the only reason for species decline. Let us consider the case of the Bornean
orangutans. Between 1999 and 2015 about 148,500 Bornean orangutans were lost (Voigt et al.
2018, p. 763). While deforestation as well as industrial paper pulp- and palm plantations account
for a major proportion of these losses, orangutan populations also declined in intact habitats. This
suggests that the direct killing of orangutans for food, pet trade or other reasons is another driver
of the orangutan population decline (Voigt et al. 2018, p. 766). The illegal and legal trade in wild
species products is worth about 342 billion US$ annually and another driver of species extinction
(Ratchford et al. 2013, pp. 8-10). With most indices (8 out of 10) for the state of biodiversity
declining for the last four decades (Butchart et al. 2010, p. 1165), the decline in populations
of wild species is a global issue, which is not restricted to exotic species such as the Bornean
orangutan. In Germany, aerial insect biomass measured in mid-summer declined by 81.6% over a
27 year period beginning in 1986 (Hallmann et al. 2017, p. 10). Over a similar period of time, the
population of European farmland birds showed a decline of 55% (EBCC 2017).
4.3.2 The tragedy of the commons
With rising population and -economic activities on the one hand, declining resources, -ecosystem
services and -wildlife on the other hand, humans seem to be entering an age of ecological scarcity
(Barbier 2011, p. 6). Ecological scarcity, however, has already been experienced several times
in the past (Brander and Taylor 1998; Diamond 2005; Barbier 2011). But how is it possible, that
humans repeatedly destroy the resources they rely on? Would this not mount to collective suicide?
Obviously, this cannot be a conscious, intended choice.
It turns out that the exploitation of resources by humans is a social dilemma under given circum-
stances. This dilemma, known as the tragedy of the commons, was first elabourated by William
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Forster Lloyd (1794-1852) and became famous after Hardin published his article "The tragedy of
the commons" in 1968. Making use of the example of herdsmen using a pasture to feed their cattle,
the tragedy of the commons describes the social dilemma underlying the exploitation of a resource
held in common by multiple rational appropriators. As in the case of public goods (section 3.4),
all individuals of a group have access to a common good (although it is theoretically feasible to
exclude some from the common good). However, in the case of the common good, the consump-
tion of the good is subject to rivalries (Kollock 1998, pp. 190-191) (table 2). The tragedy of the
commons tells us that, in the long run, rational herdsmen will overgraze their pasture and lose
their livelihood. This follows from the rationality of the herdsmen, the cost and benefit structure
underlying their business and the fact that the pasture is open to all: while a herdsman receives the
whole benefit of his additional animal on the pasture, the costs which occur to the pasture due to
this additional animal are shared among all herdsmen. The private benefit of an additional animal
on the pasture exceeds the private cost. As all herdsmen face the same situation, they will keep
adding animals on the pasture until it is completely overgrazed:
"Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." (Hardin 1968, p. 1244)
Underlying the situation described by Hardin, we find the same structure as in the prisoner’s
dilemma (table 3). Both herdsmen could keep a collectively efficient amount of animals grazing
on the pasture and have a long term benefit from the resource. However, as both herdsmen strive
for the maximum payoff, they end up with the worst outcome possible (table 12). The social
dilemma in tragedy of the common situations involves two components: first, the resource is
overused without concerns for the others; second, necessary investments needed to maintain and
improve the resource are not made (Ostrom et al. 1999, p. 279). In fact, situations where humans
exploit natural resources vary substantially and can be characterized as tragedy of the commons
situations only if several conditions are met: first, the resource must be a common good; second,
there must be multiple appropriators exploiting the common good; third, the strategies used by the
appropriators to exploit the common good have to result in a suboptimal outcome from the point of
view of the appropriators; finally, there must be at least one alternative set of strategies to exploit
the common good which is advantageous to all appropriators (Gardner et al. 1990, pp. 336-337).
Table 12: Payoff matrix of the tragedy of the commons (Faysse 2005, p. 253).
Herdsman 2:
Collectively
efficient choice
Herdsman 2:
Collectively not
efficient choice
Herdsman 1:
Collectively
efficient choice
5, 5 3, 6
Herdsman 1:
Collectively not
efficient choice
6, 3 1, 1
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The tragedy of the commons has been a highly influential theoretical model. Not only did it
strongly shape our view of the way humans exploit resources (Feeny et al. 1990, p. 2; Ostrom et al.
1999, p. 278; Stavins 2011, pp. 88-89). It was also extended to model situations involving the
exploitation of resources held in commons by non-human organisms: it seems that all organisms
exploiting a common resource face a trade-off between maximizing individual fitness and reducing
the whole groups’ fitness (Rankin et al. 2007, pp. 644-645; MacLean 2008, pp. 233-234; Gersani
et al. 2001, p. 661). Furthermore, the tragedy of the commons is also applied to phenomena
that are not directly related to the exploitation of resources, as for example antibiotic resistance
in humans (Cully 2014, pp. 16-17; Hollis and Maybarduk 2015, p. 33), the peer review crisis
(Hochberg et al. 2009, p. 2; Fox and Petchey 2010, p. 325), tax regimes of developing countries
(Berkowitz and Li 2000, pp. 370-371), the online phishing industry (Herley and Florenico 2008,
p. 59), the bitcoin mining industry (Heilman 2014), or the asbestos litigation process (McGovern
2002, pp. 1721-1723).
Although Hardin’s tragedy of the commons has convinced many from the fact that humans will ul-
timately destroy the resources they depend on, humans have been exploiting natural resources for
thousands of years, in some cases in sustainable ways. The key for succeeding to overcome the tra-
gedy of the commons lays in building institutions for governing and managing the common-pool
resource. This is mainly done by restricting the access to the resource and by creating incentives to
invest in the resource rather than overexploiting it (Ostrom et al. 1999, pp. 278-279). According
to Ostrom, this involves, among others, matching the rules governing the common good to the
conditions and needs of the local population, defining clear group boundaries, ensuring participa-
tion of those affected by the rules, making sure that the rights of affected community members are
respected by outside authorities, developing a system where community members monitor other
members’ behaviour, sanctioning rule violators, providing means for dispute resolution, and buil-
ding responsibility for the governance of the common good on the entire system (Ostrom 1990,
pp. 178-181).
All measures suggested to solve the tragedy of the commons are attributable to one of the three
main institutional solutions. These involve a change from an open access to a state property, a
communal property or a private property regime (Feeny et al. 1990, p, 1). While Hardin focused
on the state property- and the private property regimes as the only solutions to overcome the tra-
gedy of the commons (1968, p. 1245), ample evidence suggests that also the communal property
regime is successful in overcoming the tragedy of the commons (Feeny et al. 1990, p, 10). These
three main institutional solutions directly follow from Hobbes (section 2.1), Rousseau (section
2.2) and Smith (section 2.3). Advocates of the state property regime are worried about the limited
natural resources and assume that the contemporary economic system will ultimately destroy the
livelihood of humans. As a result, they ask for a strong Leviathan that keeps voracious selfish hu-
mans under control and thereby rescues humanity (Nonnenmacher 1989, pp. 269-272). Advocates
of the communal property regime are, similarly to advocates of the state property regime, also con-
cerned with the limited natural resources and also assume that the contemporary economic system
will ultimately destroy their livelihood and bring an end to humanity. However, contrary to advo-
cates of the state property regime, they do not believe in a strong Leviathan. Instead, they focus on
the solidarity and normative integration of individuals within small communities (Nonnenmacher
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1989, pp. 282-287). Finally, advocates of the private property regime do not necessarily believe in
natural limits. They highlight that the limits are more institutional than natural and that the optimal
solution is to break those institutional barriers in order to unleash the forces of the free market:
only by applying the price mechanism to scarce natural resources can these really be preserved
(Nonnenmacher 1989, pp. 275-277).
4.4 Means to overcome the tragedy of the commons
Although natural resources are essential for the survival of humans and the development of human
societies, they are often not exploited in a sustainable way. If a key natural resource becomes
overexploited, social order collapses because humans need to fight for survival. Struggles and
conflicts erupt for the key natural resource that has become scarce, leading to violent outbreaks.
However, even when natural resources are not overexploited, their allocation can still threaten
social order. This is the case when the allocation of a key natural resource is conceived as unfair.
In this section, I will deduce hypotheses based on mechanisms suggested by Hobbes, Rousseau
and Smith to achieve a sustainable natural resource use, as well as a fair allocation of natural
resources.
Drivers of sustainable natural resource use
As discussed in the prior section (section 4.3), the use of natural resources is a social dilemma
that occurs when a natural resource is held in common. As discussed in section 3.1.6, a resource
held in common is characterized by the fact that the resource is openly accessible. This means
that everybody is allowed to use the resource. At the same time, the consumption of units of the
resource by individuals is competitive: if one individual consumes a unit of the resource, nobody
else can consume the same unit. This specific constellation leads to a situation where rational
actors will increase their extraction of the resource until it is entirely depleted. The main three
solutions suggested to overcome this social dilemma are based on a restriction of the access to the
resource and are closely linked to the different political philosophies of Hobbes, Rousseau and
Smith (chapter 2).
Following Hobbes (section 2.1), as long as the resource is open access, selfish and voracious in-
dividuals will overexploit it, until it becomes depleted. This outcome can only be avoided by a
Leviathan regulating its use under a state property regime. As a consequence, we would expect
the state property regime to be the only solution for a sustainable use of natural resources. Fol-
lowing Rousseau (section 2.2), state regulations only have a lasting influence on the behaviour of
individuals if the laws of the state coincide with the moral norms of the population. This condition
is more likely to be met in small communities, than in a large state. Therefore, the communal pro-
perty regime should be the best solution to guarantee for a sustainable natural resource use. Adam
Smith, on the other hand, focused on the effect of a private property regime on the exploitation of
natural resources:
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“As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords,
like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even
for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the
natural fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only
the trouble of gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed
upon them. He must then pay for the licence to gather them; and must give up to the
landlord a portion of what his labour either collects or produces.”(Smith, 1993 [1776],
p. 219)
According to this view, the overexploitation of a natural resource held in common results from
the fact that the price mechanism is disabled. In a private property regime, if a resource becomes
scarce, its price increases, leading to a lower demand and to lower extraction rates. It follows
from these considerations that the private property regime should allow for a sustainable natural
resource use.
In addition to the type of property regime, there are at least two more important factors for a
sustainable natural resource use that can be deduced from the works of Rousseau and Smith.
Rousseau strongly argued for the necessity to govern with the help of moral rules (section 2.2).
As a reminder, Binmore qualified Rousseaus project concerning the moral education of people as
“brainwashing” (1994, p. 135). It follows that the most effective measure for a sustainable use of
natural resources is a moral norm that regulates the demand and/or the offer for the natural resource
in question. Smith, on the other hand, promotes an economic development of human societies with
the goal to maximize the wealth and the freedom of humans, thereby enforcing the natural rights
of humans (section 2.3). He argues that the means for this development are the division of labour-
and the market. By maximizing the extent of the market, the wealth of societies and the freedom of
individuals is maximized at the same time. We have seen that increased wealth comes along with
an increased exploitation of natural resources (section 4.1). As a consequence, we would expect
the exploitation of natural resources to increase as the market extends. Consequently, sustainable
natural resource use should decrease with an extending market. This reasoning clearly corresponds
to what Smith has in mind:
“A particular country [...] may frequently not have capital sufficient both to improve
and cultivate all its lands, to manufacture and prepare their whole rude produce for
immediate use and consumption, and to transport the surplus part either of the rude
or manufactured produce to those distant markets where it can be exchanged for so-
mething for which there is a demand at home.” (Smith, 1993 [1776], p. 219)
All hypotheses related to the sustainable use of natural resources are summarized in table 13.
Drivers of fair natural resource allocation
Social order is not only threatened when a resources becomes overexploited, but also when its
allocation is perceived as unfair. This follows from the inequity aversion and the unique sense of
fairness of humans. Fairness is one of the most important moral norms for social order, because
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conflicts might erupt due to allocations that are too far from the fairness norm (Falk et al. 2003;
Brosnan and deWaal 2014). Central parts of the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith focus on
the allocation of resources among individuals of a society (chapter 2). We can therefore apply
the works of the three scholars to deduce hypotheses about factors favouring a fair allocation of
natural resources.
According to Hobbes (chapter 2.1), the necessary condition for humans to agree to a fair alloca-
tion of natural resources is the pressure from an external coercive political authority that has opted
for a fair allocation. Without this condition, no fair allocation is possible. In his work, Rousseau
highlights the importance of moral norms for social order (section 2.2). He argues that such moral
norms would only be strong and relevant in homogeneous societies, without interest groups or
other subgroups negatively affecting the moral integrity of a society. Consequently, the fairness of
natural resource allocations should increase with the homogeneity of a society and decrease with
the inequality of a society. Unlike Rousseau, Smith argues that moral norms are a by-product of
daily interactions (section 2.3). They can therefore not be manipulated and used as governing tool.
According to Smith, fairness is the central moral norm responsible for the functioning of human
societies, because it keeps destructive human egoism under control. He assumes that human po-
pulations gradually build a sense of fairness with the continuous extension of the market economy
in their society. It follows that the fairness of an allocation of natural resources within a society
should increase with its integration within a market economy. Smith furthermore convincingly
argues that humans are constantly looking for means to obtain a favourable judgment by others
(section 2.3). This is one of the main motives of human behaviour. As a result, the fairness of na-
tural resource allocations should increase to the degree that the behaviour of individuals involved
in the allocation of the resource is observed or known by others. All hypotheses related to the fair
allocation of natural resources are summarized in table 13.
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Table 13: Hypotheses.
Scholar Problem of
social order
Prediction
Hobbes Natural
resource use
Leviathan: Sustainable natural
resource use can only be
implemented in a state property
regime
Rousseau Natural
resource use
General will: Sustainable
natural resource use is best
implemented in a communal
property regime
Smith Natural
resource use
Invisible hand: Sustainable
natural resource use is best
implemented in a private
property regime
Rousseau Natural
resource use
General will: The sustainability
of natural resource use increases
with the salience of a moral rule
regulating its offer or demand
Smith Natural
resource use
Invisible hand: Natural resource
use increases with the extent of
the market
Hobbes Natural
resource
allocation
Leviathan: The fair allocation of
natural resources is only
possible under the auspice of a
coercive authority opting for
such an allocation
Rousseau Natural
resource
allocation
General will: The fairness of the
allocation of a natural resource
decreases with increasing
income inequality of a society
Rousseau Natural
resource
allocation
General will: The fairness of the
allocation of a natural resource
increases with the ethnic
homogeneity of a society
Smith Natural
resource
allocation
Invisible hand: The fairness of
the allocation of a natural
resource increases with the
extent of the market integration
of a society
Smith Natural
resource
allocation
Invisible hand: The fairness of
the allocation of a natural
resource increases with the
transparency of the behavir of
individuals responsible for the
allocation of the resource
The different hypotheses tested in my observational and experimental studies (chapters 7 and 8)
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4.5 Conclusion: natural resource use
In this chapter, I discussed the relevance of natural resources for humans and human societies in
general. Not only do humans rely on natural resources for their survival and reproduction. Also,
the economic development of human societies and human population growth depend on the supply
of natural resources. While these facts are generally known, humans tend to exploit key natural
resources at unsustainable rates, putting their own existence at risk. Although this behaviour may
seem paradoxical at first glance, it is the expected outcome in a situation involving rational actors
that exploit a natural resource held in common. The exploitation of a natural resource held in
common therefore meets the criteria of a social dilemma, which can be described with the game-
theoretical model of the tragedy of the commons. The tragedy of the commons is furthermore not
only related to the failure of rational cooperation, but also a serious political philosophical problem
of social order. After a key natural resource has become overexploited and scarce, conflicts over
the scarce natural resource are to be expected. Those conflicts can lead to violence and even,
in the worst case, to the collapse of society. Conflicts based on natural resources can however
also erupt due to other reasons than a social dilemma. Most importantly, allocations of natural
resources that are not perceived as fair may be subject to intense debates and even the cause of
violent conflicts. Sustainability in the use and fairness in the allocation of natural resources are
therefore two important aspects of social order.
Finding ways to promote the sustainable use and the fair allocation of natural resources is therefore
important from a scientific, a philosophical, as well as a political point of view. The three classical
scholars Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith devoted important parts of their work to the problem of
social order and suggested different mechanisms to achieve social order. In a first step, I applied
mechanisms suggested by the three scholars to the tragedy of the commons, deducing general
theoretical hypotheses related to drivers of sustainable natural resource use. In a second step, I
applied mechanisms suggested by the three scholars to the fairness of natural resource allocation
and deduced general theoretical hypotheses related to drivers of fair natural resource allocation.
My empirical work is based on these general theoretical predictions.
While philosophy and theory provide us with a framework to explain, interpret and analyse phe-
nomena in the world, they cannot generate true knowledge on the causal mechanisms at work.
This is only possible by confronting theoretical predictions with empirical observations. In the
next chapter 5, I discuss the concept of causality and the tools available for causal inference. After
having elaborated the most promising approach to causal inference, I describe the field work I
conducted in Guinea to gather my empirical data in chapter 6. Based on this data, I conducted
two scientific studies (chapters 7 and 8) in which I applied the general hypotheses developed in
this chapter concerning the study of specific situations of natural resource use and natural resource
allocation. This approach allowed to test the predictive value of central ideas of Hobbes, Rousseau
and Smith in contexts that were not directly considered by the scholars.
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Methodical foundation
In chapters 2 and 3, I have discussed different philosophical and theoretical concepts related to the
problem of social order. Based on these two chapters, I focused in chapter 4 on the problem of
social order occuring when humans exploit natural resources and discussed mechanisms allowing
to avoid the problem of social order when exploiting natural resources. My theoretical hypotheses
are based on these mechanisms.
The different philosophical and theoretical concepts discussed so far have been highly influential.
However, even the most influential and popular philosophy or theory is of little scientific value as
long as it is not supported by empirical observations and its predictions prove wrong. It follows that
scientists not only need to think about theoretical mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest
and formulate related hypotheses, they furthermore also need to make observations and gather
empirical data to confront their theories and ideas with reality.
In this chapter, I elabourate the concepts and the analytical tools used to confront theoretical hypot-
heses with empirical observations in order to draw conclusion about causal mechanisms at work
in the world. In the first section, I discuss the contemporary approach to a science of human na-
ture. This comparative approach explicitely requires to gather data from different cultural groups
to be able to make scientific investigations into human nature. In this respect, the contemporary
approach to a science of human nature is similar to the way how the classical scholars proceeded
in their works. The second section deals with the concept of causality. Based on the the highly in-
fluential work of Hume’s “Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding”, I briefly discuss different
concepts of causality before giving a more thorough description of the counterfactual approach
to causality. This approach is of fundamental importance for science in general, because it is the
theoretical basis for experimental research. While a concept of causality is certainly of fundamen-
tal importance for a scientific investigation, it is not sufficient for causal inference. We also need
criteria to decide on the usefulness of our theories in explaining the patterns observed in the world.
These criteria are provided by the epistemological position of falsificationism. Furthermore, we
also need tools to investigate the causal mechanisms responsible for the patterns underlying our
observations. These tools are provided by statistics. In the third section, I describe different tools
of statistical inference by focusing on a frequentist approach. In the fourth section, I use simulated
data to evaluate the performance of the different tools of statistical inference described in the third
section. I close the chapter by discussing the methodical requirements for my own empirical work,
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which are based on the methodical insights presented in this chapter.
5.1 A science of human nature
Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith used a comparative approach to reflect about the human nature. They
compared savages (native people from non-European continents) with civilized people (Europeans
at their time) and found qualitative differences between them. They reasoned about these diffe-
rences and claimed that they were induced by social institutions. Hobbes focused on the means of
power. He claimed that people living without a central government, in the state of nature, were in
a constant state of war and insecurity. This state of war was to be found in most savage societies:
“It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of
warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there
are many places, where they live so now. For the savage people in many places of
America, except the government of small Families, the concord whereof dependeth
on naturall lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in that brutish manner,
as I said before.” (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 89, italics as in the original).
The only way out of this state of war was the erection of a totalitarian central government, as found
in the European monarchies (section 2.1). Rousseau focused on the social inequalities between
people. He argued that savages were more self-sufficient than civilized people, and their societies
were therefore also less inequal than civilized societies: “Telle est, en effet, la véritable cause de
toutes ces différences : le sauvage vit en lui-même; l’homme sociable, toujours hors de lui, ne
sait vivre que dans l’opinion des autres; et c’est, pour ainsi dire, de leur seul jugement qu’il tire
le sentiment de sa propre existence.” (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 144). According to Rousseau,
the main difference between savages and civilized people was the degree of independence. While
savages were nearly independent, civilized people depended on each other, relying on their private
property and the division of labour (section 2.2). Smith focused on the wealth of societies. He
claimed that civilized people were much more wealthy than savages: “[...] and yet it may be true,
perhaps, that the accommodation of an European prince does not always so much exceed that of an
industrious and frugal peasant, as the accomodation of the latter exceeds that of many an African
king, the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages.” (Smith 1993
[1776], p. 20). The reason for this difference was to be found in the division of labour and the
resulting market economy (section 2.3).
The ideas of these three scholars have been highly influential until today (section 4.3.2). From a
contemporary scientific perspective, however, the comparative work of the three classical scholars
lack a sound empirical basis, as well as appropriate analytical and statistical tools. Their know-
ledge of the savage societies was mainly based upon anecdotic evidence of travellers, merchants
and Jesuits (Smith 1896 [1763], p. 14; Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 35-36). They used this ane-
cdotic knowledge and combined it with their personal knowledge of their own societies to draw
conclusions about the human nature by pure reasoning:
“Voilà précisément le degré òu étaient parvenus la plupart des peuples sauvages qui
83
CHAPTER 5. METHODICAL FOUNDATION
nous sont connus; et c’est faute d’avoir suffisamment distingué les idées, et remarqué
combien ces peuples étaient déjà loin du premier état de nature, que plusieurs se sont
hâtés de conclure que l’homme est naturellement cruel, et qu’il a besoin de police
pour l’adoucir [...]” (Rousseau 1977 [1754], p. 116).
Contemporary scientific knowledge on human nature, on the other hand, is based on empirical
evidence from experimental studies. Statistical tools are then used to draw conclusions from those
studies. Most of these studies are, however, based on samples collected from undergraduate stu-
dents from Western universities. Such samples are known as WEIRD (Western, Educated, In-
dustrialized, Rich, Democratic). The scientists then claim that their results can be generalized to
humans in general (Henrich et al. 2010a, p. 63). This approach has been heavily criticized as it
does not take account of variations in humans cross cultures (Henrich et al. 2010a, p. 82). Cultu-
ral variation in humans is however substantial, even in fields that have generally been considered
psychological universals (Henrich et al. 2010a, p. 61). For example, the susceptibility to the
Müller-Lyer illusion (Figure 8) varies significantly across human cultures. While Western under-
graduate students are the most susceptible to the illusion, the San foragers are not at all susceptible
to the illusion. Western undergraduates differ significantly from all other studied cultural groups
in their susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion (Henrich et al. 2010a, p. 64).
Figure 8: The Müller-Lyer illusion (Copied from Henrich et al. 2010a, p. 64).
Lines “a” and “b” have the same length.
Significant differences between western undergraduates and other cultural groups were also found
in social motivation, folkbiological reasoning, spatial cognition systems, self-concepts, motivation
to conform, as well as moral reasoning (Henrich et al. 2010a, pp. 66-73). Important cultural dif-
ferences also occur in child-rearing practices (Segall et al. 1999, pp. 63-72), as well as in gender
identity, and relations between the sexes (Segall et al. 1999, pp. 228-246). Considering the fact
that WEIRD samples are outliers within a more global sample of human cultural groups on such
substantial dimensions, our understanding of the human species in general should not be based
solely on this one population sample (Henrich et al. 2010, p. 82). It has, furthermore, also been
shown that the differences between multiple populations of the same cultural group can be as
important as between single populations of different cultural groups (Lamba and Mace 2011, p.
14427). This is due to the fact that human behaviour is shaped by the socio-political, as well as
the ecological context (Segall et al. 1999, p. 26). Both dimensions can vary strongly within the
same cultural group, leading to such differences. A science of human nature should, therefore,
combine the whole battery of modern scientific methods and analytical tools with a comparative
approach, including samples of diverse cultural groups (Henrich et al. 2010a, p. 82). By follo-
wing this approach, i.e. including multiple populations from each cultural group into the sample
(Lamba and Mace 2011, p. 14429; Oosterbeek et al. 2004, p. 184) and thoroughly controlling for
variations in the socio-political and the ecological context of the sampled populations (Lamba and
Mace 2011, p. 14429), one can hope to detect human traits which are truly universal. It follows
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that generalizations on the human nature can only seriously be made if the sample data used for
the generalization includes observations of a large number of diverse individuals from different
cultural groups who show a substantial variation in their social structure and environment and do
not belong to the WEIRD category.
5.2 The fundamental problem of causal inference
Although causal inference is essential for scientific knowledge, there is disagreement on the mea-
ning of causality. This is due to the fact that causal inference is no trivial matter. The problem of
causal inference concerns the following issue: “It is a question of justifying the belief that a causal
sequence of events which has been observed in the past will be observed in the future.” (Us-
henko 1942, p. 132). This question has been subject to much debate and reasoning from countless
scholars. One of the most prominent was David Hume (1711-1776). His work ”An Enquiry Con-
cerning Human Understanding” was highly influential for the research on causal inference (Popper
1935, p. 7; Ushenko 1942, p. 132; Lewis 1973, p. 556; Kant 1983, p. 59; Holland 1986, p. 950).
In this section, I first summarize Hume’s enquiry. Then, I discuss how contemporary conceptions
of causality can be linked to Hume’s work and the issues the different conceptions are struggling
with. I conclude this section with a short discussion of falsificationism, a key epistemological
position that is directly linked to statistical hypotheses testing and inference.
5.2.1 Hume’s enquiry concerning human understanding
Hume starts his reasoning on the problem of causal inference by distinguishing thoughts and ideas
from impressions. They have in common to be products of the mind. However, the thoughts and
ideas are less lifely than the impressions thatt result from our sensual perception of the world.
And although we are free to have any ideas and thoughts, ideas and thoughts are always linked
to the perceptions we have made: “[...] all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of
our impressions or more lively ones.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 16). Thoughts or ideas can then
be combined and connected in the mind by applying the principles of resemblance, contiguity, as
well as causation to those (Hume 2007 [1748], pp. 19-22).
All objects of human reasoning are either relations of ideas (algebra, arithmetic, geometry) or
matter of facts. While the certainty of the relation of ideas can be discovered by operations of the
thought, the truth of matter of facts can never be ascertained in the same way. Matter of facts and
relation of ideas differ not only in their logical structure: beyond the records of our memory and
the testimony of our senses, all reasoning concerning matter of facts is based on the relation of
cause and effect (Hume 2007 [1748], pp. 28-29). This relation is defined the following way:
“Similar objects are always conjoined with similar. Of this we have experience.
Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, follo-
wed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects
similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the
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second never had existed. The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a
customary transition, to the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We
may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another definition of cause, and call
it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought
to that other.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 70)
This definition highlights five important aspects of the relation of cause and effect, as described by
Hume: first, a relation of cause and effect between two objects can be discovered solely through
observation and experience (Hume 2007 [1748], pp. 30-32). In order to be able to postulate a
relation of cause and effect between two objects, one needs to have observed the first object, the
cause, to occur prior to the second object, the effect, in a multitude of times. Only after having
observed those objects occur conjoined frequently, do we start to assume a relation of cause and
effect between them (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 37).
Second, the relation between the cause and the effect is a relation which is built in our mind
through habits (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 43). The inference from the cause to the effect is neither
of logical nature (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 38), nor based on an understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the relation (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 34).
Third, what we can observe are sequences of objects. We can only see one object following another
object, but never do we observe qualities of objects binding the effect and the cause (Hume 2007
[1748], p. 58-63).
Fourth, the relation between the cause and the effect assumes therefore that the future will be like
the past in all important matters. Only when assuming a similarity of the past with the future, one
can use experiences from the past to predict the future. As long as there is the slightest suspicion
that the future will differ from the past, predictions based on experience become useless (Hume
2007 [1748], p. 38).
Fifth, it follows from these thoughts that our notion of cause and effect is based on a subjective
feeling reached through our interaction with the world:
“It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises
from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these
events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed
in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances,
different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except
only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the
appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist.
This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of
the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression
from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion.” (Hume 2007 [1748],
p. 69)
According to Hume, the justification for our assumption that sequences of events observed in the
past will also be observed in the future, is therefore mainly based on custom. Different contempo-
rary conceptions of causality can be linked to the definitions provided by Hume.
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5.2.2 The problem of induction
In his broad definition of causation (section 5.2.1), Hume highlights the importance of experience
to the fundamental problem of causality: ”We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form
another definition of cause, and call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance
always conveys the thought to that other.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 70). This part describes inductive
reasoning. By applying inductive reasoning, one infers general statements (hypotheses or theories)
from observations or experiments (Popper 1935, p. 1). This kind of reasoning not only occurs in
every-day life but is also very influential in empirical sciences: “It is thus the principle of induction,
rather than the law of causality, which is at the bottom of all inferences as to the existence of things
not immediately given.” (Russel 1915, p. 222). However, such inductive reasoning is problematic.
The conclusions drawn from inductive reasoning can always prove wrong: neither can their truth
be proven logically, nor is it possible to prove their truth empirically. A scientific system based on
inductive reasoning must therefore reveal mistakes and logical contradictions (Popper 1935, pp.
1-3).
The problem of induction is usually illustrated by discussing issues arising in enumerative in-
duction. The following example is from Russel (2012, p. 552). Let us assume we are interested
in the family names of people in a village. After having interviewed nearly all inhabitants of the
village and recorded that they all have the same name (Williams) our conclusion, based on enume-
rative induction, would be that all people of the village have the name Williams. This conclusion
is however misleading. There is no argument against the possibility that some people in the village
have another name. Another famous example has been provided by Popper (1935, p. 1). A person
that has only seen white swans during his lifetime might conclude, due to enumerative induction,
that all swans are white. However, there is again no argument against the possibility that swans
might have another colour. As we all know, this conclusion would indeed be wrong, as there also
does exist a species of black swans (Cygnus atratus).
5.2.3 Association
Another part of Hume’s definition of causation (section 5.2.1) relates to the notion of association:
“[...] we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar
to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 70). The fact
that two objects tend to occur subsequently does not mean that the occurrence of the first object
is responsible for the occurrence of the second object: “Correlation does not imply causation.”
(Holland 1986, p. 945). As already mentioned by Hume (section 5.2.1), by observing that two
objects tend to occur subsequently, one does not observe the underlying mechanisms binding
these two objects. Strictly speaking, after observing that one object frequently follows another
object, the best one can do is to estimate the conditional distribution of the second object, given
the first object (Holland 1986, p. 946). While this associational measure allows us to predict the
occurrence of the second object after the first object has occurred, it does not tell us anything about
the reason why the second object will occur following the first object.
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5.2.4 A counterfactual analysis of causation
In his definition on the relation of cause and effect (section 5.2.1), Hume already suggested an
alternative to inductive reasoning and association: “[...] if the first object had not been, the second
never had existed.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 70). This definition opens up a new approach to the
analysis of causation. It is the counterfactual approach, which is based on the notion that a cause
must make a difference and that this difference should not have happened if there had been no
cause (Lewis 1973, p. 557). Using the counterfactual approach, it is hoped to uncover the causal
dependency among events (Lewis 1973, p. 562). The counterfactual approach has been formalized
by Rubin (1974).
The Rubin causal model makes use of an experimental terminology to determine the conditions
necessary to be able to estimate a causal effect in a counterfactual framework. In the terminology
of the Rubin causal model, units of a study (subjects for example) are exposed either to an ex-
perimental treatment (E) or to a control treatment (C). If the assignment of the units to E or C is
making use of some randomization mechanism, all units have the same likelihood to be exposed
either to E or C and the study is an experiment. If this is not the case, the study is called an ob-
servational study. The goal of the study is to identify the typical causal effect of E, compared to C
on an outcome variable (Y) for some population of units. Every study consists of trials. In a trial,
a given unit is exposed to a given treatment (E or C) at a point in time (t1) and the value of the
outcome variable (Y) is measured at a following point of time (t2). No unit can be exposed simul-
taneously to E and C. If the unit was exposed to E at t1, its value for Y is y(E) at t2. Respectively,
if the unit was exposed to C at t1, its value for Y is y(C) at t2. Then, y(E) - y(C) is the causal effect
for a given trial (Rubin 1974, p. 689).
Unfortunately, it is impossible to measure y(E) as well as y(C) in any single trial. If a multitude
(2N) of trials are conducted in a study, the typical causal effect for the 2N trials is defined as the
average causal effect (r) over all trials in the study (equation 5.1). As in the case of a single trial,
it is impossible to measure y(E) as well as y(C) for any single j of 2N (Rubin 1974, p. 690).
r =
1
2N
2N
∑
j=1
[y j(E)− y j(C)] (5.1)
However, if half of the subjects of 2N were exposed to E, jεSE , and the other half to C , jεSC, the
difference between the mean observed Y for the units exposed to E and the mean observed Y for
the units exposed to C, y¯d, can be measured (equation 5.2).
y¯d =
1
N ∑jεSE
y j(E)− 1N ∑jεSC
y j(C) (5.2)
If all units react the same way to the stimuli, then the trials consist of perfectly matched pairs. In
this case, it can be shown that y¯d equals r. The causal effect of E compared to C for a given study
population can therefore be accurately estimated if the units exposed to the different trials of the
study are made up of perfectly matched pairs. Although this ideal is probably never met, if all
matched pairs of the study reached similar values in Y if they were not part of the study, y¯d should
be a good proxy for r (Rubin 1974, p. 692). This can be the case either for observational studies
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or for experiments. And even though it is more likely that experiments meet this assumption than
observational studies:
“[...] a skeptical observer could always eventually find some variable that syste-
matically differs in the E trials and C trials (e.g., length of longest hair on the child)
and claim that yd estimates the effect of this variable rather than r, the causal effect
of the E versus C treatment. Within the experiment there can be no refutation of this
claim; only a logical argument explaining that the variable cannot causally affect the
dependent variable or additional data outside the study can be used to counter it.”
(Rubin 1974, p. 693)
The statistical approach to the counterfactual analysis of causality The statistical approach
to the counterfactual analysis of causality focuses on the properties of well-designed randomized
experiments for the investigation of causal relations (Holland 1986, p. 945). According to this
approach the most important property of a well-designed randomized experiment is that the ex-
posure of the units of a study to either C or E is statistically independent from all other variables.
This is known as the independence assumption. If this assumption holds, y¯d is a good proxy for r.
According to the statistical approach, the key to the analysis of causality is randomization, since it
guarantees that the assumption of independence holds (Holland 1986, p. 948-949).
More technically, y¯d is an unbiased estimator of r if randomization is properly implemented in a
study. The meaning of unbiased in this context is however not entirely trivial. Given a randomiza-
tion set consisting of all possible allocations of N E trials and N C trials in 2N, if a randomization
mechanism is used to expose the units to E or C trials, all allocations of trials are equally likely.
For all possible allocation of trials from the randomization set, y¯d could be calculated. Then, the
average of all possible y¯d equals r. This property does however not tell us anything about the
actual y¯d we calculated. It could correspond to r, but it could also be off the mark (Rubin 1974,
p. 693-694). Randomization furthermore also allows to make probabilistic statements about y¯d.
By comparing a hypothesized average causal effect, r¯, with y¯d, one can make statements about the
likelihood to observe a given y¯d when expecting r¯. Typically, one would test how likely it is that
y¯d equals 0. When this likelihood becomes too small, one can either reject the hypothesis or admit
that y¯d is unusual (Rubin 1974, p. 694-695).
“The ability to make precise probabilistic statements about the observed y¯d under
various hypotheses without additional assumptions is a tremendous benefit of rando-
mization especially since y¯d tends to estimate r .” (Rubin 1974, p. 695)
If the 2N units exposed to E and C in a study are taken from a larger population, M, the aim of
the study usually consists in generalizing the results obtained in the study to M. Assuming that T
is the average causal effect of E versus C in M, we would like to deduce T from y¯d. This can be
done when two conditions hold. First, the 2N units in the study need to be a random sample from
M. This means that all units in M had the same likelihood to be selected for the study. Second,
a randomization mechanism needs to determine the exposure of the 2N units of the study to E or
C. If this is the case, for all possible items selected from M, y¯d is as an unbiased estimator of r.
Furthermore the average of all y¯d for all possible combinations of 2N units from M equals T : y¯d
is also an unbiased estimator of T (Rubin 1974, p. 697).
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The accuracy of y¯d as a measure of T can be increased by increasing the size of the random
sample, 2N, taken from M (Holland 1986, p. 949). Beside the independence assumption, two
other assumptions, the temporal stability assumption and the unit homogeneity assumption, can
be made in order to significantly simplify causal inference. The temporal stability assumption
states that y(C) does not depend on the time the unit was exposed to C. Furthermore, y(E) is not
affected by a prior exposure to C. When this assumption holds, one can simply expose one unit first
to C, then measure y(C) and afterwards expose the same unit to E and measure y(E). Then, y(E)
- y(C) can simply be measured on the same unit (Holland 1986, p. 948). The unit homogeneity
assumption states that y1(C) = y2(E) as well as y2(C) = y1(E). If this assumption holds, y(C) -
y(E) can be measured by exposing one unit to C and another unit to E (Holland 1986, p. 948).
The scientific approach to the counterfactual analysis of causality As already explained in
section 5.2.4, there can be no proof within a randomized experiment that randomization worked
and that the independence assumption (section 5.2.4) was met in the experiment:
"An investigator who refuses to consider any additional variables is in fact saying
that he does not care if y¯d is a bad estimate of the typical causal effect of the E versus
C treatment but instead is satisfied with mathematical properties (i.e., unbiasedness)
of the process by which he calculated it." (Rubin 1974, p. 695)
The scientific approach to the counterfactual analysis of causality therefore focuses on determining
and considering all sources that could potentially influence the outcome of interest.
According to this approach, the most important task is to build a theoretical model which explains
the outcome of interest. Such a model is the “all cause” model, where the outcome follows from a
deterministic function of inputs (equation 5.3).
y(s) = g(cs,x,us) (5.3)
In this model, us captures the unobservable, x and cs the observable factors at different levels in-
fluencing the outcome y(s). Those factors are then related to the outcome by a specific relation
g. The arguments to be included in this framework are selected according to theoretical conside-
rations. They should be derived from internally consistent theories and together form an abstract
comprehensive theoretical model of the subject of interest (Heckman 2005, pp. 26-28). If the fac-
tors in the all cause model can be varied independently, usually changing one factor while keeping
the others constant, the ceteris paribus assumption holds. Then, the causal effect in this model is
equal to the hypothetical effect of a change in the specific factor on y(s), if all other factors are
kept constant. However, if a treatment effect implies a change in several factors, the model also
allows to change all relevant factors while keeping the others constant. The counterfactuals simply
derive from these hypothesized changes in the model (Heckman 2005, pp. 28-29). By explicitly
taking into account all possible sources responsible for variation in the outcome of interest, y(s),
it is possible to analyse the causal effect of a given treatment without making the independence
assumption (section 5.2.4). Especially the inclusion of the unobservable factors in a theoretical
model allows to make causal inferences even when the independence assumption does not hold
(Heckman 2005, p. 31).
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5.2.5 Deductive reasoning and falsification
As inductive reasoning can never lead to certainty about matter of facts (section 5.2.2), Karl Pop-
per (1902-1994) proposes to use a logical deductive approach in order to generate scientific kno-
wledge. Using instruments of logic, first of all, it is necessary to deduce empirically testable and
potentially wrong conclusions from general theories. Then, those conclusions are tested regarding
their logical form, as well as their empirical power. Only if the conclusions prove to be logically
coherent and empirically sound, they pass the test and the theory is assumed to be reasonable. In
these cases, the hypotheses are supported. If the conclusions are shown to be either logically inco-
herent or empirically wrong, the theory is falsified and needs to be revised (Popper 1935, pp. 5-7).
By applying deductive reasoning on theories to empirically test conclusions derived from them,
the problem of induction is solved: while the truth of any conclusion derived from experience can
never be proven, the incorrectness of logically coherent conclusions derived from general theories
can be shown by comparing them with experiences made in the real world (Popper 1935, p. 14).
Falsificationism has been highly influential in empirical science, because it allows to combine a
deductive theoretical approach with an empirical approach, thereby generating robust cumulative
knowledge. More specifically, this epistemological position has found a complementary statistical
approach, known as frequentist statistics, providing a rigid, but powerful methodical approach to
causal inference. The statistical methods used to estimate a causal effect are discussed in the next
section.
5.3 The estimation of a causal effect
Statistical analysis is a fundamental aspect of empirical science, because the outcome of interest
may be the result of a mixture of different effects. This is true for observational-, as well as for
experimental studies. Beside the factor of interest, the treatment effect for example, other uncon-
sidered factors, but also noise and measurement errors may well influence the outcome of interest.
By applying the appropriate tools of statistical inference, scientists can isolate the treatment effect
from the other effects. When used appropriately, the standardized statistical tools should also al-
low different scientists analysing the same data to reach the same results (Mundry 2017, p. 157).
The different methods of statistical data analysis vary significantly in their complexity. While the
statistical methods used to estimate a treatment effect in the statistical approach are usually simple,
they can become very complex in the case of the scientific approach (Heckman 2005, pp.48- 49).
In this section, I first discuss the frequentist approach to statistical inference, which is closely
linked to Popper’s falsificationism. I illustrate its application based on the most important statis-
tical test, the t-test. Then, I describe the main types of regression models available for statistical
inference and give a brief overview on model selection and multimodel inference.
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5.3.1 Statistical hypthesis testing
The philosophical foundation for the use of statistical hypotheses testing is rooted in Popper’s
falsificationism (section 5.2.5). The technical foundations for statistical hypothesis testing were
laid by Ronald Fisher (1890-1962), Jerzy Neyman (1894-1981) and Egon Pearson (1895-1980) in
the 1930s. The three scholars suggested two distinct approaches to statistical hypotheses testing,
which showed similarities but also differed in important points: while Fisher focused on the con-
struction of a null hypothesis and the determination of a p-value for the statistical test following
on the data collection, Neyman and Pearson argued that the relevant p-value for the statistical test
should be determined in advance and an alternative hypothesis should be formulated in conjunction
with the formulation of the null hypothesis. Scientists today mostly follow a hybrid approach to
statistical hypothesis testing, combining elements from Fisher, as well as Neyman-Pearson. Most
commonly, such a hybrid approach to statistical hypothesis testing consists of the following four
steps: first, a statistical null hypothesis (H0) is formulated. Such a H0 usually postulates that there
is no relationship or difference between population parameters. Frequently an alternative hypothe-
ses (HA) is specified at the same time. HA postulates a specific relationship or difference between
populations and must then be true if H0 is false. Second, a significance level for the statistical
hypotheses test is chosen. Mostly, the conventional values of p < 0.05 for significant, p < 0.01
for very significant and p < 0.001 for highly significant are chosen. Those values determine the
level of Type I errors that are acceptable. The type I error occurs when a correct H0 is mistakenly
rejected. For a p value of 0.05 the occurrence of a type I error is exactly 5%. This means that,
given H0 is true, the long run probability to get the observed result by chance is 5%. Third, using
a random sample from a population of interest, the relevant data is collected to calculate the test
statistic. Fourth, the value of the test statistic is compared with the probability distribution of the
respective test statistic given a true H0. If the probability of obtaining the calculated value is smal-
ler than the specified significance level, one speaks of a significant result and concludes that H0 is
wrong. If the probability of obtaining the calculated value is equal to or greater than the specified
significance level, a non-significant result was obtained and leads to the conclusion that H0 must
be true (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 32-35).
In contrast to the Type I error, the Type II error occurs when an incorrect H0 is mistakenly accep-
ted. By determining a specific significance level (p value), a trade-off is always made between the
two types of errors: while increasing p values will lead to increased Type I error rates, decreasing
p values will lead to increased Type II error rates (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp.42-43). The two
sources of errors (Type I and type II errors) are always present in the context of statistical hypothe-
sis testing. However, when the same sample is used to test a number of hypotheses independently
of each other (this is known as multiple testing), they accumulate and can become very important.
Assuming a significance level of p < 0.05, the Type I error rate is a = 0.05. While this level of
significance leads to a mistakenly refused H0 with a probability of 5% for a single hypothesis test,
this decision error increases to 14% for three tests, 40% for 10 tests and reaches 90% for 40 tests.
The probability for at least one Type I error among a number of tests conducted independently of
each other on the same sample can be calculated with the equation 1− (1− a)c, where c is the
number of tests (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp.48-49).
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Depending on the data available, different statistical hypotheses tests can be implemented. While
parametric tests assume that the underlying data is distributed in a specific way, non-parametric
tests are less restrictive. Furthermore, there are specific tests depending on the scale, the sample
size, or the variance of the underlying data (Mundry 2017, pp. 158-160).
5.3.2 The t-distribution and the t-test
The t-distribution was first introduced by “Student” in 1908 and is closely related to the normal
distribution. While the normal distribution can be described with a mean, µ , and a standard
deviation, σ , the standard deviation of a given sample from a normally distributed population,
σ/
√
n, with a sample size of n, is not known and must be estimated from the sample with s/
√
n,
where s is the observed standard deviation from the sample. Because of the properties of normally
distributed population parameters, the t-distribution can be used to make inferences about µ when
σ/
√
n is not known. Parameters obtained from a sample can be converted to a t value. Then, it is
possible to determine the probability of obtaining the specific t value, given that the sample was
taken from a t-distributed population with a hypothesized parameter. The probability density of
the t-distribution is determined as shown in equation 5.4:
f (t) = const
(
1+
t2
d f
)− 12 (d f+1)
(5.4)
where const is defined as
A(d f +1)
A(d f )
√
2pid f
For large values of the degrees of freedom, d f , the t-distribution tends towards the standard normal
distribution. As can be seen in figure 9, the deviation of the t-distribution from the standard normal
distribution increases with decreasing values of d f (Bulmer 1979, pp. 132-134).
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Figure 9: Standard normal and t-distributions.
Using the equation t = (x¯− µ)/( s√n), where x¯ is the observed mean, it is possible to calculate
the probability that a given population parameter mean obtained from one sample is derived from
a normally distributed population with a hypothesized mean. In this way, hypothesis regarding
population parameter means can be tested. Let us consider an example: we want to know if the
mean result of a sample of 1000 pupils in a test differs significantly from 0. Our H0 postulates that
the mean test result of the pupil sample is 0. As the test result of pupils is normally distributed
and our sample is a random sample from the general pupil population, the one sample t-test can be
used to test this hypothesis. The mean test result in our sample of pupils is 65.036, with a standard
deviation of 6.179, leading to a t value of 332.828. This t value is larger than the t values at the
conventional level of significance of p= 0.05. Larger t values coincide with smaller p values. The
result of our one sample t-test would lead us to conclude that the test result of our pupil sample is
not equal 0 (figure 10) (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp.35-37).
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Figure 10: The one sample t-test.
A) The random sample of 1000 pupil test result values. Test results are approximately normally
distributed with a mean of 65.036 and a standard deviation of 6.179. B) The result of a one-
sample t-test on the pupil’s test results. The t value for our sample, 332.828, is compared with
the critical t values at the conventional significance level of p = 0.05. For the one tailed test, the
critical t value is 1.645. For the two tailed test, the critical t value is 1.960. If the calculated t
value is larger than the critical t value, there is evidence to reject H0. Most of the times, two-tailed
statistical tests are conducted. The test statistic, 332.828, is so large that it cannot be drawn into
the plot. Such a mean is highly unlikely to occur if the true mean is 0 (p<0.001).
To test for a difference between two population parameters from normally distributed populations,
one can use the two-sample t-test (equation 5.5), with y¯1 and y¯2 for the two means and Sy¯1−y¯2for
the standard error of the differences between y¯1 and y¯2.
t =
y¯1− y¯2
Sy¯1−y¯2
(5.5)
There are two versions of the two-sample t-test: one for equal variances in the samples and one
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for unequal variances in the samples. One needs therefore to check for differences in the variances
between the two samples and then use the appropriate test (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp.35-37).
Building upon our previous example, we want to test whether there is a difference in the mean test
results between male and female pupils from the sample described in figure 10 A. We test the H0
that the difference between the male and female test results of our pupil sample is 0. The mean
test result for male pupils is 64.824 and the mean test result for female pupils 65.233. The test
statistics for the difference in the means of 0.409 is 1.044. This t value is smaller than the critical
t value at the conventional level of p = 0.05. Our test does not provide any evidence to reject H0.
We would therefore conclude that there is no difference in the test results of pupils in our sample
based on their sex (figure 11).
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Figure 11: The two sample t-test.
A) The two samples of 481 male and 519 females from our random sample of 1000 pupils (figure
10 A). B) The result of a two-sample t-test on the H0 that the difference in the mean test results
between male and female pupils is 0. The calculated t value , 1.044, is compared with the critical
t values at the conventional significance level of p = 0.05. For the one-tailed test, the critical t
value is 1.645. For the two-tailed test, the critical t value is 1.960. As the calculated t value is
smaller than the critical t value, there is no evidence to reject H0. Most of the times, two-tailed
statistical tests are conducted.
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5.3.3 Simple linear regression
Simple linear regression is a statistical method of data analysis which assumes a linear relationship
between two variables. In the simple linear regression, the variable of interest, the response- or de-
pendent variable, Y , has a continuous scale and is a function of a single continuous independent-,
or predictor variable, X . Simple linear regression is mainly used to describe the linear relationship
between the two variables, to predict new Y -values based on new X-values and to determine how
well the variation in Y can be explained by X (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 78). It is however also
possible to consider the relationship between a continuous dependent variable Y and a categorical
variable X in the simple linear regression. For this purpose, the categorical variable is transfor-
med into a continuous variable with the values 0 and 1 (section 5.3.6). Such variables are called
dummy-variables (Quinn and Keough 2002, p.135).
Considering a set of i= 1−n observations with X and Y values, the simple linear regression model
can be described with equation 5.6, where yi is the ith observed value for Y and xi the ith observed
value for X .
yi = β0+β1xi+ εi (5.6)
β0 is the population intercept and shows the mean value of Y when xi is 0. β1 is the population
slope and measures the change in Y for each unit change in X . εi is the error term and shows the
difference between the observed yi and the predicted values for each xi (equation 5.6). The simple
linear model makes inferences on the mean values of Y for each value of X . It assumes that there
is a population of Y -values for each xi and joins the means of these populations for each xi. The
overall mean value of Y then equals β0 + β1X and the linear model can be reformulated as the
means of Y for each xi: yi = µi + εi, with µi being the mean of Y at each xi (Quinn and Keough
2002, p. 83).
Using sample data with n observations for Y and X , the parameters of the simple linear regression
model can be estimated. For the population slope, β1, equation 5.7 allows to estimate b1. The
population intercept, β0, is then estimated the following way: b0 = y¯−b1x¯ . Once the parameters
b0 and b1 are estimated, a regression line with estimated values for all xi can be determined:
∧
yi = b0 + b1 ∗ xi, where ∧y is the predicted value for xi. These estimates are ordinary least square
(OLS) estimates: the sum of the squared deviation between the observed values and the predicted
values are minimized (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 85-86).
b1 =
∑ni=1(xi− x¯)(yi− y¯)
∑ni=1(xi− x¯)2
(5.7)
The estimation for the error term, εi, is obtained by calculating the residual, ei, at each xi: ei =
∧
yi− yi (Quinn and Keough 2002, p .87). The simple linear regression makes three assumptions
related to the error terms εi: first, they are expected to be normally distributed with a mean of 0
at each xi: estimates and test statistics are robust to this violation, as long as no other assumpti-
ons related to the residuals are violated. Second, the error terms are expected to have the same
variance at each xi: violations of this assumption, also known as heteroscedasticity, leads to unre-
liable estimates and test statistics. Third, the error terms should be independent and therefore also
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uncorrelated with each other: violation of this assumption, leads to unreliable estimates and test
statistics. By calculating the residuals for each xi resulting from a simple linear regression esti-
mation, it is possible to roughly assess whether these assumptions have been met with the help of
distribution-plots of the residuals and scatterplots of the residuals against the fitted values. If the
independent residuals assumption is violated, including an autocorrelation term, controlling for
the structure of the underlying data sample (section 5.3.6 and 5.3.7), or both, are means to obtain
reliable estimates (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 92-94). The assumptions related to the error
terms always apply to the underlying linear regression estimate. This means that these assumpti-
ons apply to the residuals, ei, and not to the theoretical error terms, εi. Frequently, a nonnormal
distribution of Y is responsible for non-normality and heteroscedasticity of residuals. In this case,
transforming Y in order to make its distribution approximately normal can be a simple mean to
guarantee that these assumptions hold. Furthermore, unusual X-values can have excessive influ-
ences on the estimated regression coefficients. By transforming a nonnormal distribution of X and
making it approximately normal, the influence of single X-values on the results of an estimation
can be balanced. Transforming Y , X , or Y and X in a way that their distributions become approx-
imately normal, is therefore a simple mean to improve the fit of the linear regression estimation
and make sure the assumptions of normality and constant variance of residuals are met. Finally,
the simple linear regression model assumes a linear relationship between Y and X . When the
relationship between Y and X is clearly nonlinear, transforming one or both variables can linea-
rize the nonlinear relationship. This method is however not applicable to all types of nonlinear
relationships (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 98).
The residuals can also be used to partition the total variance in the response variable, SSTotal =
∑ni=1(yi− y¯)2, in a part which is explained by the regression model, SSRegression = ∑ni=1(
∧
yi− y¯)2,
and a part which is not explained by the regression model, SSResidual = ∑ni=1(yi−
∧
yi) (Quinn and
Keough 2002, p. 88). The most common measure to describe the association between Y and X
in simple linear regression is R2. R2 measures how much of the variation in Y is explained by X
(Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 92) (equation 5.8).
R2 =
SSRegression
SSTotal
= 1− SSResidual
SSTotal
(5.8)
The standard errors of b0 and b1, sb0 and sb1, are the standard deviation of their sampling dis-
tributions. Standard errors are measures for the accuracy of the predictions made based on the
estimates. They can be calculated as shown in equations 5.9 and 5.10, where MSresidual is the
variance of the residuals. Using the estimates b0 and b1 as well as their standard errors sb0 and
sb1, t-tests can be implemented to test the H0 that the regression estimates are equal to 0. For the
population mean, the result of a one-sample t-test (section 5.3.2) with n− 2 degrees of freedom
and the test-statistic t = b0−0sb0 can be used to decide whether to reject H0 or not. The procedure to
test the H0 for the population slope is identical: one just has to replace b0 with b1 and sb0 with
sb1. The results of such t-tests are provided in each standard output of software packages running
simple linear regressions (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 89-90).
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sb0 =
√√√√√MSresidual
1
n
+
−
x
2
∑ni=1(xi− x¯)2
 (5.9)
sb1 =
√
MSresidual
∑ni=1(xi− x¯)2
(5.10)
The proximity of the simple linear regression to the t-test (section 5.3.2) is highlighted by the fact
that those can be replicated with simple linear regression models (tables 14 and 15).
Table 14: Simple linear regression on the test results of pupils only including the intercept.
N = 1000
Coefficients Estimate Standard error T value P value
Intercept 65.036 0.195 332.8 <0.001
The t-test from figure 10 can be replicated with a simple linear regression only including the
population intercept. The estimated mean, as well as the test statistics are identical.
Table 15: Simple linear regression on the test result of pupils including the intercept and the sex
of the pupils.
N = 1000
R² = 0.001
Coefficients Estimate Standard error T value P value
Intercept 64.824 0.282 230.088 <0.001
Female 0.408 0.391 1.044 0.297
The mean test result of the male pupils is equal to the estimate for the intercept (64.824) and
differs significantly from 0. The mean test result of the female pupils is equal to the estimate for
the intercept + the estimate for Female (0.408). The difference between the two means (0.408)
is not significantly different from 0. This result replicates the t-test from figure 11. The minor
difference in the estimated difference is due to differences in rounding.
The value of the estimate for the regression slope, b1, depends on the units in which Y and X are
measured. It is therefore difficult to compare the estimated regression slopes from different simple
linear regression models. By standardizing Y and X prior to the estimation, the resulting estimates
become independent of the units of Y and X . Standardizing is achieved by subtracting the mean
of the variable from each case and then dividing those by the standard deviation of the variable.
A standardized variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 (Quinn and Keough 2002,
p. 86). Standardizing is also known as z-transformation. When only X is standardized prior to the
estimation, the estimated population slopes becomes independent only of the units of X .
Standardizing has two further advantages. To understand these advantages, we need to recapitulate
that the population intercept shows the mean value of Y when X has a value of 0. When the value
of 0 lies beyond the range of X , our population intercept is of no practical value and makes no
sense. Additionally, the population intercept is estimated by extrapolating beyond the range of
the observed values. Extrapolating beyond the range of the observed values should however be
avoided when estimating parameters in a simple linear regression (Quinn and Keough 2002, p.
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87). By standardizing X prior to the estimation, we can easily solve these issues: the value 0 of
the standardized X is the mean of the original variable X and lies in the centre of the observed
values. Not only do we have a meaningful population intercept, but it was also estimated without
extrapolating beyond the range of the observed values (figure 12).
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Figure 12: Unstandardized versus standardized predictor.
A) The influence of the class budget on the pupils’ test results: the population intercept (cross
section of the predicted values line and the intercept line) lies beyond the range of the observed
values of the class budget. Extrapolating beyond the range of the observed values is needed to
estimate the intercept. Furthermore, a class budget of 0 does not make sense, and our population
intercept is therefore not meaningful. B) The influence of the standardized class budget on the
pupils’ test result: the population intercept (cross section of the predicted values line and the
intercept line) lies at the mean of the observed values of the class budget. No extrapolating beyond
the range of the observed values is needed to estimate the intercept. Our population intercept is
now meaningful, showing us the mean test result of pupils with a mean class budget. C) The
influence of the class budget on the pupils’ test result: this plot is identical to B, with the exception
of the X-axis. In this plot, the ticks of the X-axis are transformed back to the original units. In this
way, we can make use of the advantages of standardizing variables prior to estimation and still
interpret the results in the original units. This procedure can be applied to all types of variable
transformation. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
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5.3.4 Multiple linear regression
The simple linear regression model can be extended to include more than one predictor (Quinn and
Keough 2002, p. 111). In general linear models, all combinations of continuous and categorical
predictors (dummies) are allowed (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 77-78). In the further discussion,
I am always referring to general linear models when speaking of multiple linear regression.
Considering a set of i = 1− n observations with n observations for the response variable Y and
n observations for the p predictor variables X1 - Xp, where p≥ 2, the multiple linear regression
model is:
yi = β0+β1 ∗ x1+β2 ∗ x2+ ...+βp ∗ xp+ εi (5.11)
As in the simple linear regression model (equation 5.6), yi is the ith observed value for Y , β0
the population mean when all X1 - Xp values are 0 and εi the error term for the ith observation.
However, the population slopes β1, β2- βp, of the multiple linear regression model (equation 5.11)
are partial population regression slopes. This means that β1measures by how much Y changes for
each unit change in X1when the other X2 - Xp variables are held constant. The same applies to all
other population slopes β2- βp(Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 117) (figure 13).
Class budget*
Te
st
 re
su
lt
49
60
70
83
312 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 787
l Observed values
Predicted values
A
Class budget*
Te
st
 re
su
lt
49
60
70
83
312 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 787
l Observed values
Predicted values 1
Predicted values 2
B
Figure 13: Population slope versus partial population slope.
A) The result of a simple linear regression model on the sample of pupils where the test result is
a function of the class budget. The population regression slope (the predicted values) shows the
influence of the class budget on the results in the test. B) The result of a multiple linear regression
run on the same sample of pupils, where the test result is a function of the class budget, the
pupils’ IQ, the pupils’ socioeconomic background and the quality of the class teacher. The partial
population regression slope 1 (the predicted values 1) shows the influence of the class budget
on the test result for pupils with average IQ, low socioeconomic background, and bad teacher
qualities. The partial population regression slope 2 (the predicted values 2) shows the influence
of the class budget on the test result for pupils with average IQ, high socioeconomic background,
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and good teacher qualities. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
Using sample data with n observations for Y and X1 - Xp, the parameters of the multiple linear
regression model can be estimated by extending the methods used for the simple linear regression
(section 5.3.3). The estimation of the multiple linear regression model can be used to determine
the sample regression line,
∧
yi = b0 + b1 ∗ xi1 + b2 ∗ xi2 + ...+ bp ∗ xip, where ∧yi is the estimated
value for xi1, xi2- xip, b0 is the estimate for the population mean, β0, the population intercept of
the sample data, and b1, b2- bp are the estimates of the partial population slopes β1, β2- βp, for the
sample data (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 118 and 120). As in the simple linear regression, t-tests
can be applied to test hypotheses related to the population intercept and partial population slopes
of multiple linear regression estimates. In the case of the multiple linear regression, the degrees of
freedom for these tests are n− (p+ 1), whereas p is the number of estimated parameters (Quinn
and Keough 2002, p. 122).
Once the sample regression line has been determined, the residuals of the multiple regression can
be calculated in the same way as in the simple linear regression. The assumptions related to the
residuals in the multiple linear regression are the same as in the simple linear regression and we
also assume a linear relationship between Y and X1 - Xp, as in the simple linear regression. The
methods to detect violations of these assumptions, the consequences of these violations and the
means to deal with the violations also are the same as in the simple linear regression. Issues related
to the meaning of the population intercept, b0, extrapolation beyond the range of the observed
values, and the application of standardization and transformation discussed in the context of the
simple linear regression also apply to the multiple linear regression (section 5.3.3).
In the multiple linear regression R² is also a measure for the proportion of the variation in Y ex-
plained with the X1 - Xp predictors and can be calculated in the same way (equation 5.8). Howe-
ver, R2 does never decrease when more predictors are added. In fact, models with more predictors
always seem to explain variation in Y better than more parsimonious versions. To account for this
fact, the adjusted R2 can be used as another measure of association between the predictors and the
response variable in the multiple linear regression. The adjusted R2 takes account of the number
of predictors and can also decrease when new predictors are added to a multiple linear regression
model (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 122).
There are, however, two new issues occurring in the case of multiple linear regression, that are of
no, or only minor concern in the case of the simple linear regression. First, when more than one
predictor is included in a linear regression, issues might arise when these predictors are correla-
ted. This is known as multicollinearity. Depending on the extent of multicollinearity, estimates
become unstable and test statistics unreliable. In the most extreme case, when the predictors are
perfectly correlated, it becomes impossible to estimate the parameters for the perfectly correlated
coefficients at the same time. Multicollinearity can be detected with the help of the variance infla-
tion factor (VIF). The VIF of X1 gives a measure of the extent to which X1 is a linear combination
of the other p− 1 predictors included in the multiple linear regression: V IF = 11−R2 (Quinn and
Keough 2002, p. 128). The bigger the VIF, the more multicollinearity is an issue. Although it is
widely accepted that VIF values of 10 or greater are highly problematic (Quinn and Keough 2002,
p. 128), multicollinearity is an issue in most multiple regression analysis, even if the VIF values
of the included predictors are low (VIF values between 1 and 2.5) (Cade 2015, p. 2373). This is
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due to the fact that the scale of a given population slope from a multiple linear regression not only
depends on the units of the predictor- and the response variable, but also on the other predictors
included in the multiple regression. As long as there is some correlation between a number of
predictors in a multiple regression, this will lead to changes in the estimates for the population
slopes, depending on the constellation of the predictors included in the regression analysis (Cade
2015, p. 2372). The estimates can however be standardized with their partial standard deviation
in order to be unaffected by the correlation with other predictors. Such standardized estimates can
be interpreted as the rate of change in the response variable for a change in the predictor by one
partial standard deviation (Cade 2015, p. 2375). When VIF values exceed a threshold, for example
10, the most simple way to deal with it is, however, to simply omit the predictor with the critical
VIF value from the linear regression analysis (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 129).
A further issue, which normally is of no concern in simple linear regression, is model complexity.
Model complexity is defined by putting the sample size, n, in relation to the number of estimated
parameters, k. The complexity of models is essentially limited by the sample size. Too complex
models (too many estimated parameters for the sample size) might suffer from instability and from
a lack of statistical power. As a rule of thumb, one can calculate the minimal sample size necessary
for a given number of estimates in linear regression with the equation n≥ 10∗k (Mundry 2017, p.
163).
5.3.5 Maximum likelihood and the generalized linear model
The linear regression models discussed so far (sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4) allow to estimate the effect
of some predictor variables on a response variable with a continuous scale. The specific assump-
tions underlying these linear regression models are related to the residuals of the estimation and
to the type of the relationship between the response and the predictor variables. Linear regression
models can be quite robust to violations of these assumptions and transformations of the response
variable can help to increase the fit of the estimation and to meet the specific regression assump-
tions. When the assumptions related to linear regression models are met, most importantly the
constant variance assumption of the residuals, the OLS estimate provides the best linear unbia-
sed estimator (McElroy 1967, p. 1302), and minimizes the difference between the predicted and
the observed values (section 5.3.3). However, some types of response variables simply cannot be
transformed in such ways as to meet assumptions related to the residuals. Typically, such response
variables either represent counts or are binary (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 359). For such re-
sponse variables, the linear regression model can be extended and generalized in order to be able
to account for other than normal error distributions and for relationships between the variance and
the mean of the errors. Such regression models are called generalized linear models (Quinn and
Keough 2002, pp. 77-78). Instead of OLS, in the case of generalized linear models, maximum
likelihood (ML) is used to estimate the parameters.
ML is a method used to estimate population parameters in general. The idea behind ML is very
simple: given a sample of data from a population, the estimate for a parameter is obtained by
maximizing the likelihood to observe the actual data. This is achieved by first determining the
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likelihood function, L(y;Θ) of a given parameter, Θ , given the data, y. The likelihood function is
the joint probability distribution of all observations of the data, yi, for different possible values of
Θ (equation 5.12). Then, for computational reasons, the log-likelihood function is maximized in
order to obtain the estimate for the parameter that maximizes the likelihood to observe the given
data (equation 5.13) (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 23-24).
L(y;Θ) =
n
∏
i=1
f (yi;Θ) (5.12)
L(Θ) = ln
[
n
∏
i=1
f (yi;Θ)
]
=
n
∑
i=1
ln [ f (yi;Θ)] (5.13)
ML is a widely applicable method for the estimation of population parameters, because it allows
to consider all kinds of probability distributions, f (yi;Θ), to determine the likelihood function.
Obviously, ML can also be used to estimate regression parameters. Being able to assume not only
normal distributions, but also binomial distributions, Poisson distribution, negative binomial and
many more, widely enlarges the range of applications for regression analysis. However, analytical
solutions to estimation problems are restricted to a small fraction of the cases where ML is actually
used (Bolker 2007, pp. 229-231). Most of the time, complex iterative algorithms provide solutions
to these estimation problems (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 24). Assuming a chi-squared distribu-
tion of the negative log-likelihood, Likelihood Ratio Tests can be implemented to test hypothesis
regarding ML parameter estimates (Bolker 2007, p. 16 and p. 255). A simple example for a ML
estimation and the respective Likelihood Ratio Test is shown in figure 14.
Generalized linear models always consist of three components: first, the response variable with
an underlying probability distribution; second, the predictor variables; finally, a link function that
connects the response variable with the predictor variables, where β0, β1 and β2 are the parameters
to be estimated and g(µ) is the link function. The link function models the relationship between
the predicted values and the predictor variables: g(µ) = β0+β1X1+β2X2+ .... The link function
depends on the assumed probability distribution underlying the model. The most common link
functions are the identity link-, the log link- and the logit link function. For continuous response
variables, the identity link function models the expected value or the mean of Y , just in the same
way as in linear regression models: g(µ)= µ . For binary response variables, the logit link function
is used: g(µ) = log [µ/(1−µ)]. For count data, the log link function is used: g(µ) = log(µ).
Generalized linear models are always linear, because the response variable is first described as
a function of a linear combination of predictors. Non-linearity between the response and the
predictors is only implemented in a second step, with the help of the link function (Quinn and
Keough 2002, pp. 359-360).
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Figure 14: Maximum likelihood estimation.
Using the sample of test results from 1000 pupils (figure 10), we want to estimate the mean test
result using a maximum likelihood estimation and knowing that the standard deviation is 6.179.
The plot shows the log likelihood function for means between 0 and 100. The function for the
probability density of a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 6.179 and mean values
between 0 and 100 is maximized with a log likelihood of -3239.634 and a mean of 65.04. By com-
paring the log likelihood of our ML estimate with the log likelihood of a mean of 0 (-58,626.897),
a Likelihood Ratio Test can be implement to test whether our estimated mean is significantly more
likely than an estimated mean of 0. Such a difference in likelihoods occuring by chance is highly
unlikely (p<0.001) and we would conclude that our estimated mean is a better estimation than a
mean of 0 (Adapted from Bolker 2007, pp. 255-256 and R-Bloggers 2011).
While model assumptions in generalized linear models are the same as in linear regression models
when the response variable is continuous, the model assumptions differ in the case of other types
of dependent variables. For binary response variables, the generalized linear model is usually a
logistic regression, which makes use of a logit link function. Besides the independent residuals
assumption, the logistic regression makes no further specific assumptions related to the residuals
of the model (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 368-369). For count response variables, the gene-
ralized linear model is either a Poisson or a negative binomial regression, which makes use of a
log link function. Besides the independent residuals assumption, these models assume a specific
ratio between the mean and the variance of the residuals. Failure to meet this assumption leads
to unreliable test statistics (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 371-372). Apart from these specific
assumptions related to the residuals of generalized linear models with binary or count response
variables, all issues related to multicollinearity, model complexity, meaningful intercepts, extra-
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polation beyond the range of observed values, transformation and standardization discussed in the
context of linear regression models also need to be considered. Finally, it is worthwhile highlig-
hting that the linear regression model can entirely by replaced by the generalized linear model,
which is a generalization of the former (Mundry 2017, p. 163). ML is also used to estimate pa-
rameters in random-effects regression models (figure 17) as well as in mixed-effects regression
models (figure 19). In the further parts of this section, when I mention regression models, I referr
to both, the generalized linear models as well as the general linear models.
5.3.6 Fixed and random effects regression
The independence assumption underlying regression models is violated when the observations in
the sample data are related with each other (figure 15). This is the case when the observations
are either temporally or spatially segregated or interconnected (Hurlbert 1984, p.198). Repeated
measures, observations made at different points in time or at different locations are examples for
such related observations.
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Figure 15: Clustered data.
In this example sample data, the pupils are clustered in classes. Pupils of the same class all have
a similar test result. Although single test results of pupils from one class deviate from the class
mean, they still are more similar to test results of pupils from the same class than to test results of
pupils from other classes with a strongly differing mean test result. In this example, the test results
of pupils vary by a standard deviation of 15 points between the classes.
When the sample data used to run a regression model is made up of dependent observations, the
model assumptions are not met and one risks to make wrong statistical inferences (figure 16). This
is known as pseudoreplication (Chaves 2010, pp. 291-292). It is however possible to take account
of the dependency in the observations by considering the variable responsible for this dependency
as a factor. Such a factor, A, is modelled as a qualitative variable with a group, j, for each of
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its values ( j = 1− p) and replicate observations, i, within the groups (i = 1− n). Factors can be
included as estimates, α , into a regression model (equation 5.14), where yi j is the value of the
response for the ith replicate in the jth group, β0 the population intercept and εi j the error term for
the ith replicate in the jth group (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 178).
yi j = β0+α j + εi j (5.14)
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Figure 16: Violation of the independence assumption in regression models.
A) The dataset from figure 15 is used to estimate the influence of the pupils IQ on a test result. The
plot shows the result of a multiple linear regression model, where the test result is a function of
the pupils’ IQ, the pupils’ sex and the pupils’ socioeconomic background. The true effect for the
pupils’ IQ on the test result of 0.1 is overestimated (partial population slope estimate for pupils
IQ is 0.139). B) The residual versus fitted values plot shows that the residuals are clustered and
not evenly distributed around the residual = 0 line. This is a clear indication for a violation of the
independent residuals assumption. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
There are however different ways to model a factor. The simplest case occurs when the factor is
fixed. In this case, all relevant groups of the factor are known and included in the data sample.
Conclusions based on a regression analysis including such a fixed factor cannot be extrapolated
beyond the groups of the factor included in the sample data (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 176). For
such fixed factors, at first p dummy variables for all values of the factor in question are generated.
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Then, estimates for p− 1 factors aer included into a multiple regression analysis: yi j = β0 +
β1(dummy1)i j + ...+βp−1(dummyp−1)i j + εi j. The dummy not included in the regression is the
reference and the estimates for the dummies included as predictors show the difference between
the mean response in the reference group, β0, and the mean response in the other p− 1 dummy
groups (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 178-179). By adding such fixed factors to a regression
model with other predictors, it is possible to control for the dependency in the observations of the
sample data (figure 17): the whole unobserved heterogeneity due to the factor is controled for by
the dummies (Kohler and Kreuter 2012, pp. 318-319).
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Figure 17: Fixed-effects regression.
A) The sample data from figure 15 is used to estimate the influence of the pupils IQ on a test
result. The plot shows the result of a fixed-effects linear regression model, where the test result
is a function of the pupils’ IQ, the pupils’ sex, the pupils’ socioeconomic background, as well as
the fixed effect dummies for the pupils’ class (in form of 39 dummy predictors with one reference
dummy). The true effect for the pupils’ IQ on the test result of 0.1 is estimated correctly (partial
population slope estimate for pupils IQ is 0.103). Every single class has its own population in-
tercept and partial population slope in the fixed effects regression model. The magnitude of the
partial population slope of pupils’ IQ is however the same in all classes. B) The residual versus
fitted values plot shows that model assumptions are met. Dependency in observations is no issue
any more. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
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This approach is known as fixed-effects regression, because it is assumed that all the other predic-
tors have the same effect across all groups of the factors and that all values of the factor are present
as dummies in the regression. In summary, the fixed effects model is just a usual regression model
with the same issues and assumptions as discussed in the prior sections.
However, it is worth noting, that the fixed-effects regression model has important limitations. As
mentioned above, all results of a fixed-effects regression analysis are conditional on the groups of
the factors included in the analysis. It is not possible to extrapolate beyond those. Second, the
fixed-effects regression analysis only allows to analyse factors responsible for differences within
the groups of the factor, and is therefore also known as a “Within-Estimator”. All variables not
varying within the groups of the factor are perfectly multicollinear and cannot be considered simul-
taneously (Kohler and Kreuter 2012, pp. 320-321). This means that the fixed-effects regression
model does not allow to investigate reasons for the differences between the groups of the factor.
Another way to model a factor is achieved by considering it as a normally distributed random
variable with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ2α (Quinn and Keough 2002, p. 178). This approach
assumes that the groups of the factor present in the sample data are a random sample of all possible
groups and aims at making conclusions about all possible groups (Quinn and Keough 2002, p.
176). In equation 5.14, the estimate for the random factor α j shows the variation of the overall
mean response, β0, between the groups of the factor.
By adding such a random factor to a regression, a random-effects regression model is specified,
where RI0 j is the random intercept and measures the variation of the population intercept, β0,
between the groups of the factor: yi j = β0 +β1 ∗ xi + ...+RI0 j + εi j. Instead of estimating values
for each single group of the factor, as in the case of the fixed-effects regression model, one common
variance term is estimated, allowing to make generalizations (figure 18) (Barr et al. 2013, p. 259).
Consequently, sampling in the random-effects regression occurs at two levels, first, at the level of
the individual observations and second, at the level of the groups of the factor.
The Random-effects regression model is an extension of the regression models discussed so far.
The assumptions and issues discussed so far in the context of the other regression models also
apply to random-effects regression models. However, there are also specific assumptions related
to the random intercept RI0 j: it should be normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance
equal to the variance present in the factor it was sampled from. Additionally, hypothesis tests
cannot be implemented as easily as in the regression models discussed so far. This is due to two
important facts. First, there is no consent on how to calculate the number of degrees of freedom
in regression models including random intercepts. Second, assumptions commonly made related
to the null value of parameters in hypothesis tests are violated for random intercepts (Bolker et al.
2009, pp. 131-132; Barr et al. 2013, p. 259). As a result, only approximate tests with corrections
are available. The most universally applicable is a likelihood ratio test on the full model and a
restricted model not including the estimate of interest. For tests considering the random intercept,
additionally dividing the p value by two is an appropriate correction (Bolker et al. 2009, pp. 131-
132).
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Figure 18: Random-effects regression.
A) The sample data from figure 15 is used to estimate the influence of the pupils IQ on a test result.
The plot shows the result of a random-effects regression model, where the test result is a function
of the pupils’ IQ, the pupils’ sex, the pupils’ socioeconomic background as well as the random
effect for the pupils’ class (in form of a class random intercept). The true effect of 0.1 is estimated
correctly (partial population slope estimate for pupils IQ is 0.103). The random-effects regression
estimates one partial population slope for all pupils in all classes, allowing to generalize the
effect of the pupils IQ. The estimated variance parameter for the pupils’ class random intercept is
a standard deviation of 16.40 (true standard deviation is 15). B) The residual versus fitted values
plot shows that model assumptions are met. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
5.3.7 Mixed effects regression
In random-effects regression models, a random intercept can be added to a regression model to
allow the population intercept to vary between the groups of a factor. In the same way, a random
slope can be added to a regression model to additionally allow the effect of a predictor on the
response to vary between the groups of a factor: yi j = β0 +RI0 j +(β1 +RS1 j) ∗ xi + εi j. Such
random slopes can only be specified in combination with random intercepts. As for the random
intercept, it is assumed that the random slope, RS1 j, is normally distributed with a mean of 0
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and a variance equal to the variance present in the factor it was sampled from. It is furthermore
assumed that the random intercept, RI0 j, and the random slope, RS1 j, are not correlated (Barr
et al. 2013, p. 259). As in the case of the random-effects regression, hypotheses testing in mixed-
effects-regression models should be done with likelihood ratio tests on full- and restricted models.
When only one random term is tested, additionally dividing the p value by two is an appropriate
correction (Bolker et al. 2009, pp. 131-132). Beside of these specific assumptions and issues, all
other assumptions and issues discussed so far in the context of the other regression models also
apply to the mixed-effects regression models.
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Figure 19: Mixed-effects regression model.
A) Using a sample data where the pupils test result is not only clustered, like in figure 15, but
where the influence of the pupils’ IQ on the test result also varies between the classes, a mixed-
effects regression model is used to estimate the influence of the pupils’ IQ on the pupils’ test result.
The plot shows the result of a maximal mixed-effects regression model, where the test result is a
function of the pupils’ IQ, the pupils’ sex and the pupils’ socioeconomic background as well as the
random effect for the pupils’ class and the random slopes for the pupils’ IQ, the pupils’ sex and the
pupils’ socioeconomic background. No overall significant effect of the pupils’ IQ on the pupils’
test result is found (p=0.183). However, a highly significant variation of the effect of pupils’ IQ
on pupils’ test result by 0.2 points standard deviation is found (p<0.001) This corresponds to the
true dependencies underlying the data. B) The residual versus fitted values plot shows that model
assumptions are met. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
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Mixed-effects regression models allow to control for all possible sources of variations in the re-
sponse variable and should optimize the generalization of statistical inferences based on a specific
sample data to other individuals, i, and groups, j, when the maximal random effects structure is
specified. Given a sample data, the maximal random effects structure of a mixed-effects-regression
model is reached when all possible random intercepts and random slopes are included. Such mo-
dels are called maximal models. Maximal models best capture all dependencies in the sample data
(figure 19). Models without maximal random effects structure, on the other hand, are misspecified
and either lack statistical power or have increased Type-I error rates and also run a risk to violate
model assumptions (figure 20). Maximal models can become complex, increasing the likelihood
that the iterative algorithms used for the estimation fail to converge (Barr et al. 2013, p. 261).
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Figure 20: Misspecified random-intercept regression model.
A) Using a sample data where the pupils test result is not only clusterd, like in figure 15, but
where the influence of the pupils IQ also varies between the classes, a random-intercept regression
analysis is used to estimate the influence of the pupils IQ on the pupils test result. The plot shows
the result of a random-effects regression model, where the test result is a function of the pupils IQ,
the pupils sex, the pupils socioeconomic background as well as the random effect for the pupils
class. Although there is in reality no overall significant effect of pupils IQ on the pupils test result,
the model estimates a slight positive effect of the pupils IQ on the pupils test result which is highly
significant (p<0.001). B) The residual vs. fitted values plot shows that the constant residual
variance assumption is violated. * Variable was standardized prior to estimation.
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5.3.8 Model selection
Besides testing hypothesis regarding specific regression estimates, one important application of the
regression analysis is determining the set of predictors available in a sample data that best explain
the variation in the response variable. Frequently, the focus is laid on finding parsimonious sets of
predictors that best fit the observed data. There are a variety of criteria for deciding which model to
select as the best model and those can lead to competing best models. Furthermore, there are also
fundamentally different approaches to find the best model and investigate the effect of predictor
variables on the response variable (Quinn and Keough 2002, pp. 137-140).
In stepwise procedures, a set of variable from the sample data is first defined and then sequentially
entered into, or removed from, the regression model (this depends on whether one starts with a
null- or a full model). At each step, a new model comprising more or fewer predictors is estimated
and the changes in the overall model fit as well as the single parameter test statistics are recorded.
At the end of the procedure, a final model comprising the set of predictors that have a significant
effect on the response and that best explain the response variable is selected. In the forced-entry
procedure, only one full model is estimated where all predictors of interest are entered simulta-
neously into the model. The use of a stepwise procedure in the context of hypothesis testing and
model selection is however no valid option because it does not generally provide the best model,
while at the same time suffering from elevated Type I error rates as a consequence of multiple
testing. In contrast, forced-entry procedures produce the conventionally expected type I error rate
of 5% (Mundry and Nunn, pp. 120-123; Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011, pp. 50-52). In a strict
sense, forced-entry procedures do however not select the best model, but only provide one full-
model. In a first step, a single statistical test is conducted to test whether the full-model fits the
data better than a null-model. If this is the case, the full-model generated through the forced-entry
procedure allows however to test hypotheses related to the effect of the predictors on the response
variable without suffering from elevated Type I error rates (Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011, p. 51).
Unfortunately, it is often not possible to estimate one full model including all predictors of interest.
The applicability of forced-entry procedures depends on the size of the sample data and the set of
variables of interest and is therefore strongly limited by model complexity and multicollinearity
of predictors.
A third approach related to finding the best model and investigating the effect of predictor variables
on a response variable has been brought forward in form of model averaging and information
theoretic approaches (Burnham and Anderson 1998). Using information criteria, these approaches
allow the comparison of non-nested models. Estimates from a number of different models are then
combined to one model-averaged coefficient for each predictor (Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011,
p. 53). In the following discussion on information theoretic approaches to model selection and
statistical inference, I will focus on the Akaike information criteria (AIC). The AIC estimates how
well a fitted model represents an unknown mechanism generating the observed data used for the
regression model. The AIC is calculated with equation 5.15, where L(θ) is the likelihood of the
estimated model and k the number of parameters in the model (Burnham and Anderson 1998, p.
61).
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AIC =−2log∗L(θ)+2k (5.15)
While it does not make sense to interpret one single AIC value, in contrast to single R2 values, AIC
values can be used to compare a set of models with the same response and the same observations
from the same sample data, but with different combinations of predictors. The AIC implements
the principle of model parsimony by incorporating a trade-off between a good model fit (−2log∗
l(θ) becomes smaller with increasing numbers of predictors) and the complexity of a model (2k
becomes bigger with increasing numbers of predictors).
When comparing a set of models with the AIC, the models are first estimated and then ranked
according to their AIC values, with the best model having the smallest AIC value, AICmin, on top
and the other models following with increasing AIC-values (Burnham and Anderson 1998, pp.
62-64). In a second step, the differences in AIC values, 4i, are calculated for all models in the
model set with the equation4i = AICi−AICmin. For AICmin,4i is obviously 0. Although we can
rank our set of models according to AIC values, there still is uncertainty: we can never be sure
that the model with the smallest AIC value is really the best model. The AIC differences can be
used to get a feeling of which models have support and which models have no support of being the
best model (Burnham and Anderson 1998, pp. 70-72). The AIC differences can furthermore also
be used to compute the Akaike weights, wi, where
R
∑
r=1
are all models included in the model set
(equation 5.16). The Akaike weights simplify the interpretation of the support for a given model,
as they provide us with a measure for the likelihood that a given model from a set of models is the
best model. This holds true when it is assumed that the best model is included in the model set.
Akaike weights are additive and their total sum equals one (Burnham and Anderson 1998, p. 75).
wi =
exp(−124i)
R
∑
r=1
exp(−124r)
(5.16)
Using the Akaike weights of all models in the model set, a 95% confidence set of models can
be built: starting with the best model, the model with the highest Akaike weight, and continuing
with decreasing Akaike weights, the sum of the Akaike weights of the models is built until it
reaches 0.95. Given a set of models and the actual data, all models used to build the sum of the
Akaike weights for the 95% confidence set have strong support to be the best model (Burnham
and Anderson 1998, pp. 169-171). Calculating Akaike weights and building a 95% confidence set
are means to deal with the uncertainty underlying the quest for a best model.
Finally, this approach can also be used to lower the uncertainty underlying inference. By using the
Akaike weights of the models from the model set, model averaged coefficients can be calculated
(equation 5.17), where a given coefficient from a model of the model set is βi j, the respective
model averaged coefficient is
−
β j, and coefficients not occuring in a model are simply set to 0. Such
model averaged coefficients reduce model uncertainty, model selection bias and provide much
more stable inference than simply relying on one best model (Burnham and Anderson 1998, pp.
151-152). Standardizing all coefficients of all models of the model set with their partial standard
deviation prior to averaging is a procedure to make sure that the model averaged coefficients are
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meaningful (Cade 2015, pp. 2380-2381).
−
β j =
R
∑
i=1
wiβi j (5.17)
Information theoretic model selection can be used to run regression models including all possible
combinations of predictor variables from a given sample data. In this way, it is appealing to sim-
ply let the data speak. This allows us to get a feeling of the structure underlying the sample data
(Burnham and Anderson 1998, p. 64). The result of such a model selection analysis however enti-
rely depends on the set of models the scientist defines at the beginning of the analysis. Information
theoretic model selection is therefore also a fruitful approach when following a more theoretically
driven data analysis strategy:
“Of course, models not in the set remain out of consideration. AIC is useful in
selecting the best model in the set; however, if all the models are very poor, AIC will
still select the one estimated to be best, but even that relatively best model might be
poor in an absolute sense. Thus, every effort must be made to ensure that the set of
models is well founded.” (Burnham and Anderson 1998, p. 62)
5.4 Simulation study: estimating a treatment effect
In this simulation study, I use simulated data to evaluate the performance of the different approa-
ches to causal inference discussed in this chapter. More specifically, I compare the performance of
the unadjusted treatment effect of RCTs (section 5.2.4) with the adjusted treatment effect obtained
through different regression models (section 5.3) on the same RCTs data. This section mainly
takes up a manuscript which is currently under review in a scientific journal. Some parts were
however adapted for the purpose of this work.
5.4.1 Introduction: simulation study
The counterfactual approach to the analysis of causation is based on a notion of causation which
was well summarized by David Hume in 1748: “[...] if the first object had not been, the second
never had existed.” (Hume 2007 [1748], p. 70). Making use of an experimental terminology,
a causal effect can be determined as a treatment effect. When units of a study are exposed to an
experimental treatment (E) or a control treatment (C), the mean difference in the outcome between
the units exposed to E and the units exposed to C, the average treatment effect (ATE), corresponds
to the typical treatment effect, if the units of the study exposed to E and C are made up of perfectly
matched pairs: they all react in the same way to the stimuli. This can be the case for experimental
as well as for observational studies. Unfortunately, studies consisting of perfectly matched pairs
rarely occur in reality. As a solution to this issue, experimental studies make use of randomization
in order to meet the independence assumption, which states that the units of a study should be
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exposed to E or C independent of all other variables. If this assumption holds true, the ATE is an
unbiased estimator of the typical treatment effect (Rubin 1974; Holland 1986).
Such Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) are commonly seen as the gold standard to causal
inference and are conducted in a wide range of scientific disciplines (Grossman and Mackenzie
2005; Farrington and Welsh 2005; Druckman et al. 2006; Rubin 2008; Banerjee and Duflo 2011;
Bothwell et al. 2016; Deaton, 2017; Webber and Prouse 2018).
One important controversy related to RCTs is the question of covariate adjustment. Although,
about 1/3 of clinical studies adjust the ATE in their main analysis, thereby increasing the precision
of the ATE (Kahan et al. 2014; Deaton, 2017), adepts of RCTs usually focus on the characteris-
tics of well-designed randomized studies for causal inference and are reluctant to adjust the ATE
(Heckman 2005). They argue that it is never clear which other variables are truly relevant. By con-
trolling for irrelevant variables and using complex statistical methods, one might then introduce a
bias into the ATE (Rubin 1974; Freedman 2008).
In this study, I use simulated data to evaluate when the unadjusted ATE is a good proxy for the
typical causal effect and when the ATE should be adjusted by considering other covariates. More
specifically, I use this simulation study to test the following hypothesis:
H1: The unadjusted ATE of RCTs is an unbiased estimator of the typical causal effect (Rubin
1974, p. 693).
H1a: Adjusting for irrelevant covariates leads to a bias in the ATE of RCTs (Rubin 1974, pp.
696-697 and p. 700).
H1b: Adjusting for covariates relies on additional assumptions that lead to additional bias in the
ATE of RCTs (Freedman 2008, p. 181).
H2: Maximal mixed effects regression model provide ATEs of RCTs that optimize generalization
of findings (Barr et al. 2013, p. 261).
H2a: Adjusting for covariates correlated with the outcome increases the precision of ATEs of
RCTs (Kahan et al. 2014, p. 2).
5.4.2 Methods: simulation study
In comparison to real-world-data, where the true data generating process is unknown, all mecha-
nisms and processes underlying the generation of simulated data are exactly known and manipu-
lable. This makes simulation studies a valuable tool for statistical and methodological research
(Mundry and Nunn 2009, Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011, Barr et al. 2013, Schmidt-Catran and
Fairbrother 2016; Bryan and Jenkins 2016). Let us consider a simple example adapted from Heck-
man (2005, p. 28). The outcome of interest, yig, is a function of observed (O) and unobserved
variables (U) of individuals i and groups g (equation 5.18).
yig = Oi+Ui+Og+Ug (5.18)
Based on this simple framework, I first generated a dataset of 1000 individuals nested in 40 groups
(25 individuals per group). The individuals had two observed variables (i.cov and i.fac) and the
groups had one observed variable (g.cov), as well as two unobserved variables (g.unobs.cov and
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g.unobs.fac) (table 16).
Table 16: Parameters used for the generation of the dataset.
Variable Parameters Observed/Unobserved
i.cov Normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a
sd of 15
Observed
i.fac Binomially distributed with probabilities of
0.4 for 1 and 0.6 for 0
Observed
g.cov Normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a
sd of 100
Observed
g.unobs.cov Equally distributed with values between 0
and 1
Unobserved
g.unobs.fac Binomially distributed with probabilities of
0.3 for 1 and 0.6 for 0
Unobserved
First, the 1000 individuals were evenly distributed among the 40 groups. Then, the values of
individuals and groups for the different variables were set according to the parameters shown in
the table.
The next step consisted in generating the outcome. This was done by simulating the effects of
the observed and the unobserved characteristics of the individuals and the groups on the outcome.
For this purpose, four conditions were considered, with different settings of parameters for the
effects of the observed and the unobserved characteristics (table 17). Then, using the simulated
dataset with the respective outcome, a random sample was drawn. I implemented four different
sample sizes (n=50, n=100, n=500, n=1000=full sample). All individuals from the random sample
were then randomly attributed either to the experimental control- or treatment conditions. I then
simulated four different ways in which the treatment influenced the outcome. In all cases, the
outcome stayed the same for individuals in the control condition (table 18).
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Table 17: Parameters used for the generation of the outcome.
Condition Effect of the observed variables
on the test result
(fixed effects)
Effect of the unobserved
variables on the test result
(intercept, noise and random
effects)
Noise i.cov: 0
i.fac: 0
g.cov: 0
g.unobs.cov: 0
g.unobs.fac: 0
g.sd: 0
i.cov.sd: 0
i.fac.sd: 0
Observed i.cov: 0.15
i.fac: 15
g.cov: 0.1
g.unobs.cov: 0
g.unobs.fac: 0
g.sd: 0
i.cov.sd: 0
i.fac.sd: 0
Unobserved i.cov: 0.15
i.fac: 15
g.cov: 0.1
g.unobs.cov: 15
g.unobs.fac: 10
g.sd: 0
i.cov.sd: 0
i.fac.sd: 0
Group i.cov: 0.15
i.fac: 15
g.cov: 0.1
g.unobs.cov: 15
g.unobs.fac: 10
g.sd: 20
i.cov.sd: 0.1
i.fac.sd: 10
In all conditions, the outcome was a function of the observed and the unobserved variables of the
individuals and groups. The parameter settings for each condition were defined as shown in the
table and the outcome was calculated by building the sum of the products between the parameter
and the respective variable values from the data set. Clustered outcomes were implemented by
modelling a group random intercept with a mean of 0 and a sd equal to the g.sd. Effects of
observed individual variables varying between groups were implemented by modelling random
slopes with a mean of 0 and a sd for each fixed effect as shown in the table. Under all conditions,
the overall mean outcome was 100 with a standard deviation of 1.5.
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Table 18: Parameters used for modeling the treatment effect.
Condition Treatment effect
Fixed treatment Fixed effect = 0
Interaction with i.cov = 0
Treatment effect sd = 0
Correlated treatment Fixed effect = 0
Interaction with i.cov = 1.5
Treatment effect sd = 0
Varying treatment Fixed effect = 0
Interaction with i.cov = 0
Treatment effect sd = 5
Correlated and varying
treatment
Fixed effect = 0
Interaction with i.cov = 1.5
Treatment effect sd = 5
Under all conditions, the fixed effect of treatment was 0. In the correlated treatment condition, the
treatment effect however depended also on the value of i.cov. In the varying treatment condition,
the treatment effect varied among the groups and in the correlated and varying condition, the
treatment effect depended on i.cov and varied among the groups.
Table 19: The different statistical models implemented in the simulation.
Model Estimation procedure
Ttest TreatmentEffect=t.test(Treatment, Control,
var.equal=TRUE, paired=FALSE)
Linear
(linear regression)
linear=lm(outcome~Treatment+i.cov+i.fac+g.cov,
data=sample)
Fixef
(fixed effects
regression)
fixef=lm(outcome~Treatment+i.cov+i.fac+g_dummies,
data=sample)
Ranef
(Random effects
regression
ranef=lmer(outcome~Treatment+i.cov+i.fac+g.cov+
(1|g), data=sample, REML=FALSE)
Mixef
(Mixed effects
regression)
mixef=lmer(outcome~Treatment+i.cov+i.fac+g.cov+
(1|g)+(0+Treatment*|g)+(0+i.cov|g)+(0+i.fac|g),
data=sample1, REML=FALSE)
(given the data available, this corresponds to the
maximal
model Barr et al. 2013, p. 261)
The table shows the R notation for the different estimation procedures.
Finally, using the same sample data including the outcome for the individuals in the treatment
and control groups, I used different estimation procedures to estimate the treatment effect (table
19). The two sample T-test coincided with the unadjusted ATE. The regression models adjusted
the ATE by considering other variables. While the linear regression model only accounted for
other observed variables, the fixed- and the random effects regression models also controlled in
different ways for unobserved heterogeneity at the group level (the unobserved variables) and
clustered outcomes (random intercepts). The mixed effects regression model furthermore also
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controlled for varying effects of observed individual level variables (random slopes). Considering
the available data, the maximal mixed effects regression model includes all random terms possible
given the data (Quinn and Keough 2002; Barr et al. 2013; Bruederl and Ludwig 2015; Mundry
2017).
In summary, the simulation consisted of the five following steps: generation of the data (table 16),
generation of the outcome (table 17), drawing the sample data and random assignment to the ex-
perimental groups, assignment of the treatment effect (table 18), estimation of the treatment effect
(table 19). This was done for all combinations of outcomes (table 17), sample sizes and treatment
effects (table 18), leading to 64 distinct combination of parameter settings for the simulation. For
each of the 64 parameter setting the simulation was repeated 1000 times, leading to 64,000 simu-
lation runs and 304,000 estimated treatment effects (for simulation runs with sample sizes equal
to 50, I did not estimate the mixed effects regression model (the model was too complex for the
sample size. This is why the number of estimated parameters is not equal to 64,000*5=320,000)).
The simulation was conducted in R (R Core Team 2016). The random- and mixed effects regres-
sion models were estimated with the package lme4 (Bates et al. 2015) and the significance for the
treatment effect of these models was calculated with a Likelihood Ratio test (Bolker et al. 2009;
Barr et al. 2013).
5.4.3 Results: simulation study
Overall, the estimated ATE varied strongly. The t-test provided estimate ranges between 0.6 and
61.4 with shares of significant estimates between 3.7% and 54.4%. The linear regression provi-
ded estimate ranges between 0.6 and 56.9 with shares of significant estimates between 4.2% and
58.3%. The fixed effects regression provided estimate ranges between 0.6 and 50.3 with shares of
significant estimates between 3.6% and 66.5%. The random effects regression provided estimate
ranges between 0.6 and 36.8 with shares of significant estimates between 3.6% and 66.6%. The
mixed effects regression provided estimate ranges between 0.6 and 22.3 with shares of significant
estimates between 3.5% and 11.3%. The estimate range of the different estimation procedures
were mainly influenced by the type of outcome, the type of treatment effect and the sample size.
The share of significant results of the different estimation procedures were mainly influenced by
the type of outcome and the type of treatment effect. The different estimation procedures showed
important differences in the way their estimates reacted to changes in type of outcome and tre-
atment effect: while the mixed effects regression provided the most consistent results across all
types of outcome and treatment effect, the ranges of the t-test and linear regression estimates were
most strongly influenced by the type of outcome and treatment effect. The shares of significant
results of the fixed and random effects regression were highly inflated for the varying treatment
effect. Increasing sample size reduced the ranges of estimates in most of the simulation conditions
(figures 21 to 24).
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Figure 21: The estimates for the fixed treatment effect.
The plot shows all estimates for simulation runs in the fixed treatment condition (table 18). For all
estimation procedures, estimates for sample sizes of 50 are shown left, estimates for sample sizes of
100 are shown second from left, estimates for sample sizes of 500 are shown second from right and
estimates for full samples are shown right. Significant estimates (p values <= 0.05) are in red and
non-significant estimates (p values > 0.05) in black. The share of significant estimates is written
in the upper segment of the plot, above the respective sample size and estimation procedures. The
range of estimates is written in the lower segment of the plot, below the respective sample size and
estimation procedures. The average of all estimates is depicted with a green point.
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Figure 22: The estimates for the correlated treatment effect.
The plot shows all estimates for simulation runs in the correlated treatment condition (table 18).
For all estimation procedures, estimates for sample sizes of 50 are shown left, estimates for sample
sizes of 100 are shown second from left, estimates for sample sizes of 500 are shown second from
right and estimates for full samples are shown right. Significant estimates (p values <= 0.05) are
in red and non-significant estimates (p values > 0.05) in black. The share of significant estimates
is written in the upper segment of the plot, above the respective sample size and estimation pro-
cedures. The range of estimates is written in the lower segment of the plot, below the respective
sample size and estimation procedures. The average of all estimates is depicted with a green point.
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Figure 23: The estimates for the varying treatment effect.
The plot shows all estimates for simulation runs in the varying treatment condition (table 18). For
all estimation procedures, estimates for sample sizes of 50 are shown left, estimates for sample
sizes of 100 are shown second from left, estimates for sample sizes of 500 are shown second from
right and estimates for full samples are shown right. Significant estimates (p values <= 0.05) are
in red and non-significant estimates (p values > 0.05) in black. The share of significant estimates
is written in the upper segment of the plot, above the respective sample size and estimation pro-
cedures. The range of estimates is written in the lower segment of the plot, below the respective
sample size and estimation procedures. The average of all estimates is depicted with a green point.
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Figure 24: The estimates for the correlated and varying treatment effect.
The plot shows all estimates for simulation runs in the correlated and varying treatment condition
(table 18). For all estimation procedures, estimates for sample sizes of 50 are shown left, estimates
for sample sizes of 100 are shown second from left, estimates for sample sizes of 500 are shown
second from right and estimates for full samples are shown right. Significant estimates (p values
<= 0.05) are in red and non-significant estimates (p values > 0.05) in black. The share of signi-
ficant estimates is written in the upper segment of the plot, above the respective sample size and
estimation procedures. The range of estimates is written in the lower segment of the plot, below
the respective sample size and estimation procedures. The average of all estimates is depicted with
a green point.
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Hypothesis test
H1: The unadjuted ATE of RCTs is an unbiased estimator of the typical causal effect (Rubin 1974,
p. 693). This hypothesis is falsified. The unadjusted ATE was biased under several conditions of
my simulation.
H1a: Adjusting for irrelevant covariates leads to a bias in the ATE of RCTs (Rubin 1974, pp.
696-697 and p. 700). This hypothesis is falsified. Under none of the conditions did adjusting for
irrelevant covariates introduce a bias.
H1b: Adjusting for covariates relies on additional assumptions that leads to additional bias in
the ATE of RCTs (Freedman 2008, p. 181). This hypothesis is supported. Especially the multiple
linear-, the fixed effects-, as well as the random effects regression models suffered from additional
bias in comparison to the unadjusted ATE in my simulation study. This was however not the case
for the mixed effects regression models.
H2: Maximal mixed effects regression model provide ATEs of RCTs that optimize generalization
of findings (Barr et al. 2013, p. 261). This hypothesis is supported. The mixed effects regression
model provided the best, or among the best estimates under all conditions of my simulation.
H2a: Adjusting for covariates correlated with the outcome increases the precision of ATEs of
RCTs (Kahan et al. 2014, p. 2). This hypothesis is supported. The precision of the adjusted
ATE increased compared to the precision of the unadjusted ATE as long as the covariates were
correlated with the outcome.
5.4.4 Conclusion: simulation study
When evaluating the performance of the different estimation procedures in the simulation, two
aspects need to be considered: first, the treatment effect estimates should be good proxies for the
true treatment effect size; second, the significances of the treatment effect estimates should provide
good measures for the relevance of the true treatment effect. In the case of the first criterion, I focus
on the range of the estimates. Because all estimates were unbiased, they were all 0 on average
(figures 21 to 24), this criteria cannot be used to compare the estimation procedures. The smaller
the range of the estimates, the better the performance of the estimation procedures. In the case of
the second criterion (the significance as a measure for the relevance of the treatment effect), I will
focus on the share of significant estimates. The larger the share of significant estimates, the worst
the performance of the estimation procedures. Then, the overall performance of the estimation
procedures was made up of these two components (the range of the estimates and the share of
significant estimates).
According to these two criteria, the best performing estimation procedure was clearly the mixed
effects regression. The t-test performed poorly related to the ranges of the estimates but was among
the better performing ones related to the share of significant estimates. The linear regression was
the worst performing one, because it had large ranges of estimates as well as inflated shares of
significant estimates. The performance of the fixed as well as the random effects regression models
laid somewhere in the middle: although having smaller ranges of estimates than the t-test and the
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linear regression, they provided the highest shares of significant results in the varying treatment
effect condition. Adjusting the ATE by considering other relevant variables did always result in
smaller estimate ranges. At the same time, adjusting the ATE by considering irrelevant variables
did only negatively affect the estimate ranges in the case of the fixed effects regression for sample
sizes of 50. On the other hand, not accounting for clustering and variation of effects present in the
data, led to an increased share of significant estimates (figures 21 to 24).
The good performance of the mixed effects regression models corroborates the finding of Barr et
al.: “In sum, our investigation suggests that for confirmatory hypothesis testing, maximal LMEMs
yield nearly optimal performance: they were better than all other approaches [...].” (2013, p. 272).
This result was to be expected, considering the fact that the Generalized Linear Model is a gene-
ralization of the t-test and that the Generalized Linear Mixed Model generalizes the Generalized
Linear Model (figure 25).
Figure 25: The relationship between the t-test, the generalized linear model and the generalized
linear mixed models (adapted from Bolker 2007, p. 397 and Mundry 2017, p. 164).
The generalized linear mixed model encompasses the general linear model, which in turn encom-
passes the t-test.
The good performance of the mixed effects regression models comes however at a cost. First,
mixed effects regression models can become very complex and their applicability relies upon large
enough sample sizes. Second, there is no agreement on which method to use in order to obtain p
values of estimates from mixed effects regression models. Hypothesis testing can become quite
complicated (for example testing the significance of multiple random slopes) and some tests are
not implemented in statistical packages. The different tests might also lead to slightly differing
conclusions (Bolker et al. 2009; Barr et al. 2013). Third, the maximal mixed effects regression
model might suffer from convergence issues in some cases (Bolker et al. 2009; Barr et al. 2013).
Finally, the mixed effects regression models have additional assumptions related to the random
terms, which are of no relevance in the case of the t-test and the generalized linear models (Quinn
and Keough 2002; Barr et al. 2013; Bruederl and Ludwig 2015; Mundry 2017).
As a practical recommendation, I would recommend following a hybrid approach to causal infe-
rence. I would suggest only relying upon unadjusted ATEs when the following conditions hold:
first, RCTs with large enough sample sizes are not feasible; second, the investigator is not aware of
other factors than the treatment known to influence the outcome; third, it is not feasible to gather
126
5.5. CONCLUSION: METHODICAL FOUNDATION
information on other factors known to influence the outcome; fourth, clusters and variations of in-
dividual effects in the data are not an issue. In all other cases, the experimental design should allow
for the adjustment of the ATE by considering other relevant factors and controlling for clustered
outcomes within a maximal mixed effects regression model framework.
5.5 Conclusion: methodical foundation
In this chapter, I have discussed different methodical issues related to causal inference. Causal in-
ference allows to make conclusions on the mechanisms underlying patterns observed in the world.
Only in this way are we able to generate and accumulate knowledge on the causal laws dictating
our life and world. According to the epistemological position I am following in this work, Pop-
per’s falsificationism, causal inference is the result of a combination of theoretical and empirical
work. Specific and logically coherent theoretical hypotheses are confronted with empirical data.
This corresponds to a test of the hypotheses and the underlying theories. As long as the theoretical
predictions correspond with the observations, the theory is supported. Otherwise, the theory is
falsified. My theoretical hypotheses, presented in chapter 4, postulate general mechanisms un-
derlying human behaviour using natural resources that are deduced from the works of Hobbes,
Rousseau and Smith.
Following a science of human nature approach, a sound test of these hypotheses can only be
conducted if the empirical data used for this test consists of observations made on a large number
of individuals with varying characteristics. These individuals should furthermore also belong to
different cultural groups that are not part of the WEIRD category and that show an important
variation in their environment and social structure. This is a first prerequisite for my empirical
work.
I have devoted an important part of this chapter to discuss the counterfactual analysis of causal
inference. This approach has been decisive for the progress of science, not only because it lays the
foundation for experimental research. It also provides a terminology and an analytical framework
to define causality. According to this approach, a causal effect is the difference between the value
of an outcome following a treatment and the value of the same outcome when the treatment is
missing. One of the main issues arising when measuring such a causal effect is, however, the fact
that it is never clear that different outcomes are really attributable to the treatment. Other factors
besides the treatment might also be responsible for the differences in the outcome. These other
factors are known as confounders. There are two main ways to deal with confounders. On the one
hand, the effect of confounders can be evened by conducting a randomized experiment. Usually,
this is the approach followed in experimental studies. On the other hand, these confounders can
be included as predictors in a statistical regression model, allowing to estimate their effect on the
outcome and isolating the treatment effect. Usually, this is the approach followed in observational
studies. However, different types of regression models allow to control for confounding effects
at different degrees. In my simulation study, I have shown that mixed-effects regression models
provide the best treatment effect estimates, and that the combination of a randomized experiment
with such a mixed-effects regression model is a highly promising approach to causal inference.
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Such an approach can however only be applied if a randomized experiment is feasible and if
reliable data on important confounders is available. As a result, a sound test of my hypotheses can
only be implemented if I have access to a large amount of information on my study population
in order to control for confounders. Ideally, this information is combined with data from a RCT.
These are the other prerequisites for my empirical work.
In the next chapter 6, I describe the field work I conducted to gather my empirical data and give
a qualitative report of my study population. My study population consisted of people living in
small-scale societies in a remote region of Guinea, West Africa, showing important variations in
socio-economic, demographic and cultural factors. I gathered a large amount of data on a large
number of different aspects during my field work in Guinea (chapter 6). In my observational
study on the sustainable use of natural resources (chapter 7), I linked this data with ecological
data and used mixed-effects regressions for causal inference. In my experimental study on the
fair allocation of natural resources (chapter 8), I linked this data with data from a randomized
experiment I conducted and used mixed-effects regressions as well for causal inference.
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Data basis: field work in Guinea
Humans exploiting a natural resource held in common face a problem of social order. If the
resource becomes overexploited and scarce, conflicts might erupt. If the allocation of the resource
is perceived as unfair, conflicts might erupt if some individuals want to modify the allocation. Key
concepts used by scientists to determine solutions to overcome this problem of social order build
upon the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. Based on the works of the classical scholars, I
have deduced hypotheses on factors allowing to overcome the problem of social order occurring
when humans use natural resources which are held in common (table 13).
Popper’s falsificationism puts equal weight on the theoretical deductive and the empirical part of
scientific investigations. Only the confrontation of theoretical hypotheses with empirical observa-
tion, within the framework of a statistical hypotheses test, allows to generate robust knowledge on
causal mechanisms responsible for patterns observed in the world. While the theoretical hypot-
heses without doubt play an important part of such a hypotheses test, the result of each statistical
hypotheses test is intrinsically linked to the quality of the empirical observations. This is well
known from the following simple statement: garbage in, garbage out. Besides the quality of the
empirical observations, two further requirements need to be met in order to be able to put my
theoretical hypotheses to a sound empirical test: first, my observations need to be conducted on
a non-WEIRD study population, showing importation variations in socioeconomic, demographic,
environmental, as well as cultural factors; second, my observations should allow to gain insights
on a large number of factors that could be important for my outcomes of interest. These two
prerequisites directly result from the work presented in my methodical chapter 5.
In this chapter, I describe how I obtained my data basis used for the empirical tests of my hypot-
heses. Most of this data results from extensive field works I conducted in Guinea in a 12-month
period between April 2013 and October 2014. First, I describe the institutional framework of my
field work. Then, I give a detailed qualitative report of the work conducted to gather the data, as
well as the different dimensions of the study population in which I was interested. This qualitative
report also serves as a description of my study population.
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6.1 The chimpanzee offset project in Guinea
The Wild Chimpanzee Foundation (WCF) is a nongovernmental, non-profit organization with the
mission “[...] to enhance the survival of the remaining wild chimpanzee populations and their
habitat [...]” (Wild Chimpanzee Foundation 2018). For this purpose, the WCF implements conser-
vation programs in three West African countries (Guinea, Liberia and Ivory Coast). The conser-
vation programs of the WCF are diverse, but focus on one of the four following pillars: scientific
knowledge, law enforcement as well as community education and livelihood. By combining these
three aspects, the WCF hopes to be able to successfully complete its mission (Wild Chimpanzee
Foundation 2018).
In Guinea, the WCF cooperates with the Guinean government, the International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC), the Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée and the Global Aluminium Corporation in
order to implement a biodiversity offset project according to IFC standards. As a result of this
cooperation, the two mining companies agreed to finance a new national park in Guinea in order
to compensate for the negative impact of their mining activities on the chimpanzees living on their
concessions. Ideally, this should result in a net gain in the total Guinean chimpanzee population.
Following on extensive efforts which began in 2012 with a nationwide inventory of chimpanzees,
the Guinean Minister of Environment, Water and Forests signed an order for the creation of the
new Moyen-Bafing National Park on the 28th September 2018 (International Finance Corporation
2017). My thesis is embedded in the preliminary work related to the creation of the Moyen-Bafing
National Park. The detailed interviews and survey of the local population conducted in the course
of my thesis offered an insight into the lifestyle of the local population. Combining this informa-
tion with biomonitoring data of wildlife from the same area allowed to assess the compatibility of
the socioeconomic practices of the local population with wildlife conservation in the area.
6.1.1 My thesis work within the WCF offset project in Guinea
The results of a nationwide inventory of chimpanzees conducted in 2012 revealed an interesting
pattern: chimpanzees were most abundant in the Foutah Djallon (Wild Chimpanzee Foundation
2012, p. 12). This region has no rainforest, in contrast to the region of the Guinée Forestière, and
has the second highest human population density in the country. Finding the highest abundance
of chimpanzees in this part of the country is intriguing, as one would expect chimpanzees to be
most abundant in their natural habitat, the rain forests, and also in the regions with the lowest
human population densities. As the Foutah Djallon offered promising potential offset sites for
the destructive activities of mining companies (Wild Chimpanzee Foundation 2014, p. 30), more
research was necessary to understand the underlying causes of the irregularity in the distribution
of chimpanzees in Guinea. This was the incentive for my thesis. After having secured support and
funding (chapter 10), I went to Guinea to carry out the necessary field work. During a first trip
from April 2013 to June 2013, I visited the region to gather important information and initiate the
necessary preparations for the field work, to be conducted from October 2013 to June 2014. During
the same period, two WCF biomonitoring teams recorded signs and sightings of wild mammals
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from October 2013 to March 2014. The broad area for my field work was determined by the
results of the monitoring conducted in 2012 (figure 26). I decided to start working in the north
east of the area, between the classified forests of Bakoun, Sobory and Boula. The next sections of
this chapter describe my field work and the local population I studied. If not especially mentioned,
all pictures shown in these sections were taken by me in the study area.
Figure 26: Distribution of chimpanzees in the Foutah Djallon region (Wild Chimpanzee Founda-
tion 2012, p. 12).
The area where I conducted my field work is demarcated with a red rectangle.
6.1.2 Preparations for the field work
Before my first trip to Guinea in 2013, my knowledge of the study area mainly consisted of the
results of the WCF nationwide inventory of chimpanzees (Wild Chimpanzee Foundation 2012), as
well as the sparse information available on Google Earth (figure 27).
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Figure 27: Information available through Google earth on the potential study area.
Because of the low level of information available related to the potential study area, the field work
had the character of an expedition, with the aim of makíng a reliable, precise map of the area that
besides environmental characteristics also included in depth information on the human population
living there. As the area was inaccessible and undeveloped (even by Guinean standards), extensive
preparations were necessary in order to successfully carry out the field work, e.g. to bring along
most of the needed equipment. The preparations started with obtaining the necessary working
permit and the procuring the necessary amount of money in cash (figure 28).
Figure 28: Working permit and money.
Left) A working permit had first to be issued by the Guinean Ministry of Environment, Water and
Forests in the capital Conakry. Then, all governors in charge of the area where I wanted to work
had to sign the working permit. With this official signed document the population of the study area
was more or less obliged to support my work. Right) The study area was remote, without access to
any banks. For this reason, I had to bring along enough cash to be able to finance all necessities
on-site. The 5 million Franc Guinéen on the picture correspond to 500 euros.
Most importantly, I had to recruit a driver as well as two assistants (figure 29). The driver was
responsible for driving, maintaining, packing the car, as well as for its safety (figure 30). The
task of the assistants was to conduct interviews with the local people of the study area. Although
the official language of Guinea is French, and the questionnaire was in French (see questionnaire
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in the appendix), most of the inhabitants of the study area did only speak one of the two local
languages, Malinke or Fulbe. The assistants therefore had to be fluent in French, as well as at least
in one of the two local languages. One of the assistants, Salian Traore, was also an employee of
the Guinean Ministry of Environment, Water and Forests. The 1500 questionnaires we brought
to the field were kept in a big metal box in order to protect them from the weather and any other
damage. Since the whole work was conducted in an area without any electricity infrastructure, we
had to make sure to provide our own source of electricity. For this purpose, we entirely relied on a
solar panel, with the car battery as a back-up source for electricity. In this way, by making use of
a powerbank that we always tried to keep charged, we were able to charge the laptop, the batteries
for the Garmin GPS devices, our mobile phones and our torches. Finally, we also had to bring
our food in order to be not too much of a charge for the local people hosting us (figure 31). We
furthermore also brought along presents for the local people (figure 32). This greatly increased
their acceptance for our work.
Figure 29: The whole team.
Traore, my main assistant, on the far right of the picture. The woman he is shaking hand with was
the cook of the ecologist team. Ousmane, to my right, was my driver. Mohammed, the driver of the
ecologist team, is to the right of Ousmane. Lamine, to my left, was my second assistant. The other
people on the picture are the ecologists responsible for the biomonitoring, led by Foromo, on the
far left. Both cars are Toyota Land Cruisers. The car on the left belonged to my team, the car on
the right to the ecologists. All people working on these two projects were hired by the WCF.
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Figure 30: The car.
The WCF provided a Toyota Land Cruiser for my field work. The car was essential for the success
of the field work and was not only used as a means of transport, but also for storage. Top left)
Driving the car was not an easy task in the remote study area. The roads were in bad shape
and there were no bridges. Top right) The car got stuck frequently and it happened that we only
managed to carry on thanks to the help of local people. Bottom left) All our material and food had
to fit in the car. Bottom right) The only way was also using the top of the car.
Figure 31: Food and water.
Left) The food we brought with us had to be durable. Our diet consisted mainly of rice with
palm oil or peanut cream. Then, we also had beans, canned vegetables, as well as corned beef,
some pasta, vegetable oil, onions, garlic, salt and pepper. Most importantly, we took care to
bring along enough green tea as well as plenty of sugar to prepare the highly appreciated Ataya.
Additionally, depending on the village and the season, we were able to buy fresh vegetables, fruits
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and occasionally a chicken from the village communities. Middle) Mohamed preparing Ataya.
This beverage is made up of green tea with sugar and is widely consumed in Guinea, but also
in other West-African countries. Right) We used the same water as the local people, which came
either from draw-wells, from springs or from rivers. However, we always filtered the water with a
ceramic filter. This procedure was time consuming, and we had to filter the water during a whole
day to obtain one canister of drinking water.
Figure 32: Presents.
Left) We brought along one soccer ball and 10 Cola nuts for every single village we visited to
conduct the field work. The soccer balls were intended for the youths of the villages and the 10
Cola nuts were a ritual present to the elders of the communities. We gave the presents to the
village communities when we introduced ourselves. In some cases, when we had the impression
that the village was especially poor, we also gave a rasp to the village community. Our presents
were always well received and helped to build a mutually beneficial relationship with the village
communities. Middle) In each village, we interacted more with some individuals than with others.
We therefore also brought along a stock of cigarettes and Cola nuts as little giveaways for smokers
and adepts of Cola nuts. For some individuals who really helped us a lot, we also had watches.
Those watches were however only given after careful considerations, as they represented a pre-
cious gift. Right) With the aim to increase the participations of the villagers to our survey, we
brought along salt and promised a remuneration of 1 kg of salt for every household participating
in our survey (chapter 8). The whole salt, approximately 900 kg, took plenty of precious room in
our car.
6.1.3 Conducting the field work
The twofold objective of my field work was: on the one hand, I focused on gathering information
on the locations and the names of all villages and settlements, the roads, the trails and the fields in
the area. This information was then combined with topography, hydrology, as well as information
about the vegetation. In this way, a precise and informative map of the area was created. On the
other hand, I also focused on gathering information on the demography, the cultural practices and
beliefs, as well as the economic activities of the local population.It was essential for the success
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of my scientific work to be able to gather reliable information on a wide range of topics, crucial
for being able to put my theoretical predictions (table 13) to a sound empirical test.
We started the field work in the central, most important village of the area. This village was
Gagnakaly, and we were advised to go there by the governor of the prefecture of Dinguiraye. The
aim was to interview as many people in as many villages as possible. While the assistants were
interviewing the people, I was following local guides through the area to take track logs of the
village boundaries, the boundaries of the fields of the villages, the trails and the roads in the area.
We proceeded like that from one village to the next one, and when on some occasions, it was not
possible to reach a village by car, we had to walk. We were well received in every village, and we
were always provided with a hut to stay by the community, and a woman to cook for us. During
the whole field work, we lived in the villages where we worked (figure 33).
Figure 33: Daily life.
Top left) Traore, Lamine, Ousmane and me with the chief and his close relatives of a village. Top
right) One of the many huts in which we stayed. These huts were useful for charging the powerbank
placed in the shade, while the panel was sun-exposed during the whole day. Bottom left) In the
evening, Traore, Lamine, Ousmane and me shared our meal. Here, me and Lamine. Bottom right)
When I had a day off from taking track-logs, I entered the data collected on the spot. In this way,
I was always busy.
Mapping the area In order to map the area, we depended on the help of the local communities.
The village communities selected my guides, and we discussed the work to be done (figure 34).
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Figure 34: Mapping the area.
Top left) The local people in the study area had a good knowledge of their environment. However,
the only map of the area we could find was misleading, as the relations between the rivers and the
villages on the map were partly incorrect. Top middle) The villages in the area were inaccessible
and sometimes entirely in the woods. 14 of the 69 villages where we conducted our work were not
accessible by car. Top right) A guide showing me a field. We walked along the boundaries of all
main fields of the villages. Bottom left) Whenever possible, we used a motorbike to take the track
logs of roads or trails. Crossing a river was always a hurdle and sometimes only possible with a
boat, as there were no bridges in the area. Bottom middle) Crossing a river by foot was also not
always easy. Sometimes a fallen tree worked as a bridge for pedestrians. Bottom right) A guide
showing me the trail used to reach a neighbouring village. The guides showed me all trails and
roads leading away from their villages. In this way, we walked up to 60 km daily. I walked a total
of about 2500 km to collect all these track logs. The guides received an average remuneration of
1 Euro per hour as well as cigarettes and Cola nuts.
Studying the population When studying the human population living in the study area, I was
mainly interested in aspects related to the demography (figure 35), the structure (figure 36), the
beliefs (figure 37), and the economic activities (agriculture (figure 38), cattle-breeding (figure 39),
fruit-growing (figure 40), hunting (figure 41), gathering (figure 42), fishing (figure 43), mining,
and working migration (figure 44)). I tried to record and quantify all these different aspects with
standardized quantitative interviews conducted by the assistants with the population of the study
area. All interviews were first conducted with the family fathers of the village communities.
Then, if they agreed to, we also interviewed as many other members of the households as possible
and necessary. For example, when a household was cultivating rice, we were also interested in
interviewing the members of the household responsible for the cultivation of the rice. In total, we
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were able to interview about 86% of the households (10,463 people) living in the area (figure 45).
Figure 35: Demography.
The village communities in the study area are composed of extended families made up of family
fathers with their wives (up to 4 wives), their relatives and their children. Left) The families of
the chief of a village (sitting third from right in the first row) and his brother (standing on the
left). Apart from Traore, Lamine and me (standing last row/behind) all other male individuals on
this pictures are the two men’s sons. The children are their children and the women are either
their wives, their unmarried daughters or their mothers. Right) As a result of the large number
of children in each household, the population of the study area is very young (median age of 14
years)
Figure 36: Structure.
Top left) In most villages, the people live in traditionally built huts and practice the same lifestyle.
138
6.1. THE CHIMPANZEE OFFSET PROJECT IN GUINEA
Top right) The most common lifestyle is based on subsistence. Here, the top of the hut is used to
store the millet from the last harvest. Every day, a share of this millet is used to make a soup.
Bottom left) Some villagers, however, also produce a surplus to be sold. After the harvest, traders
visit the villages to buy the people’s harvest. Bottom right) Because of their economic activities,
some villagers are able to build modern-fashioned houses. The presence of such houses among
the traditional huts is an indication for economic inequality.
Figure 37: Beliefs.
The local population is strongly religious and practices a traditional Islam, combined with ani-
mistic beliefs. I was especially interested in the religious taboos related to the consumption of
specific types of meat. Top) A man in front of the traditional mosque of his village. Bottom) A
modern mosque in the middle of a village composed of traditional huts.
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Figure 38: Agriculture.
The most important economic activity of the local population in the study area is agriculture (more
specifically crop production). Top left) Slash and burn is used to produce crops mostly in the
forests: prepared field where rice is starting to grow. We expected this practice to have a strong
negative impact on the environment. Top right) In all villages, crops are also grown within the
village boundaries: fresh maize growing within a village. Maize is one of the four most important
crops in the study area. Middle left) Beside crop cultivation, women also produce vegetables in
gardens located within the village. Middle right) The most important crop in the area are peanuts:
peanut harvest drying on the soil. Bottom left) Millet is, besides peanut, the traditionally grown
crop in the area: women during the millet harvest. Bottom right) Rice is another crop of major
importance for the population in the study area: men during the rice harvest.
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Figure 39: Cattle-breeding.
The second pillar of the local economy is cattle breeding. The local population has an intimate
relationship with their animals and keeps them in close distance. Animals are sometimes held
for private consumption, but mainly for ceremonial and financial purposes. Top left) Cows are
the most important animals and one measure for the wealth of a man is the number of cows he
owns: cows visiting my hut. Top right) Cows are also very important because of the milk they
produce. Households owning enough cows are able to consume milk every day. Middle left)
Sheep are omnipresent in all villages and mainly are held for ceremonial purposes. Most of them
are slaughtered at Eid al-Adha: two sheep visiting me in my hut. Middle right) Also goats are
omnipresent in all villages and have a similar economic value as sheep. They are however less
important for the ceremonies. Bottom left) Chicken are the only animals that are consumed on
a regular basis. Nearly every household owns chicken: a chicken family visiting me in my hut.
Bottom right) A chicken breeding in my hut.
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Figure 40: Fruit-growing.
Fruit trees are planted mainly within the villages. Plantations are very rare in the region, but
begin to play a role for the local economy. Top left) Mango trees are crucial for the well-being
of the population. These trees become huge and produce countless amounts of fruits. The fruits
are ripe at the beginning of the wet-season. This is important, as the stock of crops from the last
harvest is coming to an end or is already used up at this time of the year. If this is the case,
mango is the only food available, when cattle or other precious reserves are not to be touched.
Top right) Orange trees are also abundant in the region, but play a much less important role for
the well-being of the locals than mango trees. Bottom left) Banana trees are grown in plantations,
mainly for commercial purposes. Bottom right) Papayas, like a number of other fruit trees, are
less frequent than the three mentioned before and are mainly planted for private consumption.
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Figure 41: Hunting.
Hunting in the study area is practiced mostly for the sake of local meat consumption. Top left)
Although most households own a gun, only a small fraction of them hunt on a regular or even pro-
fessional basis. Top right) Besides hunting for meat consumption, hunters also keep the offspring
of killed animals as pets. Here, a child with an infant monkey (Erythrocebus patas) Bottom left)
As a consequence, the hunters in the area also supply the broader trade in pet animals. Here, a
baby bushbuck. Bottom right) Also, the furs are of economic value. This picture shows a hunter’s
collection of bushbuck furs.
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Figure 42: Gathering.
All households in the study area make use of gathered products. Wood, for example, is the only
resource available for heating and is used on a daily basis. Everyone who needs wood just collects
it in the forest. However, there are innumerable other products that local people gather in the
study area. Some of them have an important economic value and are used for trade. Top left)
The Vitellaria paradoxa trees are abundant in the study area and huge amounts of their fruits are
collected. Top middle) The Vitellaria paradoxa tree fruits are used to make shea butter which is
used for cooking and as an ingredient for beauty products. Top rigth) Parinari excelsa trees are
also abundant in the area. Their fruits play an important role for the Guinean cuisine. Middle left)
The fruits of the Parinari excelsa tree are used to produce a flavouring powder that is omnipresent
in Guinea. Middle middle) Wild honey is frequently found in tree holes in the forest. In order to
extract honey from a tree, a fire is laid around the tree, and then it is cut down to get out as much
honey as possible. Middle right) Wild honey is used for private consumption, but is also sold on
markets. Bottom left) The roofs of the traditional huts are made of grass. When the grass is high,
it is gathered and stored. Bottom middle) The bark of trees is used to build ropes. Bottom right)
These ropes are used in all kinds of construction works.
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Figure 43: Fishing.
In all villages located close to rivers, some households practice fishing on a daily basis. Fishing is
an important economic activity, as it provides the village communities with animal proteins. Top)
The daily catch made by one fisher. Bottom) Lamin was very fond of fish, so whenever we had the
opportunity, we bought some fresh fish.
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Figure 44: Other activities.
In addition to the activities mentioned above, there are two more important economic activities
practiced in the study area. Top left) A number of households trade with goods. For example,
on special gatherings, they bring along industrial goods to sell them. Top right) Guinea is rich
in gold and other minerals. People are searching for gold everywhere in the country: the trench
of an illegal local mine. Bottom left) Women also search for gold, but have a different approach
than males: surface mining is their way to search for gold. Bottom right) Finally, all families in
the area are concerned with working migration. During the dry season, when there is no work in
agriculture, around one quarter of the adult population of the study area leaves the area to work
in the huge industrial mines or the cities of the country. This picture was taken on a Guinean road
outside of the study area and shows how most Guineans travel through the country.
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Figure 45: Interviews.
It was not always possible to realize a standardized interview situation during our field work.
Whenever possible, face-to-face interviews were conducted in closed huts without the presence
of others. The interviews were, however, sometimes also conducted outside with bystanders. We
always started the interviews with the family father and, after he gave his approval, went on
with interviewing other members of his household. Sometimes it took several days to finalize the
interviews with one household: Traore conducting an interview under a mango tree.
6.2 Conclusion: field work
In this chapter, I have described the field work undertaken to collect observational data and infor-
mation allowing to put my theoretical hypotheses (table 13) to an empirical test.
Based on the work presented in chapter 5, my data basis had to meet two requirements: first,
observations needed to be made on a study population composed of individuals from different
non-WEIRD cultural groups showing important variations in the social structure and in individual
characteristics. My data clearly meets this first requirement: the study population was made up
of Fulbe and Malinke small-scale societies. Fulbe and Malinke are the two most important ethnic
groups found in Guinea who differ in important aspects: they have different conventions and
customs, they speak different languages, they have distinct appearances and their antagonism has
strongly shaped the history of Guinea. Although all studied village societies lived in the same
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geographical area, they showed a substantial variation in key social, economic, and demographic
factors. A second requirement for a sound empirical test of my theoretical hypotheses was the
availability of information on a variety of factors that could potentially influence the outcomes
of interest. As I was able to conduct extensive interviews with 86% of the households living in
the area, my data base covers most aspects that are relevant for the two subjects of interest and
therefore allows for sound empirical tests of my theoretical hypotheses (table 13).
In the next two chapters (chapters 7 and 8) I apply my general theoretical hypotheses to two
specific situations, allowing for a test of their predictive values. In my observational study (chapter
7), I combined my empirical data with ecological data on the abundance of wild mammals in
the study area. Considering wild mammals as a natural resource allowed to specify my general
hypotheses accordingly and put them to an empirical test. In my experimental study (chapter 8),
I link my empirical data to experimental data on a common pool resource game conducted in the
study population. In this experiment, the common pool resource was allocated among the subjects
involved in the experiment. Specifying my hypotheses accordingly, this allowed to test for their
predictive value in explaining the fairness of the observed allocation.
148
Chapter 7
Observational study: sustainable
natural resource use
In this chapter, I combine my empirical data with ecological data on the abundance of wild mam-
mals to evaluate the impact of the local human population on the local wild mammal populations
in the study area. Wild mammals are a natural resource which is used for multiple purposes by the
local human population. My different general theoretical hypotheses regarding factors influencing
the sustainability of natural resource use can therefore be reformulated in this context. This is a
simple enterprise, where sustainability in natural resource use more or less corresponds to high
abundance in wild mammals. In the introduction, I give a short summary of the rationale behind
the scientific study and the institutional framework it was embedded in. In the methods, I describe
my data and introduce the theoretical framework of Social Ecological Systems. I then reformulate
my theoretical hypotheses to the specific situation of wild mammal conservation and describe the
strategy used for the statistical analysis. In the results, I show the results of my hypotheses tests
and discuss implications for the theoretical work on social dilemma, as well as for the conservation
of wild mammals in the conclusion. This chapter mainly takes up a published study: L. Boesch,
R. Mundry, H. S. Kühl and R. Berger, 2017, Wild mammals as economic goods and implications
for their conservation, Ecology and Society, 22(4). Some parts were, however, adapted for the
purpose of this work.
7.1 Introduction: observational study
7.1.1 Wild mammals as a natural resource and issues related to their conservation
Wildlife is an important natural resource for human societies (section 4.2). Wild mammals, as
an integral part of wildlife, are also used by humans as a natural resource and can be seen as an
economic good. Excludability and rivalry are the two fundamental properties of any economic
good (table 2). Excludability refers to the restriction of access to the good, and rivalry refers to the
divisibility of the consumption of the good among individuals (Musgrave and Musgrave 1989).
According to these criteria, wild mammals can be classified as common goods in many regions of
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the world. Humans can gain economic value from wild mammals in three ways (Chardonnet et al.
2002). First, nutritious value is gained when humans exploit wild mammals in a direct consump-
tive way: wild mammals are an important source of meat for humans in many parts of the world,
and demand for bushmeat has been identified as one factor driving wild mammals to extinction
(Davies 2002; Milner-Gulland et al. 2003). Second, productive use value is gained when wild
mammals are exploited in a direct nonconsumptive way. Examples for the productive use value of
wild mammals are numerous, but trade certainly plays the most important role: wild mammals are
an important source of income for humans in many parts of the world (Milner-Gulland et al. 2003),
and the trade in wild mammals has been identified as a driver of the extinction of endangered wild
mammal species (Madhusudan 2005; Milledge 2007; Nijman and Schepherd 2007; TRAFFIC
2008; Nijman 2010; Briceno-Linares et al. 2011). In the African context, the exploitation of wild
mammals includes the whole range from rural consumption, based on subsistence, to purely com-
mercial activities driven by the demand of international trade (Brashares et al. 2011). Third, even
if they do not exploit wild mammals directly, humans can still gain indirect nonconsumptive use
value from wild mammals. Examples of this value are bird-watching or safari tourism. Finally,
wild mammals are an integral part of the ecosystem. Ecosystem functions in turn provide goods
and services that are essential for the survival of people. This aspect is not commonly included in
the economic value consideration as it is difficult to quantify (de Groot et al. 2002).
The properties inherent in common goods may lead to a social dilemma, where appropriators
of the common good have the incentive to raise the exploitation of the common good without
limit, thereby leading to its destruction (section 4.3.2). The assumption that the property of wild
mammals as non-excludable can be altered has been the origin of deer parks in medieval Europe,
where the king considered all deer as his private good (Birrell 1992). This assumption is one of
the main paradigms of modern conservation policy, which has led to the implementation of strictly
protected areas (Gardner et al. 2007), where wild mammals no longer represent an economic
value. The success of protected areas in conserving wild mammal populations is, however, not
guaranteed and depends on substantial efforts (Bruner et al. 2001; Craigie et al. 2010; Tranquilli
et al. 2012; Tranquilli et al. 2014), thereby leading to the “mounting realization that protected
areas are part of a complex social-ecological system characterized by flux, nonlinear relationships
and unpredictable outcomes” (van Wilgen and Biggs 2011, p. 1179). Integrated conservation and
development projects therefore suggest that the best way to protect wild mammals is to directly
involve the local human population: through ownership, economic incentives, and participation,
local people should benefit from conservation and support it (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003).
This approach is also termed “new conservation” and has been heavily criticized (Soulé 2013;
Marvier and Kareiva 2014; Marvier 2014). A pragmatic approach to conservation therefore builds
upon a flexible case-to-case approach, where the whole array of management tools are taken into
consideration.
An understanding of wild mammal-human relationships and the consequences of human activi-
ties for the spatial distribution of animals is of major interest for conservation biology and policy
because it allows understanding the relationships between the human population and wild mam-
mals in an area of interest (Elith and Leathwick 2009; Iwamura et al. 2014; van Vliet et al. 2015).
This is an important condition, first, for improving our understanding of social-ecological sys-
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tems, and second, this understanding is essential for implementing viable conservation programs,
since the fate of biodiversity, and especially wild mammals, is closely linked to human behaviour
and activities (Chazdon et al. 2009; Brncic et al. 2015; Junker et al. 2015). Typically, the set of
predictors for modelling species distribution does not include detailed socioeconomic information
but only some measure of human population density as a proxy for human activity. Probably this
is because spatial information about human population density is easily accessible and does not
require the time-consuming collection of detailed spatial socioeconomic context information. Ho-
wever, this approach neglects the fact that some important characteristics of human populations
are not represented by human density. For example, knowing that two areas have the same hu-
man population density does not tell us anything about the religious affiliation or the economic
activities of the people living in those areas. Not taking account of those differences might lead
to biased estimations. Analysing the relationship between wild mammals and humans within the
framework of social-ecological systems can help determine the relevant set of predictors. Os-
trom (2007; 2009) suggested a framework where social-ecological systems are made up of four
subsystems: the resource system, the resource units, the users, and the governance systems. Alt-
hough those subsystems are loosely separable, they interact to produce a common outcome at the
social-ecological system level. When trying to model the relationship between different factors
within a social-ecological system, the relevant factors from the four subsystems should therefore
be determined and incorporated as predictors into the model. We used a region in the Republic
of Guinea as an example to estimate the influence of humans on wild mammal abundance. We
compared the predictive value of human population density and other socioeconomic factors on
wild mammal abundance. We incorporated the concepts discussed so far into a social-ecological
system framework, as suggested by Ostrom (2007; 2009), to derive the relevant factors for our
model. This approach also allows to test predictions of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith applied to
the conservation of wild mammals. Finally, we consider how our socioeconomic approach could
be used to increase our understanding of wild mammal-human relationships in other regions.
7.1.2 The offset project implemented by the Wild chimpanzee foundation in Gui-
nea
The Republic of Guinea (figure 46 A), located in Western Africa, covers an area of 245,720 km2
(World Bank 2016c). Although its mammal fauna is not well-studied, Guinea is believed to have
the highest diversity of large mammals in the West African forests on a species per area basis
(Barnett and Prangley 1997). Results from a first nationwide chimpanzee survey, conducted from
1996 to 1997, suggested that Guinea was also home to about 18,000 chimpanzees (95% confi-
dence limits: 8113–29,011), the largest countrywide population of chimpanzees in West Africa
(Ham 1998). A second large-scale chimpanzee survey conducted by the Wild Chimpanzee Foun-
dation (WCF) in 2012 confirmed such a large chimpanzee population (Regnaut and Boesch 2012).
On the other hand, Guinea is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. In
2011, Guinea ranked 178 of 187 in the World Development Indicator (United Nations Develop-
ment Programme 2016), with a yearly per capita income of US$447.8 and a life expectancy of 57
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years (World Bank 2016b; World Bank 2016d). The Guinean economy relies on extractive acti-
vities. It has an important mining sector with potential access to one-third of the world’s highest
grade bauxite deposits, one untouched high-grade iron ore deposit, and gold, diamonds, platinum,
cobalt, nickel, silver, uranium, lead, and zinc (Campbell and Clapp 1995). In 2011, Guinea had
mineral rents worth 15.8% of its gross domestic product (GDP) and forest rents worth 13.4% of
its GDP (World Bank 2016e; World Bank 2016a). While 35% of the Guinean population lived in
urban areas in 2011 (World Bank 2016g), the rural population relies on ecosystem services for its
survival (Laakso and Tyynela 2006) and practices a slash-and-burn agriculture. Since “the current
level of extraction is low compared to the potential indicated by the resource value on the ground”
(World Economic Forum 2011, p. 28), extractive economic activities are believed to further incre-
ase. Furthermore, population growth was continuously greater than 2% from 2004 to 2014 (World
Bank 2016f). Past population growth led to a decrease in the fallow period from traditionally 17
years to 8 years (Sirois et al. 1998). Concerns are high that population and economic growth will
have a negative effect on the Guinean wild mammal populations, if no appropriate measures are
taken. In 2014, 15.4% of the world’s terrestrial area was classified as protected area (Juffe-Bignoli
et al. 2014). In Guinea, there were 124 resource management and protected areas covering 30%
of the country’s terrestrial area (Protected Planet 2016). Of these, 98 were classified forests (CFs).
These are forests that have been classified by the Guinean state as being of national interest. The
exploitation of environmental goods in CFs is regulated in a way as to find an equilibrium between
the socioeconomic needs of the local population and the interests of conserving the environment
(Ministère de l’agriculture et des ressources animales de la République de Guinée 1999). Only five
Guinean protected areas (Kankan Faunal Reserve [IUCN category IV], Mont Nimba Strict Nature
Reserve [IUCN category I], Badiar National Park [IUCN category II], Haut Niger National Park
[IUCN category II], and Blanche Island Faunal Reserve [IUCN category IV]) were dedicated to
the protection of biodiversity. These five protected areas cover 7050 km2 (2.9%) of Guinea’s ter-
restrial area, including three of five Guinean ecoregions. Furthermore, not all globally threatened
mammals that occur in Guinea are found in these five protected area. These findings highlight the
need to increase the number of protected areas that are dedicated to the protection of biodiversity
in Guinea (Brugiere and Kormos 2009). In an effort to create a new national park in the region, the
WCF cooperates with the Guinean government, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and
the mining companies Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée and Global Aluminum Corporation, in
order to implement a biodiversity offset project in Guinea. The WCF is a nongovernmental orga-
nization with the mission “to enhance the survival of the remaining wild chimpanzee populations
and their habitat, in West Africa” (Wild Chimpanzee Foundation 2018). The WCF offset project
aims at achieving conservation outcomes from offset programs of the involved mining compa-
nies’ activities, according to IFC standards (International Finance Corporation 2012), through the
creation of a new national park in Guinea (Wild Chimpanzee Foundation 2015). The location of
this future national park was selected according to abundance data based on the Guinean WCF
Chimpanzee Inventory 2012, as well as feasibility criteria (Regnaut and Boesch 2012). The park
is located close to the border of Mali, between the Labe-, the Mamou-, and the Faranah regions,
and comprises an already existing network of CFs (figure 46 A).
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Figure 46: Guinea, study region and study area.
(A) Guinea and the broader study region. (B) Transects of the Wild Chimpanzee Foundation
biomonitoring project located within a classified forests network in the study region. (C) Study
area with the transect segments and the locations of the villages, fields, rivers, roads, and trails.
7.2 Methods: observational study
7.2.1 Study area, sampling, and field data collection
In 2013 and 2014, data on wild mammals and the human population were collected in the region
where the WCF offset project is located to gain a better understanding of the wild mammals,
the human population, and human activities in the region (chapter 6). From October 2013 to
March 2014, two WCF biomonitoring teams recorded signs and sightings of wild mammals on
184 line transects according to IUCN standards (Kuehl et al. 2009), using a systematic design
(systematically segmented track line sampling) and distance sampling methodology (Buckland
et al. 2001; Thomas et al. 2010). Transect length was 2.5 km, and spacing between transects
was 5.5 km. Total effort was 462.5 km (185 transects), covering 8153 km2. This was the WCF
biomonitoring project area (figure 46 B). From April 2013 to June 2014, one sociological team,
consisting of four people and headed by L. B., collected socioeconomic and infrastructure data
in the same area. The sociological team focused its effort on a part of the WCF biomonitoring
project area. This area is referred to as the study area, and all further details on data and results
153
CHAPTER 7. OBSERVATIONAL STUDY: SUSTAINABLE NATURAL RESOURCE USE
refer to it. The study area comprised 52 transects and 69 villages (figure 46 C). The transects
were selected according to the following criteria: they had to be partly located either within a
5 km range of fields or villages, or they had to be within an area surrounded by villages. We
conducted detailed face-to-face interviews with the household heads of the village population and,
if necessary and feasible, several other members of the households. The interviews focused on
demography, economic practices, values, and beliefs related to the environment (see questionnaire
in the appendix). Furthermore, we took GPS track logs of the locations of the villages, their
important fields, the trails, and the roads in the study area.
7.2.2 The theoretical model
Applying the basic concepts briefly described in the introduction to the situation in the study area
enabled us to formulate hypotheses regarding the influence of the local human population on the
wild mammals in the study area. Our underlying assumption was that the local population did not
gain an indirect use value from wild mammals. This assumption was based on our knowledge of
the situation on site. We considered only the value which the local population could deduce by
exploiting wild mammals. Furthermore, we did not consider the relevance of wild mammals for
other stakeholders or the ecosystem. Using the social-ecological system framework suggested by
Ostrom (2007; 2009), we defined the situation and the relevant factors as follows. The outcome
of interest was wild mammal abundance. The resource unit system was made up of mobile wild
mammals. The resource system consisted of the habitat where the wild mammals live. We ex-
pected the suitability of the habitat for wild mammals to depend on the habitat type (Tews et al.
2004; Guisan and Thuiller 2005), its access to water (Western 1975; Redfern et al. 2003; DeGama-
Blanchet and Fedigan 2006; Chammaillé-Jammes et al. 2007), its accessibility (Malcolm and Ray
2000; Develey and Stouffer 2001; Laurance et al. 2006), and its destruction rate (Tilmann et al.
1994; Pimm and Raven 2000). The user system was made up of the local population living in the
study area. We expected the local population to use wild mammals as a source of meat for private
consumption (Davies 2002; Milner-Gulland et al. 2003; Brashares et al. 2011) and a source of
income (Milner-Gulland et al. 2003; Madhusudan 2005; Milledge 2007; Nijman and Schepherd
2007; TRAFFIC 2008; Nijman 2010; Briceno-Linares et al. 2011; Brashares et al. 2011). The de-
pendency of the local population on wild mammals depends on viable alternatives (Bennett 2002;
Milner-Gulland et al. 2003; Brashares et al. 2011; Junker et al. 2015), which are provided through
access to the market, as well as fishing activities. Whether the population will use wild mammals
is further influenced by normative prescriptions about the appropriateness of consuming specific
kinds of wild animal meat (McDonald 1977; Balée 1985; Pezzuti et al. 2010; Read et al. 2010;
Luzar et al. 2012). While the whole population uses wild mammals and can exploit them, only
a fraction of the population consists of professional appropriators (hunters) who are specialized
in harvesting wild mammals. They depend on the demand of the local population and the access
to the market in order to be able to earn money. The hunters may have special normative pres-
criptions related to the killing of wild mammal species (McDonald 1977; Balée 1985; Pezzuti
et al. 2010; Read et al. 2010), but we assumed that their hunting activities are based essentially
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on the demand from the local population and the market. The governance system is shaped by
the limited influence of the central government, which is restricted to the CFs. Those are under
government control, while the rest of the area is divided among the different village communities
and is managed by them through customary rules (table 20).
7.2.3 Wildlife conservation from the perspective of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith
Although it dos not seem obvious at first sight, the work of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith (chapter
2) can help to gain insight about the way humans exploit wild mammals and about useful me-
chanisms for their conservation. In this section, predictions related to the effect of the human
population on wild mammal abundance in the study area are elabourated.
Land ownership in the study area was determined according to customary and state law. Each vil-
lage community owned a part of the area and the exploitation of wild mammals within these areas
was regulated through customary rules. The CFs were owned by the state and the sustainable ex-
ploitation of wild mammals in the CFs was regulated through state law (Ministère de l’agriculture
et des ressources animales de la République de Guinée 1999). Strictly speaking, the wild mammals
in the study were therefore no common good any more: two of the main institutional solutions to
the tragedy of the commons, the state property- and the communal property regimes were already
implemented (section 4.3.2). While it generally seems that there was a broad consensus on the
ownership of the land, some parts of the area were subject to conflicting land ownership claims
(figure 47).
The empirical evidence regarding the success of the two types of property regimes in protecting
wild mammals from overexploitation is contradicting (Bruner et al. 2001; Campbell and Vainio-
Mattila 2003; Craigie et al. 2010; Tranquilli et al. 2012; Soulé 2013; Marvier 2014; Marvier and
Kareiva 2014; Tranquilli et al. 2014; Jones et al. 2018). From a philosophical perspective, we
find arguments supporting both regimes one over the other. Following Hobbes (section 2.1), the
communal property regime should not be strong enough to solve the tragedy of the commons.
Communal property means that all members of the community have at least some access to wild
mammals and are not controlled by any external authority to restrict their use. This is due to the
lack of the Leviathan, i.e. lack of a state authority (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 89). Therefore, selfish
and greedy individuals can still overexploit wild mammals. This outcome can only be avoided with
a Leviathan regulating its sustainable use in a state property regime. As a consequence, we would
expect wild mammal abundance to be higher under state property regimes, than under communal
property regimes. Following Rousseau (section 2.2), laws and rules only have a lasting influence
on the behaviour of individuals if they coincide with their norms (Rousseau 1966 [1762], p. 90).
This condition is more likely to be met in small communities, than in a large state. Therefore, the
communal property regime should be more effective at exploiting wild mammals sustainably, than
the state property regime. As a consequence, wild mammal abundance should be higher under
communal property regimes than under state property regimes.
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Figure 47: Land ownership in the study area.
The figure shows the 28 villages located in the centre of the study area (figure 46 C), the borders
of their land and the CFs
In his work, Rousseau strongly argued for the necessity to govern with the help of normative
rules (section 2.2). As a reminder, Binmore qualified Rousseau’s project concerning the moral
education of people as “brainwashing” (1994, p. 135). It follows that the most effective laws for
the conservation of wild mammals should be laws coinciding perfectly with normative rules. The
effectiveness of normative rules for the conservation of wild mammals has been shown in previous
studies, where rules prohibiting the consumption of certain types of meat had a positive effect on
the abundance of these animals (McDonald 1977; Balée 1985; Pezzuti et al. 2010; Read et al.
2010; Luzar et al. 2012). Similarly, we would expect wild mammals targeted by food taboos in
the study area to be more abundant than wild mammals not targeted by such taboos.
In his work, Smith promoted an economic development of human societies with the goal to max-
imize the wealth and the freedom of humans, thereby naturally enforcing the natural rights of
man. He believed that the means for this development would be the division of labour and the free
market. By maximizing the extent of the free market, the wealth of societies and the freedom of
individuals would be maximized (section 2.3). We have seen that increases in wealth come along
with an increased exploitation of natural resources (section 4.1). As a consequence, we would
expect the exploitation of natural resources to increase as the market extends. This is clearly in
line of what Smith had in mind:
“A particular country [...] may frequently not have capital sufficient both to improve
and cultivate all its lands, to manufacture and prepare their whole rude produce for
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immediate use and consumption, and to transport the surplus part either of the rude
or manufactured produce to those distant markets where it can be exchanged for so-
mething for which there is a demand at home.” (Smith, 1993 [1776], p. 219)
Consequently, wild mammal abundance should decrease with increasing market extent (table 20).
Table 20: Predictions, mechanisms, variables, and sources of data.
Hypothesis Theoretical mechanism Variable and
operationalization
Source of data
Smith: The higher
the extent of the
market, the lower
the wild mammal
abundance.
Wild mammals are an important
source of income for people
living in rural areas of
economically developing
countries when they dispose of
the means to exploit them
economically (Davies 2002;
Milner-Gulland et al. 2003;
Brashares et al. 2011). Humans
can exploit wild mammals in a
direct non-consumptive way if
they are able to sell their
products (Chardonnet et al.
2002). The opportunities of
people to exploit wild mammals
economically should increase
with an expansion of the
market, decreasing the wild
mammal abundance.
Market extent:
Mean monthly
trips to markets of
the village
population;
aggregated at
transect segment
level §.
Socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
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Rousseau: The
higher the number
of people abiding
to a food taboo
targeting a specific
wild mammal
species, the higher
the abundance of
this specific wild
mammal species.
Food taboos prohibit individuals
to demand for the nutritious
value of wild mammals targeted
by the taboo. Food taboos
reduce the exploitation of
species targeted by the taboo
(McDonald 1977; Balée 1985;
Pezzuti et al. 2010; Read et al.
2010; Luzar et al. 2012, ). Food
taboos are prevalent in the
population of the study area,
and we expect species targeted
by food taboos to be more
abundant than species not
targeted by food taboos.
Taboo influence:
Number of
household heads of
a village abiding to
a specific food
taboo norm;
aggregated at
transect segment
level §.
Socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
Hobbes: Wild
mammal
abundance is
higher in CFs than
in the rest of the
study area
The property rights of land
influences the access people
have to the resources on the
land (Hardin 1968; Musgrave
and Musgrave 1989; Gardner
et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990).
The state property regime is one
institutional solution to the
overexploitation of resources
(Feeny et al. 1990).The
sustainable exploitation of wild
mammals in CFs is controlled
by the state (Ministère de
l’agriculture et des ressources
animales de la République de
Guinée 1999) in the CFs. The
state, as an external authority
can enforce these rules, while
on community land,
overexploitation of wild
mammals cannot be hindered.
Share classified
forests: Proportion
of transect segment
located inside CFs.
World database on
protected areas‡;
WCF transect
data†.
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Rousseau: Wild
mammal
abundance is
higher in areas
under communal
property regimes
than in CFS
The property rights of land
influences the access people
have to the resources on the
land (Hardin 1968; Musgrave
and Musgrave 1989; Gardner
et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990).
The communal property regime
is one institutional solution to
the overexploitation of
resources (Feeny et al. 1990).
Rules only have a lasting effect
when they coincide with the
norms of the people. As this is
more likely to be the case in
small communities than in a
large state, overexploitation of
wild mammals is more likely to
be avoided on communal land
than in the CFs.
Share classified
forests: Proportion
of transect segment
located inside CFs.
World database on
protected areas‡;
WCF transect
data†.
Control
C1) Supply of the
local human
population with
fish.
Fish is an alternative source of
animal proteins to wild
mammals (Milner-Gulland et al.
2003; Junker et al. 2015).
Fish supply:
Number of fishers
living in a village;
aggregated at
transect segment
level §.
Socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
C2) Hunting
pressure.
Hunters are the professional
appropriators of wild mammals
and especially dependent on the
exploitation of wild mammals
for their survival (Hardin 1968;
Gardner et al. 1990).
Hunting pressure:
Number of hunters
living in a village;
aggregated at
transect segment
level §.
Socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
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C3) Human
population density.
Wild mammals are an important
source of meat for people living
in rural areas of economically
developing countries (Davies
2002; Milner-Gulland et al.
2003; Brashares et al. 2011).
Humans can use wild mammals
as a source of food when they
exploit them directly (they may
also exploit them for fur,
medicine, etc.) (Chardonnet
et al. 2002). The people living
in our study area belong to the
category of people living in
rural areas of economically
developing countries.
Population density:
Number of people
living in a village;
aggregated at
transect segment
level §.
Socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
C4) Habitat type. Wild mammals need specific
types of habitat to thrive and
prosper (Tews et al. 2004;
Guisan and Thuiller 2005).
NDVI¶: Calculated
using satellite data
of the study area.
Vegetation
characterizes the
structure of the
habitat (Tews et al.
2004) and NDVI
values correlate
with different
habitat types
(Holben 1986).
RapidEye satellite
data#
C5) Habitat
destruction.
The destruction of the habitat
influences the distribution of
wild mammals (Tilmann et al.
1994; Pimm and Raven 2000).
Crop cultivation is the main
habitat destructing activity in
the study area and should
therefore influence wild
mammal abundance.
Distance to nearest
field: Shortest
Euclidian distance
between transect
segment mid-point
and any field.
Track logs from
socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
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C6) Access to
water.
Wild mammals need access to
water to thrive and prosper
(Western 1975; Redfern et al.
2003; DeGama-Blanchet and
Fedigan 2006;
Chammaillé-Jammes et al.
2007)
Distance to nearest
river: Shortest
Euclidian distance
between transect
segment mid-point
and any river.
Spatial hydrology
layer|; WCF
transect data†.
C7) Accessibility. The access to wild mammals
influences their abundance
(Malcolm and Ray 2000;
Develey and Stouffer 2001;
Laurance et al. 2006). We
expect the access to wild
mammals to be easier in
proximity to roads.
Distance to nearest
road: Shortest
Euclidian distance
between transect
segment mid-point
and any road.
Track logs from
socioeconomic
survey††; WCF
transect data†.
†) The transect data are available through the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) Species Survival Commision (SSC) A.P.E.S. Database (http://apes.eva.mpg.de). ‡) The
world database on protected area is available through the IUCN and the United Nations Envi-
ronment Project (UNEP) (www.protectedplanet.net). §) See text and figure 3 for the process of
aggregation. |) The spatial hydrology layer was provided by the WCF. The layer represents the
streams having water all year round in the study area. ¶) Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index
#) Information on the level 3A products we used can be found on the following site: http://web-
dev.rapideye.de/rapideye/all-products/ortho.htm ††) The survey was conducted for this study
7.2.4 Analytical methods
Processing of line transect data We aggregated the transect sighting raw data in the following
way: first, transects longer than 1600 m were split into two equally long segments to account
for potential local-scale variation in mammal distribution and the predictor variables (although all
transects were designed with a length of 2500 m, it was not always feasible to pass through their
entire length. This is why the mean length of the “empirical” transects was 2365 m and nine were
shorter than 1600 m). Second, sighting types were classified as ephemeral (direct observation and
vocalization) or long-lasting (faeces, trace, activity, and nest), and were summed up accordingly.
Then, per species, we kept only the more common, ephemeral, or longlasting sightings, and finally
considered only species with sightings that occurred on at least 10 transect segments (Brncic et al.
2015). This was our proxy for abundance. Finally, we further excluded species lacking informa-
tion about home range sizes since we needed this information for the habitat type control variable
(tables 20 and 21, figure 48).
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Table 21: Raw sighting type records, by species and their re-
spective aggregated abundance.
Species Faeces
(long
lasting)
Trace
(long
lasting)
Nest
(long
lasting)
Observation
(epheme-
ral)
Activity†
(long
lasting)
Vocalization
(epheme-
ral)
Abundance
Cane rat
(Thryonomys
gregorianus)
9 3 0 0 0 0 Not
included
African
buffalo
(Syncerus
caffer)
10 0 0 0 0 0 Not
included
Hippopotamus
(Hippo-
potamus
amphibius)
1 3 0 0 0 1 Not
included
Otter (Aonyx
capensis or
Hydrictis
maculicollis)
1 0 0 0 0 0 Not
included
Red river hog
(Potamo-
choerus
porcus)
3 0 0 0 0 0 Not
included
Green monkey
(Chlorocebus
sabaeus)
0 0 0 3 0 2 Not
included
Mongoose‡
(Herpestidae)
0 1 0 1 0 0 Not
included
Common
genet (Genetta
genetta)
14 0 0 0 0 0 14
African civet
(Civettictis
civetta)
25 0 0 1 0 0 25
Bushbuck
(Tragelaphus
scriptus)
20 8 0 1 0 0 28
Duiker
(Cephalophus
spp.)
28 1 0 0 0 0 29
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Jackal (Canis
adustus)
32 0 0 1 0 0 32
Crested
porcupine
(Hystrix
cristata)
6 37 0 0 0 0 43
Patas monkey
(Erythrocebus
patas)
80 0 0 4 0 0 80
Scrub hare
(Lepus
microtis)
116 0 0 4 0 0 116
Guinea
baboon (Papio
papio)
125 104 0 5 0 8 229
Common wart
hog
(Phacochoerus
africanus)
307 286 0 6 0 0 593
Chimpanzee
(Pan
troglodytes)
14 0 994 1 35 2 1043
†Long-lasting signs of wild mammals others than faeces, traces, or nests, usually resulting from
food activities.
‡Mongooses were not determined at the species or genus level; therefore, only the family name is
given here.
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Figure 48: Pixel Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index (NDVI) values of a landscape surroun-
ding an example transect segment (112_1) and the 11 home range polygons constructed around
this transect segment.
The shortest distance from the polygon edge to the transect segment (this distance is the same for
every location on the edge of the polygon) as well as the mean NDVI values of the pixels located
within the home range polygons are shown in parentheses for each species. We obtained home
range information from the following sources: duiker: Estes 1991; bushbuck: Estes 1991; African
civet: Ayalew et al. 2013; porcupine: Mori et al. 2014; hare: Wildpro 2016; wart hog: Estes 1991;
jackal: Estes 1991; common genet: Estes 1991; Guinea baboon: Patzelt 2013; chimpanzee: Estes
1991; patas monkey: PrimateInfo 2016.
Determination of predictor variables We interviewed 1389 households (86% of all village
households) with a total of 10,463 individuals. We recorded the number of individuals living in
households and summed all individuals of all households per village to derive village population
sizes. Most villages had approximately 230 inhabitants, but there was a large variation in po-
pulation size. In order to assess whether our village population sizes were trustworthy, we also
counted the number of buildings in all villages and controlled whether the village population size
correlated with the number of buildings in villages. The Pearson correlation between the number
of buildings and the population sizes of the villages was 0.97, which suggested that the population
size was indeed trustworthy. We measured the market integration of the village populations by re-
cording monthly shopping trips of individuals and calculating the mean monthly trips to markets
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of each village population. The mean number of monthly trips to markets of the village populati-
ons ranged from 0 to 10.75. We recorded the number of hunters living in a village and summed
them at the village level. Forty-three percent of all households possessed a hunting rifle; 17% of
them hunted regularly. Overall, 15 households had commercial hunters, who hunted nearly every
day. The most frequently hunted animals, in decreasing order, were scrub hare, duiker, cane rat,
and bushbuck. An average hunter shot 1.56 duikers per month, whereas the best shot 20. Approx-
imately 193 duikers were shot monthly by the people who were interviewed in the study area. We
recorded the number of fishers living in a village and summed them at the village level. Eleven
percent of all households fished regularly, and 45 households fished nearly every day. For each
village, we recorded the number of household heads who abided to food taboo norms that forbid
eating certain wild mammal species, and summed them at the village level. The population in
the study area was strongly religious, and animistic beliefs survived side-by-side with the Mus-
lim religion. Species targeted with food taboos were chimpanzees, common wart hogs, Guinea
baboons, and patas monkeys. Household heads’ food taboo abidance ranged from 0 to 100% per
village (tables 20 and 22).
Table 22: Summary statistics of variables.
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Village:
Population size
213 174 8 867
Transect segment:
Population density
1667.194 720.520 354.100 3223.866
Village:
Mean monthly
trips to markets
3 2.9 0 10.7
Transect segment:
Market integration
23.395 16.225 1.081 59.346
Village:
Number of fishers
2.655 3.795 0 18
Transect segment:
Fish supply
21.803 13.570 1.963 55.172
Village:
Number of hunters
4.121 2.791 0 11
Transect segment:
Hunting pressure
32.597 12.650 9.005 58.884
Village:
Number of
household heads
not eating
chimpanzees
11.034 10.299 0 44
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Transect segment:
Taboo influence
87.019 41.023 17.530 182.621
Village:
Number of
household heads
not eating wart
hogs
6.603 7.014 0 26
Transect segment:
Taboo influence
52.080 24.458 10.551 113.196
Village:
Number of
household heads
not eating Guinea
baboons
6.414 7.260 0 28
Transect segment:
Taboo influence
50.209 23.429 10.332 107.537
Village:
Number of
household heads
not eating patas
monkeys
6.414 7.260 0 28
Transect segment:
Taboo influence
50.209 23.429 10.332 107.537
Transect segment:
Share classified
forest
0.22 0.39 0 1
Transect segment:
Distance nearest
road (in m)
2742 2146 6 9401
Transect segment:
Distance nearest
river (in m)
1979 1299 8 5020
Transect segment:
Distance nearest
field (in m)
2091 1525 93 6609
Transect segment:
NDVI
0.50 0.08 0.18 0.69
Determination of control variables The studied human population practiced slash-and-burn
crop cultivation. The most important crops were rice and peanut. Both were cultivated by approx-
imately 95% of all households during the 2013 growing season. During this season, households
harvested an average of 191 kg of rice, with a maximum of 3 tons, and an average of 602.6 kg
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of peanuts, with a maximum of 6 tons. Other important crops were manioc, millet, and beans.
Human-wildlife conflicts were very common because wild mammals and humans competed for
the crops in the fields. Ninety-five percent of all households were troubled by wild mammals in
their fields, and they all took retaliatory measures when wild mammals entered their fields. We
took crop cultivation as a proxy for habitat destruction, and computed the shortest Euclidian dis-
tance between transect segments’ midpoints and any field. Access to water was calculated as the
shortest Euclidian distance between transect segments’ midpoints and any stream in the study area
that had water year-round. Accessibility of the study area was very rudimentary; it was provided
by a few dirt roads that were maintained by the local people, and rivers could be crossed only
during the dry season (from November to June). We measured the accessibility of the transect
segments as the shortest Euclidian distance between transect segments’ midpoints and any road.
Four CFs were located within the study area. For each transect segment, we determined its pro-
portion that was located within a CF by using the World Database on Protected Areas layer (IUCN
and UNEP 2016). On 1 and 2 December 2013, 13 RapidEye Level 3A tiles (Rapideye 2016) of the
study area were acquired. We used those satellite images to calculate the Normalized Differenced
Vegetation Index (NDVI). The NDVI has been successfully used to predict animal population size
(Osborne et al. 2001; Oindo and Skidmore 2002; Zinner et al. 2002), and land cover types can
consistently be stratified as a function of the NDVI (Holben 1986). We then extracted the mean
NDVI within polygons around each transect. The shortest distance from each point on the edge
of the polygons to the transect segment was equivalent to the home range radius for each species
(table 20, table 22, figure 48).
Aggregation of predictor variables at transect segment levels All predictor variables were
further aggregated at the transect segment level. For this process, we first computed the cost
distance between all transect segment midpoints and all villages. The cost distance between two
points is the path that links the two points with the least traveling effort. The effort was obtained
by considering the slope and the distance between two points. We set the slope to 0 on terrain
with a road or a trail, and otherwise set it to the steepness of the terrain. We used the costDistance
function of the gdistance package in R (van Etten 2015; R Core Team 2016), a Shuttle Radar
Topography Mission digital elevation model (Jarvis et al. 2008), our track logs of all roads, trails
and villages, and the locations of the transect segments to compute the cost distance between all
transect segments and villages. Our main assumption for the aggregation process, based on our
experience in the field and other studies (N’Goran et al. 2012), was to define an activity radius of
the local population of up to 25 km. This means we assumed that villagers living outside the 25
km radius of a transect segment had no influence on its wild mammals, and that the influence of
villagers within the 25 km radius of a transect segment decreased with increasing cost distance to
the transect segment. We constructed 25 km activity radii around all transect segment midpoints
and selected all villages within the activity radii. The values of the predictor variables within the
transect segment activity radii were then weighted with the respective inverse cost distance and
then were summed up per transect (table 22, figure 49).
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Figure 49: From village population size to transect segment population density.
(A) Population size is available only at the village level. The area of the black points shows
the village population sizes. (B) Villages were assumed to have an influence on the respective
transect segments when they fell within the respective 25 km action radius (red and green circle).
(C) The population size figures of the villages that influenced the respective transect segments
were weighted with the inverse cost distance to the respective transect segment and summed up,
resulting in different population densities on the two transect segments, which are represented by
the area of the grey points. (D) The result of the aggregation process of village population size,
which resulted in population densities for each transect segment in the study area. We aggregated
all predictor variables determined in villages in this way.
Model-building First, we identified all species with abundance data that followed approximately
a Poisson distribution. This was the case for duiker, bushbuck, African civet, crested porcupine,
scrub hare, common wart hog, jackal, common genet, Guinea baboon, and patas monkey. Chim-
panzee abundance data, on the other hand, were highly overdispersed with an excess number of
zeroes and some very high values. We built two data sets, the mixed species abundance data (938
cases) and the chimpanzee abundance data (97 cases). We used mixed effects Poisson regression
models to estimate the influence of the human population on the mixed species abundance, and
used zero inflated negative binomial regression models to estimate the influence of the human po-
pulation on chimpanzee abundance (McCullagh and Nelder 1996; Baayen 2008). Because some
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of the correlations among predictors (population density, market integration, fish supply, hunting
pressure, taboo influence) were very high (tables A2.1 and A2.2), we were not able to fit models
that included all test and control predictors. Instead, we used multimodel inference (Burnham and
Anderson 1998). Since the full model with all test and control predictors was characterized by
large collinearity (maximum Variance Inflation Factor [VIF] 25.8) (Field 2005), we constructed
the set of models in the following way: to begin with, we included a model that comprised the
five control predictors only (share classified forests, distance nearest road, distance nearest river,
distance nearest field, NDVI) and all models that included all five control predictors and one of the
five test predictors (market integration, hunting pressure, fish provision, taboo influence, popula-
tion density) at a time (six models for the mixed species abundance data and for the chimpanzee
abundance data). The model that comprised the control predictors and population density cor-
responded to a standard ecological model. Since we were specifically interested in the combined
effects of taboo influence, market integration, hunting pressure, fish provision, and population den-
sity, we added all models that contained combinations of these test predictors and all the control
predictors with a maximum VIF 5 (eight additional models for the mixed species abundance data,
leading to 14 models, and two additional models for the chimpanzee abundance data, leading to
eight models). Since we were interested to know to what extent the control predictors contributed
to mammal abundance, we added all the above models but without the control predictors to the
set of models (14 additional models for the mixed species abundance data, leading to 28 models,
and eight additional models for the chimpanzee abundance data, leading to 16 models). Note that
this led to a model that comprised none of the test or control predictors. We controlled for varying
transect segment length by including it (log transformed) as an offset term (McCullagh and Nel-
der 1996) into all models. The final model set for the chimpanzee abundance data comprised 16
models. For all models on the mixed species abundance data, we included an autocorrelation term
as well as a random intercept of transect segment ID and random intercept of species (random
slopes of the autocorrelation term within species and transect we kept in all models). Finally, we
also replicated the entire set of 27 models (all models apart from the model that comprised only
the intercept), and this time also included the random slopes of all predictors within species and
added these models to the set. We included these models, since we were interested in whether
species were affected differentially by the predictors, and we aimed at avoiding overconfident mo-
dels (Barr et al. 2013). The final model set for the mixed species abundance data comprised 55
models (tables A3.1 and A3.2 for the full set of candidate models). All test and control predictors
were transformed when necessary (i.e., to achieve approximately symmetrical distributions and to
avoid influential cases) and then were standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1
prior to estimation to achieve easier interpretable estimates (Schielzeth 2010). In order to control
for autocorrelation (which was no issue for the chimpanzee abundance data), we first fitted a full
model that included all test and control predictors, apart from taboo influence, and extracted the
residuals from it. We then, separately for each data point, averaged the residuals of all other data
points of the same respective species, whereby we weighted their contribution by their distance
to the respective data point. By this we derived an “autocorrelation term” to be included in the
full model. The function that determined the weights when averaging the residuals had the shape
of a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation determined such that the
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likelihood of the full model with the derived autocorrelation term included was maximized. This
approach is similar to what was done in Fürtbauer et al. (2011). The 55 mixed effects Poisson
regression models (table A3.1) on the mixed species abundance data were fitted using the glmer
function of the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2015). The 16 zero inflated negative binomial
regression models (table A3.2) on the chimpanzee abundance data were fitted using the zeroinfl
function of the pscl package in R (Jackman 2015). For the zero inflated negative binomial re-
gression models, we always included the same predictor and control predictors into the zero part
as in the count part. We estimated VIF using the vif function from the car package in R (Fox
and Weisberg 2011) The dispersion parameters of the mixed effects Poisson regression models
ranged between 1.028 and 1.143. The dispersion parameter of the zero inflated negative binomial
regression models ranged between 0.781 and 0.891. All Akaike information criterion (AIC) were
calculated with the correction for sample size (AICc) (Burnham and Anderson 1998), and the AIC
values for the mixed effects Poisson regression models we additionally corrected for overdisper-
sion (QAICc) (Burnham and Anderson 1998). We centred our inference on delta AIC and the 95%
best model confidence set based on Akaike weights (Burnham and Anderson 1998).
7.3 Results: observational study
7.3.1 Descriptive results
Wild mammal species abundance In total, 2303 sightings of 18 species were recorded in the
study area. The most frequently recorded sighting type were chimpanzee nests, with 994 re-
cords, and the most frequently recorded species was the chimpanzee, with 1046 records. The least
frequently recorded sighting type were vocalizations, with 13 records, and the least frequently
recorded species was otter, with one record (table 21).
7.3.2 Results of statistical analysis
Mixed effects Poisson regression models on species abundance The 95% best model con-
fidence set of our multimodel inference on mixed species abundance included 17 of 55 models
(table 23). Fifteen of these models included random slopes. This indicates that it is important to
account for variation between species in how the predictors influenced their abundance. Sixteen
of the models from the confidence set comprised the control predictors. The model that comprised
only control predictors was also included in the confidence set: with a delta AIC of 9.094 and
an Akaike weight of 0.004, the support for this model was however meager. The fact that most
models in the confidence set included the control predictors strongly supports the importance of
environmental factors to wild mammal abundance.
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Table 23: Result of multimodel inference on mixed effects Poisson
regression on mixed species abundance (duiker, bushbuck, African
civet, porcupine, hare, wart hog, jackal, common genet, Guinea
baboon, and patas monkey) (AIC: Akaike information criterion;
VIF: Variance Inflation Factor).
Model Model
rank
Confidence
set
cum AIC Akaike
weight
Delta
AIC
Max.
VIF
Hunting pressure+
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
control+RS
1 yes 0.372 3790.108 0.372 0 3.645
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
Population density+
control+RS
2 yes 0.596 3791.123 0.224 1.016 5.603
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
control+RS
3 yes 0.759 3791.753 0.163 1.645 1.972
Hunting pressure+
Market integration+
control+RS
4 yes 0.802 3794.458 0.042 4.35 3.622
Market integration+
control+RS
5 yes 0.843 3794.489 0.042 4.382 1.972
Market integration+
Population density+
control+RS
6 yes 0.884 3794.518 0.041 4.41 5.579
Taboo influence+
Population pressure+
control+RS
7 yes 0.899 3796.566 0.015 6.458 1.916
Population density+
control+RS
8 yes 0.909 3797.349 0.01 7.242 1.916
Hunting pressure+
Market integration+
Taboo influence+RS
9 yes 0.916 3798.063 0.007 7.955 2.897
Fish supply+
Taboo influence+
control+RS
10 yes 0.922 3798.366 0.006 8.258 1.935
Fish supply+
control+RS
11 yes 0.928 3798.398 0.006 8.29 1.935
Hunting pressure+
control+RS
12 yes 0.932 3799.162 0.004 9.054 1.961
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Control+RS 13 yes 0.936 3799.202 0.004 9.094 1.609
Hunting pressure+
control
14 yes 0.939 3799.315 0.004 9.207 1.961
Hunting pressure+
Market integration+
control
15 yes 0.943 3799.326 0.004 9.218 3.622
Taboo influence+
control+RS
16 yes 0.947 3799.33 0.004 9.223 1.629
Hunting pressure+
Taboo influence+
control+RS
17 yes 0.951 3799.332 0.004 9.224 1.962
Hunting pressure+
Taboo influence+
control
18 no 0.954 3799.367 0.004 9.259 1.962
Population density+
Control
19 no 0.958 3799.37 0.004 9.263 1.916
Market integration+
Population density+
control
20 no 0.961 3799.381 0.004 9.273 5.579
Hunting pressure+
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
control
21 no 0.965 3799.389 0.004 9.282 3.645
Taboo influence+
Population pressure+
control
22 no 0.968 3799.43 0.004 9.322 1.916
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
Population density+
control
23 no 0.972 3799.447 0.003 9.339 5.603
Fish supply+
Taboo influence+
control
24 no 0.975 3799.461 0.003 9.353 1.935
control 25 no 0.979 3799.467 0.003 9.36 1.609
Market integration+
control
26 no 0.982 3799.468 0.003 9.36 1.972
Taboo influence+
control
27 no 0.986 3799.489 0.003 9.381 1.629
Fish supply+control 28 no 0.989 3799.509 0.003 9.401 1.935
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Market integration+
Taboo influence+
control
29 no 0.992 3799.525 0.003 9.417 1.972
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
Population
density+RS
30 no 0.995 3800.208 0.002 10.101 4.174
Hunting pressure+
Market
integration+RS
31 no 0.996 3801.73 0.001 11.623 2.874
Market integration+
Taboo influence+RS
32 no 0.997 3801.973 0.001 11.865 1.067
Market integration+
Population
density+RS
33 no 0.998 3802.451 0.001 12.344 4.15
Market
integration+RS
34 no 0.998 3803.252 0.001 13.145
Taboo influence+
Population pressure+
RS
35 no 0.998 3804.944 <0.001 14.836 1.065
Population
density+RS
36 no 0.999 3805.327 <0.001 15.219
Hunting pressure+
Market integration
37 no 0.999 3806.384 <0.001 16.277 2.874
Hunting pressure+
Market integration+
Taboo influence
38 no 0.999 3806.428 <0.001 16.32 2.897
Hunting pressure 39 no 0.999 3806.468 <0.001 16.361
Hunting pressure+
Taboo influence
40 no 0.999 3806.45 <0.001 16.392 1.065
Hunting
pressure+RS
41 no 0.999 3806.507 <0.001 16.4
Hunting pressure+
Taboo influence+RS
42 no 0.999 3806.591 <0.001 16.483 1.065
Market integration+
Population density
43 no 0.999 3807.053 <0.001 16.945 4.15
Market integration+
Taboo influence+
Population density
44 no 0.999 3807.077 <0.001 16.969 4.174
Population density 45 no 1 3807.096 <0.001 16.988
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Taboo influence+
Population pressure
46 no 1 3807.129 <0.001 17.021 1.065
Fish supply+RS 47 no 1 3807.51 <0.001 17.402
Fish supply+
Taboo influence+RS
48 no 1 3807.523 <0.001 17.415 1.073
Market integration+
Taboo influence
49 no 1 3807.924 <0.001 17.816 1.067
Market integration 50 no 1 3807.989 <0.001 17.881
Fish supply+
Taboo influence
51 no 1 3808.214 <0.001 18.106 1.073
Fish supply 52 no 1 3808.353 <0.001 18.245
Taboo influence 53 no 1 3808.434 <0.001 18.326
Taboo influence+RS 54 no 1 3808.473 <0.001 18.365
Intercept only 55 no 1 3809.319 <0.001 19.21
Control predictors are share classified forests, distance nearest road, distance nearest river, dis-
tance nearest field, NDVI; and RS indicates that random slopes of all predictors within species
were included in the model.
The best model had an Akaike weight of 0.372 and included hunting pressure, market integration,
taboo influence, and the control predictors (table 24). In this model, the influence of the market
integration varied between the species, having a negative effect on duiker, patas monkey, common
genet, and common wart hog abundance, a positive effect on jackal, African civet, crested porcu-
pine, and scrub hare abundance, and no clear influence on Guinea baboon or bushbuck abundance
(figure 50). The model that included population density and the control predictors was also in the
confidence set, but ranked only eight and had a delta AIC of 7.242 with an Akaike weight of 0.01
(table 25). The model averaged coefficients revealed that, across all models, taboo influence and
distance to the nearest field had by far the strongest influence on species abundance. The stronger
the taboo influence and the larger the distance to the nearest field, the larger the wild mammal
species abundance. While the NDVI also had a positive influence on species abundance, the share
classified forests, the population density, the hunting pressure, and the distance to the nearest river
and road had a negative influence on wild mammal abundance. The influences of fish supply and
market integration were very close to zero (figure 51).
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Table 24: Result of the best model (mixed effects Poisson regression) on wild mammal abun-
dance with market, hunting, and taboo influence, and the control predictors (NDVI: Normalized
Differenced Vegetation Index).
Observations
938 abundance
values
Random effects N Standard
deviation
Chi² P Value
Species intercept 10 0.839
Transect intercept 98 0.507
Species: Market
integration‡
0.253 10.656 0.001
Species: Taboos† 0.079 0.048 0.826
Species: Hunting
pressure‡
0.000 0.000 1.000
Species: NDVI† 0.136 0.466 0.495
Species: Distance
next field‡
0.000 0.000 1.000
Species: Distance
next river‡
0.000 0.000 1.000
Species: Distance
next road‡
0.100 0.521 0.471
Species: Share
classified forest†
0.000 0.000 1.000
Fixed effects Estimate Standard
error
P Value
Intercept -7.879 0.278 <0.001
Market
integration‡
0.023 0.151 0.878
Taboo influence† 0.406 0.197 0.039
Hunting pressure‡ -0.203 0.137 0.140
NDVI† 0.073 0.081 0.365
Distance next
field‡
0.214 0.087 0.014
Distance next
river‡
-0.013 0.068 0.852
Distance next
road‡
-0.027 0.092 0.765
Share classified
forest†
-0.065 0.072 0.368
†) z-transformed ‡) square root and then z-transformed
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Figure 50: Influence of the market integration on wild mammal abundance.
Plots show the effect of market integration on species abundance for each individual species.
Abundance refers to the number sightings per kilometre transect. Observed abundances are shown
as points, and the estimated abundances are shown as dotted lines.
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Table 25: Result of the mixed effects Poisson regression on wild mammal abundance with popu-
lation density and the control predictors.
Observations
938 abundance
values
Random effects N Standard
deviation
Chi² P Value
Species intercept 10 1.085
Transect intercept 98 0.498
Species: NDVI† 0.000 0.000 1.000
Species: Distance
next field‡
0.000 0.000 1.000
Species: Distance
next river‡
0.000 0.000 1.000
Species: Distance
next road‡
0.089 0.367 0.545
Species: Share
classified forest†
0.000 0.000 1.000
Species:
Population
density§
0.102 2.115 0.146
Fixed effects Estimate Standard
error
P Value
Intercept -7.852 0.352 <0.001
NDVI† 0.064 0.063 0.306
Distance next
field‡
0.209 0.083 0.012
Distance next
river‡
-0.013 0.067 0.846
Distance next road -0.014 0.083 0.869
Share classified
forest†
-0.069 0.067 0.297
Population
density§
-0.013 0.079 0.866
†) z-transformed ‡) square root and then z-transformed §) square root transformed after sub-
traction of minimum and then z-transformed
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Figure 51: Coefficients of the fixed effects of the mixed effects Poisson regression models on
mixed species abundance.
The values of the coefficients are shown on the x-axis, and the names of the predictors are shown
on the y-axis. The number of times each predictor was included in a model is shown in parentheses
behind the predictor name. The darker the coefficient, the higher the Akaike weight of the model
it was taken from. All coefficients were standardized by the partial standard deviation of the
respective predictors to be comparable across models and to allow for the deduction of meaningful
model averaged coefficients (Cade 2015). (NDVI: Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index) †z-
transformed; ‡ square root and then z-transformed; §square root transformed after subtraction of
minimum and then z-transformed
Zero inflated negative binomial regression models on chimpanzee abundance The 95% best
model confidence set of our multimodel inference on chimpanzee abundance included seven of 16
models (table 26). None of these models comprised control predictors, which suggests that envi-
ronmental factors were not of primary importance in predicting chimpanzee abundance. The best
model had an Akaike weight of 0.414 and was the model that included only market integration.
The model that included population density alone was also in the confidence set. It had a delta
AIC of 2.57 and an Akaike weight of 0.114. The model averaged coefficients of the count part
of the zero inflated negative binomial models on chimpanzee abundance showed that, while mar-
ket integration clearly had a negative influence on chimpanzee abundance, hunting pressure had
a weak positive influence on chimpanzee abundance, and all other coefficients were close to zero
(figure 52). The model averaged coefficients of the zero part of the zero inflated negative bino-
mial models on chimpanzee abundance showed that the likelihood of no chimpanzee occurrence
increased strongly with the market integration (figure 53). Our results revealed that including hu-
man socioeconomic factors other than human population density alone increased our capacity to
model wild mammal abundance in our study area in Guinea. All human population factors that
we considered in our analysis were deduced from the framework of wild mammals as economic
goods. In the case of the analysis on mixed species abundance, the best model did not contain
human population density at all, but was made up of taboo influence, market integration, hunting
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pressure, and the environmental control predictors. Chimpanzee abundance was best modelled by
market integration alone.
Table 26: Result of multimodel inference on zero inflated negative binomial regression on the
abundance of chimpanzees (AIC: Akaike information criterion; VIF: Variance Inflation Factor).
Model Rank Confidence
set
AIC delta
AIC
Akaike
weight
cum max.VIF
Market integration 1 yes 525.519 0.000 0.414 0.414
Taboo influence 2 yes 527.600 2.081 0.146 0.560
Population
density
3 yes 528.096 2.577 0.114 0.674
Hunting pressure +
Market integration
4 yes 528.220 2.702 0.107 0.781 2.793
Fish supply 5 yes 528.774 3.255 0.081 0.863
Market integration
+ Population
density
6 yes 529.476 3.957 0.057 0.92 4.101
Hunting pressure 7 yes 530.214 4.696 0.04 0.959
Market integration
+ Control
8 no 531.878 6.359 0.017 0.977 1.931
Hunting pressure +
Market integration
+ Control
9 no 534.143 8.624 0.006 0.982 3.569
1 10 no 534.304 8.785 0.005 0.987
Market integration
+ Population
density + Control
11 no 534.741 9.222 0.004 0.991 5.613
Fish supply +
Control
12 no 535.622 10.103 0.003 0.994 1.910
Taboo influence +
Control
13 no 535.685 10.167 0.003 0.997 1.976
Population density
+ Control
14 no 536.268 10.749 0.002 0.998 1.898
Control 15 no 537.899 12.380 0.001 0.999 1.606
Hunting pressure +
Control
16 no 538.271 12.752 0.001 1.000 1.956
Control predictors are share classified forests, distance nearest road, distance nearest river, dis-
tance nearest field, and Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index.
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Figure 52: Coefficients of the count part of the zero inflated negative binomial regression models
on chimpanzee abundance.
The values of the coefficients are shown on the x-axis, and the names of the predictors are shown
on the y-axis. The number of times each predictor was included in a model is shown in parentheses
behind the predictor name. The darker the coefficient, the higher the Akaike weight of the model
it was taken from. All coefficients were standardized by the partial standard deviation of the
respective predictors to be comparable across models and to allow for the deduction of meaningful
model averaged coefficients (Cade 2015). (NDVI: Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index) †z-
transformed; ‡square root and then z-transformed; §square root transformed after subtraction of
minimum and then z-transformed
Figure 53: Coefficients of the zero part of the zero inflated negative binomial regression models
on chimpanzee occurrence.
This part of the model estimates the probability of having zero in the response variable. The values
of the coefficients are shown on the x-axis and the names of the predictors on the y-axis. The num-
ber of times each predictor was included in a model is shown in parentheses behind the predictor
name. The darker the coefficient, the higher the Akaike weight of the model it was taken from.
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All coefficients were standardized by the partial standard deviation of the respective predictors
to be comparable across models and to allow for the deduction of meaningful model averaged
coefficients (Cade 2015). (NDVI: Normalized Differenced Vegetation Index) †z-transformed; ‡
square root and then z-transformed; §square root transformed after subtraction of minimum and
then z-transformed
7.4 Conclusion: observational study
7.4.1 Wildlife conservation from the perspective of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith
Although the transect data revealed promising wild mammal abundance in the study area, our
results point to serious issues for the WCF biodiversity offset project in the study region. These
can all be linked to the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith (chapter 2).
First, the CFs in the study area were not enhancing wild mammal abundance. Instead, they had
a negative effect on wild mammal species abundance and did not influence chimpanzee abun-
dance. This might be due to different reasons. For example, the knowledge of the classified forest
boundaries was not widespread in the study area, and CF boundaries were not respected, as nine
villages were being located right within them despite the law (figures 46 and 47). Furthermore, the
success of protected areas in conserving wild mammals depends on considerable effort, especially
in law enforcement (Bruner et al. 2001; Tranquilli et al. 2012; Tranquilli et al. 2014). Such effort
is lacking in the study area. On the other hand, our results suggest that the village communities
were more successful in controlling the overexploitation of wild mammals than the government
was in the CFs. When the government does not sufficiently invest in monitoring and controlling its
protected areas (as is the case in the example of the Island of Hidpaniola cited below), those areas
might be considered as common ground by the communities surrounding them. The mechanism
of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968) then leads to overexploitation. Similar findings
have been observed previously in other areas: converting communal property areas to a state pro-
perty area in order to protect a resource can lead to a de facto open access area (Feeny et al. 1990).
This indicates that protected areas without sufficient monitoring and controlling efforts are worse
for the conservation of wild mammals than giving the land as property to the local communities
(Coase 1960). Or vice versa, if areas with restricted access should remain an important element
of conservation projects, the functional regulation and monitoring of restricted access to the area
is essential for the protection of wild mammals. For our study area, this result supports the com-
munal property- over the state property regime. Rousseau and his community approach seems to
work better than the Hobbesian Leviathan in protecting wild mammals from overexploitation in
the study area. Of course, it seems unfair to use Guinea, a “failed state” as an example for state
interventions. Nevertheless, the idea that social order is only possible under the rule of a strong
state, as proposed by Hobbes, is very popular and my results suggest that this is not true. Although
our study was conducted in a very small area, the global pattern regarding the ability of states to
enforce the protection of their protected areas goes in the same direction: worldwide, 57% of all
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protected areas are under intense human pressure. Even areas dedicated to the protection of biodi-
versity (IUCN I-IV) were under intense human pressure. In 55% of the protected areas designated
prior to 1993, the human pressure increased until 2009 (Jones et al. 2018). Although increases
in human pressure over such a long period of time might result from a wide range of different
reasons, this result nevertheless highlights the inability, or at least the lack of effort, of the states in
protecting their protected areas. As stated by Hobbes: “[...] no man obeys them, whom they think
have no power to help, or hurt them.” (Hobbes 2012 [1651], p. 64). For local people in the study
area, this statement is certainly relevant. As the Guinean state is more or less absent in the study
area, why should they respect its laws? The relevance of the power factor, which is clearly lacking
in the study area, for the implementation of protected area becomes obvious when considering
the fate of the island of Hispaniola. Hispaniola is divided into a green part (the Dominican Re-
public with 28% forest cover) and a brown part (Haiti with 1% forest cover). Although there are
important geographic, climatic, historic and socioeconomic differences between both countries,
the difference in the forest cover between the two countries is also the result of differences in the
management of their protected areas. While the Dominican Republic used a top-down approach,
including the extensive use of armed forces, to halt illegal human activities within its extensive
network of protected areas (32% of the country’s territory), Haiti did not intervene to protect its
four national parks from human pressure (Diamond 2005).
Second, although the human population of the study area was poor and suffered from animal
protein deficiency, some did not eat potential game (especially common wart hogs provide plenty
of meat) because of religious beliefs. Food taboos had a positive effect on wild mammal species
abundance in the study area. As suggested by other studies, our results support the notion that food
taboos can work as resource management tools to protect wild mammal species (McDonald 1977;
Balée 1985; Pezzuti et al. 2010; Read et al. 2010; Luzar et al. 2012). The option to appeal to such
beliefs, in cooperation with local religious authorities, should seriously be considered. The notion
that a moral norm is a good rule to govern, as suggested by Rousseau, is therefore supported
by our analysis. The strength of such moral norms is especially highlighted by the fact that its
abidance has a negative influence on the individual fitness: not eating a wart hog is nice for the
wart hog, but from the perspective of a hungry human individual, it is counterproductive. In fact,
moral norms can be so strong that they even may hinder the ability of societies to adapt to changes
in their environment. For example, the Vikings were able to colonize Greenland for about 500
years. However, sometimes in the 1400s, their presence in Greenland vanished. One explanation
for their failure is based on moral factors: “The Greenlanders’ clinging to their European Christian
image may have been a factor in their conservatism that I mentioned above: more European than
Europeans themselves, and thereby culturally hampered in making the drastic lifestyle changes
that could have helped them survive.” (Diamond 2005, p. 247). First, although surrounded by fish
and originating from a fish-eating culture, the Greenlanders developed a food taboo against fish.
This seems especially misplaced when considering the abundance of fish in Greenland. Second,
due to cultural preferences, the Greenlanders kept cattle. This practice was highly inefficient and
inappropriate for the environment. As a consequence of not using the available resources, while
practicing highly inefficient economic activities, the Greenlanders vanished (Diamond 2005).
Our results regarding chimpanzees are especially interesting because they suggest that in our study
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area, chimpanzee abundance was not obviously influenced by environmental factors but mainly
by human population factors. Especially, the market integration had strong negative influence on
chimpanzee abundance. The situation was similar for common wart hogs. Their abundance decre-
ased strongly with increasing market integration. It seems that for species that lack a local demand
due to moral food taboos, such as chimpanzees and common wart hogs, the market integration of
the population compensates for this missing demand and puts pressure on these animals. This
result supports the notion that market interactions erode moral values (Falk and Szech 2013). For
other species, such as scrub hares, the same mechanism has however the opposite effect: their
abundance increases with market integration. Probably, hunting scrub hare is substituted with
buying cheap chicken, which is available only on the market. The simplistic view that increa-
ses in the market extent would lead to decreases in the overall wild mammal abundance, as we
expected, does not hold in our study area. Our results reveal a more nuanced picture. The mar-
ket extent does have an effect on wild mammals, but this effect varies between the species. As
a consequence, a market approach to the conservation of wild mammals is not generally out of
question. Instead, a consistent and thoughtful case-by-case approach is needed. In some cases,
market mechanisms can support wild mammals’ conservation, in others not. So overall, while the
market integration provides alternative sources of income to the local population, it also provides
additional incentives to exploit wild mammals. If, in the long run, the economic development and
the market integration of the local population, which was very low, even for Guinean standards,
should eventually catch up with the rest of the country, a strategy targeting this issue is necessary.
A promising strategy for the WCF biodiversity offset might be to provide alternative sources of
income for the local population. These alternatives should outweigh the benefits of exploiting wild
mammals. Such a strategy is, however, unsustainable and risky: prices and economic incentives
can change significantly from one day to the other, without announcement, rendering long term
plans of action obsolete and ineffective (McCauley 2006).
7.4.2 Other findings
The local population of the study area relied on slash-and-burn cultivation for their subsistence
agriculture. This practice has a detrimental influence on the environment, and the locations of the
fields had a strong negative effect on wild mammal species abundance in the study area. It remains
unclear whether this effect was due to habitat destruction or to conflicts with wild mammals that
are attracted by field crops. In any case, long-term conservation planning in the area is constrained
if the fields are relocated regularly. Protecting the crops without harming wild mammals, for
example by erecting fences around the fields, might prove an efficient tool for wild mammal
conservation in the study area (Rao and Tripathi 2016). Unlike Junker et al. (2015), we did not find
an effect of fish availability on wild mammal abundance. This suggests that fish availability did
not work as a substitute for wild mammal meat in the study area. One reason for this missing effect
might be that the amount of fish provided in the study area is not sufficient to substitute bushmeat.
Furthermore, the accessibility of the transects did not influence wild mammal abundance. This
indicates that the few existing roads might not have affected the remoteness of the area and were
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used mainly by local people. The effect of hunting was ambiguous. On the one hand, wild mammal
species abundance decreased with increasing hunting pressure. On the other hand, chimpanzee
abundance increased with growing hunting pressure on other animal species. The reason for this
difference might be that chimpanzees benefit from the decrease of other wild mammals, potential
competitors, in areas with increased hunting pressure.
7.4.3 Outlook
Our results revealed that although environmental factors were important for understanding the
abundance of wild mammal species in our study area, it was fundamental to also account for
human population factors. In fact, only two of our environmental predictors (NDVI and distance
to nearest river) were purely environmental. The other three (distance to nearest road, distance
to nearest field, share classified forests) represented human factors. For the chimpanzees, the
environmental control predictors did not influence their abundance at all. The crucial reason for
considering factors other than human population density when estimating the effect of the human
population on wild mammals consists not only of optimizing the goodness of fit, as it is shown in
our multimodel inference analysis (tables 23 and 26). Rather, the main reason is to improve our
understanding of the relationships between the human population and the wild mammals. This is
best shown when comparing the best model (table 24) and the model of rank 8 (table 25) from our
multimodel inference on the mixed species abundance (table 23). In the best model, wild mammal
species abundance was a function of market integration, taboo influence, hunting pressure, and
the control predictors. In the model of rank 8 (with a delta AIC of 7.24), wild mammal species
abundance was a function of population density and the control predictors. The conclusions drawn
from the two models differ substantially. When looking at the population density model (table
25), one would conclude that the human population had no influence on wild mammal abundance.
But the best model, where human population density was replaced by hunting pressure, taboo
influence, and market integration, showed a different picture (table 24 and figure 50): increasing
taboo influence came along with increases in wild mammal abundance. Our analysis furthermore
revealed that market integration negatively influenced the abundance of chimpanzees, duikers,
patas monkeys, common genets, and common wart hogs, positively influenced the abundance of
jackals, African civets, crested porcupines, and scrub hares, and had no obvious influence on the
abundance of Guinea baboons and bushbucks. Therefore, when planning conservation activities
in the area, market activities of the human population must be taken into account very carefully,
avoiding negative effects (additional incentives to exploit wild mammals) and using positive ones
(substitution of wild mammal products with products available on the market). Our results were
expectable given that wild mammals and humans are part of a common social-ecological system
and influence each other. The framework of wild mammals as economic goods within a social-
ecological system is an appropriate tool to help detect important factors that drive the relationship
between wild mammals and humans in a diverse range of settings.
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Chapter 8
Experimental study: determinants of
fair sharing
In this chapter, I combine my empirical data with experimental data from a common pool re-
source game which I conducted with the study population. This experiment allowed constructing
a measure for fair allocations. My general theoretical hypotheses regarding factors influencing the
fairness of natural resource allocations can therefore be reformulated in this context and put to an
empirical test. In this context, fair allocations coincide with fair behaviour at the individual level.
If all individuals behave in a fair way, the resulting allocation is fair. In the introduction, I discuss
the importance of fairness for human societies and evolutionary mechanisms that favour the emer-
gence of fairness in human societies. In the methods, I first discuss the experimental approach to
the study of fairness in humans. Then, I describe the data and the theoretical model and predicti-
ons. Finally, I describe the strategy used for the statistical analysis of the data. In the results, I
show the results of the test of my hypotheses and discuss the implications for the theoretical work
on fairness in the conclusion. This chapter mainly takes up a manuscript which was accepted for
publication by the journal Human Nature on March 21. 2019. Some parts were however adapted
for the purpose of this work.
8.1 Introduction: experimental study
8.1.1 Theoretical introduction
Fairness is a normative concept, which is used to evaluate the distribution of a resource among
individuals. The most common concepts of fairness are equity (fairness as the same ratio of
input and output for everybody) and equality (fairness as the same share for everybody) (Berman
et al. 1985). Fairness is an important characteristic of human societies because it is linked to the
evolution of cooperation. As Brosnan and deWaal (2014, p. 1) note „Cooperation could not have
evolved without mechanisms to ensure the sharing of payoffs.”
Equal shares are omnipresent in nature, from the sex ratio of mammals to the division of a cake
among a group of people (Skyrms 1994). Such fair shares do, however, not necessarily result from
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the human sense of fairness, but can also be the result of inequity aversion (IA). IA is a negative re-
action to benefits characterized as being not equal. Disadvantageous IA occurs when the inequity
is at the detriment of the actor. Advantageous IA occurs when the actor benefits from inequity.
The capacity to compare one’s benefits with others is the foundation for IA. Disadvantageous IA
has been documented in controlled experiments in capuchin monkeys, macaques, chimpanzees,
dogs, crows and humans. Those species protest and refuse a given reward when another individual
receives a higher reward for the same task. In contrast to disadvantageous IA, advantageous IA
occurs when the individual actually has an advantage. This behaviour has so far only been docu-
mented in humans and chimpanzees. High anticipatory capacities are necessary in order to be able
to conduct the reasoning behind advantageous IA. Human fairness extends however further than
IA. It is based on the notion that appropriate benefits apply to all individuals within the commu-
nity. Abstraction at the community level, i.e. an understanding of the advantages of self-control
when sharing resources and a precise language to exchange information about third parties, are
necessary conditions for a notion of fairness to emerge within a population. Only the human spe-
cies has built these capacities, due to its proportionally exceptional brain enlargement. However,
the basic calculations and emotional reactions underlying the human sense of fairness seem to be
rooted in the primate background of the human species (Brosnan and deWaal 2014).
8.1.2 Fairness in humans
In humans, fair sharing is a universally observed strategy applied in situations where resources are
shared among individuals. Fair sharing is not only a Nash equilibrium among rational actors but
also an evolutionary stable strategy (Rubinstein 1982; Skyrms 1994; André and Baumard 2011b;
André and Baumard 2011a). The fact that fair sharing occurs is however intriguing, because it does
not satisfy the short-term interests of parties involved in the distribution of resources (Brosnan and
deWaal 2014; Debove et al. 2016). The interest in fairness has led to a great variety of research
trying to explain how fairness could have evolved despite its costly short term effects. This rese-
arch is interdisciplinary and the different theoretical models point to different mechanisms in order
to explain the evolution of fairness. The different models, however, also frequently make use of
different terminology, different definitions of fairness and refer to different time scales (Debove
et al. 2016). Although all relevant theoretical models explaining the evolution of fairness make
use of game theory (Debove et al. 2016), the underlying assumptions strongly differ, depending
on the discipline. Orthodox game theory focuses on the payoff maximizing strategies in situati-
ons involving interactions between rational actors with full information and common knowledge.
Evolutionary game theory, on the other hand, makes use of a "Darwinian Veil of Ignorance". In
this context, no assumptions about rational, fully informed individuals, and common knowledge
is needed. Strategies are successful when they maximize the fitness of individuals. The strate-
gies played by the individuals are genetically encoded, so that individuals have no choice, and
individual characteristics coincide with their strategy. The population consists of all individual
strategies and the outcome of interest are dynamic changes in the composition of the population
with the different strategies. Orthodox and evolutionary game theory can lead to strongly differing
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conclusions (Skyrms 2000).
8.1.3 Biological models of fairness
From a biological perspective, fairness in humans results from a sense of fairness which has evol-
ved in human ancestors (Debove et al. 2016). Such a sense of fairness must therefore be genetically
encoded and be the product of natural selection.
Natural selection Natural selection links the reproductive success (fitness) of individuals and
the adaptation of populations to their environment. Heritable traits that increase the fitness of in-
dividuals are selected and accumulate, while heritable traits that decrease the fitness of individuals
become less frequent in the population. Eventually, the better adapted individuals dominate the
population, thereby altering its genetic pool (West and Gardner 2010). As equal sharing comes
along with costs for the parties involved (a bigger share of the resource is always better), fairness
can be described as a specific type of altruistic behaviour (Gintis et al. 2003; Tomasello and Vaish
2013). The theory of inclusive fitness determines necessary conditions for natural selection to
favour altruism.
Fairness among related individuals Genes do not only spread directly from one individual to
its own offspring (direct fitness), but also through the offspring of other individuals carrying the
same genes (indirect fitness). The inclusive fitness is made up of these two components. When one
individual, the actor, interacts with another individual, the recipient (both having a relatedness of
r), and if the interaction between the two individuals comes at a cost, c for the actor, and a benefit,
b for the recipient, natural selection favours altruism if r*b-c>0 (Hamilton’s rule). By sticking to
interactions with close kin having a common ancestor, one can maximize its indirect fitness. This
mechanism, known as kinship selection, can lead to the evolution of altruism through natural se-
lection: "[...] altruistic behaviors can be favored if the benefits are directed toward other individu-
als who share genes for altruism [...]" (West and Gardner 2010, p. 1341). Indirect fitness depends
on the genetic relatedness between interacting individuals. This does not correspond necessarily
to their kinship. A given set of genes responsible for a conspicuous phenotype of individuals in a
population, the greenbeards, and using this information to discriminate between greenbeards and
non-greenbeards by being altruistic only towards other greenbeards could be favoured by natural
selection, even if the carriers were no kin. Thus, kinship selection and the greenbeard mechanism
are two ways in which natural selection can favour the evolution of altruism within a population.
Hamilton’s rule is however not only about genetics (r), but also about the environment (b and c).
The benefit cost ratio (b/c) is determined by the environment and strongly influences the outcome
of natural selection: altruism becomes more competitive with increasing values of the b/c ratio.
Genetics and the environment are not competing explanations, but always work side by side (West
and Gardner 2010). In summary, indirect fitness can favour fairness, given the genetic relatedness
between the individuals involved in the sharing of a resource is sufficiently high to compensate for
the costs of fair sharing for the actors.
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Fairness among unrelated individuals Fairness can also be favoured by natural selection if
it leads to a comparative advantage in the direct fitness of individuals in a population. Natural
selection works on the relative advantage of individuals in comparison with other individuals of
the same population during their whole lifetime. Although single absolute benefits can be very
high, in total, individuals with single high absolute benefits can still end badly compared to others.
Furthermore, decisions to cooperate with others must be based on the entire history of interaction
with the potential partners, and an evaluation of the effort versus payoff balance must be available
to guide this decision. In this context, natural selection can favour fairness when it increases the
benefits of cooperation for the individuals of a population (Brosnan and deWaal 2014). Sharing
is therefore always the result of a prior interaction which generates an outcome among the actors
involved in the interaction. This outcome then needs to be shared. The selective forces working
on the evolution of strategies guiding the behaviour of the individuals involved in the sharing
activity work in two directions: first, an individual has an advantage if he can get a big share of
the resource, favouring selfish strategies; second, an individual has an advantage if he can attract
partners to share with him, favouring generous strategies (André and Baumard 2011a). Depending
on the bargaining power of the individuals sharing a resource, natural selection will favour certain
types of strategies. When individuals sharing resources have the same bargaining power (this
is a symmetric bargaining problem), fair sharing evolves as the only evolutionary stable strategy,
because no individual needs to accept an unfavourable outcome, but is able to enforce a favourable
one (Rubinstein 1982; Skyrms 1994). When the bargaining power of individuals sharing a resource
is uneven (this is an asymmetric bargaining problem), the outcome is always in favour of the
dominant individuals (the individuals with more bargaining power). This is due to the fact that the
dominant individuals can impose their proposal to the subordinate individuals (the individuals with
fewer bargaining power). In such situations, fairness cannot evolve (Nowak et al. 2000; Chiang
2008;André and Baumard 2011b; André and Baumard 2011a; Debove et al. 2015). Mechanisms
that equalize the bargaining power between individuals in asymmetric bargaining problems can
favour the evolution of fairness.
Free partner choice and outside options Free partner choice may change the bargaining power
of the individuals sharing a resource, depending on their outside options. Outside options are the
expected payoffs of individuals in the same time period if they refused to share the resource. If the
subordinate individuals have better outside options than the dominant individuals, the bargaining
power switches in favour of the subordinate individuals. In such situations, the outcomes favour
the subordinate individuals, and fairness cannot evolve. If the dominant individuals have better
outside options than the subordinate individuals, the outcomes are still in favour of the dominant
individuals, leaving no room for fairness to evolve. Only when the dominant and subordinate
individuals have the same outside options does free partner choice lead to the evolution of fair
sharing (André and Baumard 2011a; Debove et al. 2015).
Free partner choice and reputation When individuals in a population have free partner choice,
the possibility to build a reputation can lead to the evolution of fairness through natural selection.
Individuals can build reputation when their behaviour in past sharing activities is known to other
individuals when a new sharing opportunity emerges. In this case, the other individuals can choose
whether to use this new opportunity based on the reputation. For dominant individuals, a negative
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reputation will have a negative impact on the number of occasions they can incite other individuals
to share resources with them. This leads to a shift in bargaining power in favour of the subordinate
individuals and may result in the evolution of fairness (Nowak et al. 2000).
Social fluidity Finally, social fluidity can also lead to the evolution of fairness in asymmetric
bargaining problems. Social fluidity is given when individuals have the possibility to switch be-
tween dominant and subordinate positions when sharing resources. Even when individuals have
fixed partners, changing roles allows for an equalization of bargaining power and the evolution of
fairness in asymmetric bargaining problems: if the subordinate individuals would always refuse to
interact with the dominant partner, no interaction and therefore no sharing, would occur. In order
to be able to share a common resource, the dominant individuals have to restrict themselves and
be more generous as if there was no switching of roles. This dynamic can lead to the evolution of
fairness (André and Baumard 2011b).
Fairness and the market Free partner choice, social fluidity and reputation are especially pro-
nounced characteristics of the human market economy. The human sense of fairness might there-
fore have been favoured by natural selection, because it optimizes human behaviour in an environ-
ment characterized by a market economy (Nowak et al. 2000; Chiang 2008;André and Baumard
2011b; André and Baumard 2011a; Debove et al. 2015).
The idea that participation in a market economy enhances fairness is in fact an old and widely
accepted notion in economics. This proposition, known as the “doux-commerce thesis”, was
first postulated by Montesquieu in the 18th century. At that time, economists assumed that the
emerging free market economy would create a new type of human being. This new human would
be more reliable, honest, disciplined, and orderly than the human encountered in the pre-capitalist
feudal epochs. Reliability, honesty, order, and discipline were considered as essential for the
function of a market economy. With the continual expansion of the capitalist production mode,
those mentalities would become more frequent in the overall population (Hirschman 1982). We
have seen in section 2.3.3 that Adam Smith followed a similar line of argument.
Spite Finally, the power asymmetry between individuals in asymmetric bargaining problems can
be overcome when the subordinate individuals have the opportunity to reject the offers of the do-
minant individuals. In contrast to free partner choice, the subordinate individuals do not have the
opportunity to choose other individuals for an alternative interaction in such cases, but end up with
nothing, just like the dominant individuals. Rejection of positive offers therefore comes at a cost
for the rejecting individuals and is a form of costly punishment. Depending on the amount offe-
red by the dominant individuals, the costs for such rejection might, however, differ between the
individuals involved. When dominant individuals make selfish offers, the costs are higher for the
dominant individuals than for the subordinate individuals, leading to comparative advantages for
the rejecting individuals. When the dominant individuals make fair offers, rejecting those offers
do not lead to comparative advantages for the rejecting individuals. When the dominant indivi-
duals make generous offers, rejecting these offers do even lead to advantages for the dominant
individuals. The strategy of rejecting unfair offer leads to the evolution of fairness when the po-
pulation size is small enough or when the individuals interact in clusters of limited size within the
population (Huck and Oechssler 1999; Forber and Smead 2014).
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8.1.4 Cultural Models of fairness
Cultural evolution describes a process whereby a population adapts to its environment through
social (cultural) learning. While individual learning results from the interaction between an indivi-
dual and his environment, social learning results from the interaction between different individuals
of a population. The cognitive abilities necessary for social learning to emerge are transmission
and preservation: the individuals of a population need first to transfer the relevant information
from one brain to another (transmission), and second to keep the information (preservation) in
order to be able to transfer those later. When fluctuations in the environment occur every tenth
to hundredth generations, social learning can lead to an increased adaptation of the population.
However, a population only made up of social learners has an average fitness equal to the average
fitness of a population composed entirely of individual learners. Social learning only leads to a
comparative increase in fitness, when it increases the output of individual learning, or when it leads
to behaviour that no individual could acquire through individual learning over his entire lifetime.
Cultural learning then is a type of social learning, where the information transferred between indi-
viduals has accumulated over generations. Although cultural variations are observed in different
kinds of species, from birds to lizards, cultural learning is omnipresent in humans, and has so far
only been observed to some limited extent in chimpanzees and birds. Cultural evolution can be
modelled with the same tools as biological evolution, although there are two major differences:
first, adaptation can occur during the lifetime of the individuals and is not necessarily observed
intergenerationally; second, while genetic transmission is always preservative (the genes transmit-
ted from one generation to the next should be preserved and only change by accident), cultural
transmission is most of the time reconstructive: a specific strategy is not only blindly copied but
also needs to be adapted to a new setting (Boyd and Richerson 1996; Henrich and McElreath 2003;
Nowak and Sigmund 2004; Boyd et al. 2011; Claidière et al. 2014).
8.1.5 Gene-culture coevolution
In bargaining situations, fair sharing can evolve in a framework of cultural evolution through the
same mechanisms that also favour the evolution of fair sharing through comparative advantages
in the direct fitness of individuals (reputation, free partner choice, punishment). In fact, when
analysing human behaviour, both genes and culture, as well as their interaction should be taken
into account (Henrich and McElreath 2003).
8.2 Methods: experimental study
Empirical evidence related to fair behaviour is based to an important extent on labouratory game-
theoretical experiments. Those experiments simulate different bargaining situations and compare
the observed behaviour with theoretical predictions (Camerer 2003). So far, this experimental ap-
proach to symmetric bargaining problems has attracted little interest (Nydegger and Owen 1974;
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Rubinstein 1982; Skyrms 1994). This might be due to the fact that the theory predicts fair sharing,
which is indeed observed in such situations, which does not awake much interest in such symme-
tric bargaining situations.
8.2.1 Dictator and Ultimatum games as models of fairness
Interest in experimental approaches to asymmetric bargaining problems, on the other hand, has
led to countless studies from different disciplines. In this case, the predictions differ strongly from
the observed behaviour. The dictator game and the ultimatum game are the most prominent ex-
periments conducted to investigate fair behaviour in asymmetric bargaining problems (Camerer
2003). In the dictator game, one player receives an amount of a resource and decides on how
much to give to a second player. This game models the most asymmetric bargaining problem
possible, because the second player has no bargaining power at all in this situation. Predictions
for this game are clear: a first player is rational if he takes the whole amount for himself, leaving
nothing to the second player. However, equal shares are frequently observed in dictator game ex-
periments (Camerer 2003). In the ultimatum game, one player receives an amount of a resource
and decides on how much to give to a second player. The second player then accepts the deal or
not. If not, both players receive nothing. A rational actor will give the smallest possible positive
amount and accept any positive amount. Since the first ultimatum game was presented in 1982,
thousands of ultimatum game experiments have been published (Güth and Kocher 2014). The
ultimatum game models an asymmetric bargaining problem in which the subordinate player still
has some bargaining power. A review of the literature on ultimatum game experiments reveals
that the mean offered share is wide above theoretically predicted shares and that positive amounts
are frequently rejected (Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Güth and Kocher 2014). Furthermore, offered and
rejected shares seem to vary with the cultural setting (Roth et al. 1991; Henrich 2000; Paciotti
and Hadley 2003; Tracer 2003; Cronk 2007). The implications of the results from asymmetric
bargaining experiments are highly contested with regard to content, as they are taken as a proof,
either for selfish or prosocial human behaviour (Camerer 2003; Hagen and Hammerstein 2006).
However, methodical issues related to labouratory experiments also challenge the external validity
of those experiments (Levitt and List 2007). This challenge is further supported by the fact that
those experiments are mainly conducted with Western, educated, industrialized, rich and demo-
cratic (WEIRD) people. However, WEIRD people represent one of the worst possible samples to
make generalizations about the human species as a whole (Henrich et al. 2010a). Finally, also the
reliability of those experiments is questioned: in cultural comparative studies, mostly samples on
only one population per culture are taken, not enabling to control thoroughly for environmental
differences (Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Lamba and Mace 2011). In the present study, the different
aspects relevant to fairness discussed so far were put to an empirical test. We combined a socioe-
conomic survey with a field experiment (Gerber and Green 2012). The study was conducted in 37
mixed horticultural villages with varying population structures in Guinea. We used mixed effects
regressions to analyse the data and test the predictive value of the different theoretical concepts on
fair sharing.
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8.2.2 Study population and design
Our study population lived in 37 villages of a remote rural area of Guinea, between the Labe and
the Faranah regions. The villages had a population of between 45 and 908 inhabitants with a
varying ethnic composition. The village population was mainly made up of the two main ethnic
groups, Malinke and Fulbe, as well as a few foreigners, and other Guinean ethnic groups. People
in the study area lived in a subsistence economy with animal keeping and slash-and-burn cultiva-
tion as primary income sources. They relied heavily on gathered forest products for energy and
housing. However, some households also frequently visited markets and were well integrated in
the broader Guinean market economy. Modern infrastructure and state institutions were absent in
the area and the young population (median age: 14 years) was organized around kinship relations
and traditional Islamic beliefs. Each village population was made up of between 2 and 16 extended
families (kin groups) (figure 54, table 27).
Figure 54: Map of the study area and its location within Guinea.
For the study area, the locations of the villages, their names, their population size, their market
integration, the number of kin groups as well as the respective share of the two main ethnic groups
are depicted. For illustrative purposes, if other ethnic groups than Malinke or Fulbe occurred in
a village, they were included in the minority group of the village.
We conducted a socioeconomic survey in the study area, including questions about the demo-
graphy, economic activities, as well as opinions and taboos concerning the environment from
April 2013 to June 2014 (chapter 7, full questionnaire in A1). The surveys were conducted with
the help of assistants, who mainly interpreted to the local languages. The assistants were residents
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of the capital of the country, Conakry, and had no links to the study population, which was known
to everybody involved. The households taking part in the survey were promised a remuneration
of 1 kilogram of salt. Salt is a valuable resource because it cannot be produced locally, can be
stored and is essential for cooking. The salt was distributed in an experimental setting in which all
surveyed households were entitled to participate. Each household had to choose one of its mem-
bers to join our experiment. After having finished the survey in a village, we fixed a day when
individuals could come to receive their salt. We put a bucket containing the exact amount of salt
needed to compensate all entitled households of the village in a closed hut of the village. Then,
subjects entered the hut one by one. They were told by the assistants that the salt in the bucket was
intended for all households in the village having participated in the survey. They were instructed
that they could take their share of salt, exactly 1 kilogram, with the measuring jug and put the salt
in a black plastic bag provided to them. Such jugs and plastic bags are omnipresent in Guinea.
Hence the amount taken was not obvious to the other inhabitants of the village. This was the case,
as long as the subjects did not take more than about the double of the fair share of one kilogram,
as the bag would have been quite bulky. When subjects took their share of salt in the presence
of our assistants, the assistants did not interfere: the subjects took their share of salt in front of
the assistants, put it in the black bag and left the hut. This was the control condition. We also
implemented a treatment variation: after having explained the procedure to the subjects in the hut,
the assistants left the hut. So the subjects of the treatment group took their share of salt alone in
the hut. Subjects were allocated to the experimental groups randomly. The rationale behind our
experimental variation was as follows: in the control group, due to the observability of behaviour,
subjects had the opportunity to build a reputation. In the experimental group, this opportunity was
missing. The bucket with the salt was weighed with a digital scale before the subjects entered the
hut to take their share and after they left the hut with their share. We calculated the amount of salt
taken by every subject by calculating the difference between these two weights. This procedure
continued until the salt assigned to the entitled households of a village was entirely distributed. If
some households were left without their share, because the other subjects had already taken all of
it, the bucket was not refilled. In 5 villages (Balagan, Kela, Marga, Lafaboube, Sobori), the bucket
was not big enough to hold the complete amount of salt for all subjects. In these villages, we filled
as much salt into the bucket as possible, adding the missing salt later, after some subjects had alre-
ady taken their share. The experiment was supervised by our Guinean assistants. Our experiment
models a situation where a group of individuals shares a resource held in common. All subjects
contributed to the production of the resource, the salt, by taking part in our survey. The situation
had however the characteristic of an asymmetric bargaining problem. The first individual entering
the hut had the most bargaining power. In principle, he could take the whole salt and leave the
others without their share of salt. The bargaining power of individuals participating in our expe-
riment decreased with their order of participation in the experiment and reached its lowest level
with the last individual entering the hut. Our experiment is therefore a mixture of a common pool
resource game (Rapoport 1988; Fischer et al. 2004; Ahn et al. 2011; Lamba and Mace 2011) and
a sequential dictator game (Cason and Mui 1998; Diekman 2004). Our experiment was a covert
field experiment, as the individuals taking part were not aware that it was an experiment (Gerber
and Green 2012).
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8.2.3 Predictions and variables
Fair sharing from the perspective of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith In a strict sense, the
situation modelled in our experiment was not a tragedy of the commons situation. Although the
salt from our experiment was a common good to the subjects in the experiment, it was clear that
the salt would be gone once the experiment was over. Subjects only had the possibility to use the
salt once. Therefore, there were no collective costs occurring at the group level due to the use
of the resource at the individual level (section 4.3.2). At the same time, our experimental design
allowed for unequal allocations of the resource. Central parts of the works of Hobbes, Rousseau
and Smith focused on the allocation of resources among individuals of a society (chapter 2). We
can therefore apply the works of the three scholars to our experiment in order to deduce predictions
about factors favouring a fair allocation of the resource.
In chapter 7, we showed that species targeted by a food taboo were more abundant than the other
species. It follows that a moral norm can be used to govern the way how humans use a natural
resource. This aspect of governance has been highlighted by Rousseau. In his work he argued that
the capacity to govern with the use of moral norms depends to a big extent on the homogeneity
of the society, with interest groups and other subgroups negatively affecting the moral integrity of
a society (section 2.2). Consequently, the fairness of the allocation of the salt in our experiment
should increase with the homogeneity of the village population. Rousseau’s prediction related
to the influence of ethnic homogeneity within a society is also supported by evolutionary theory.
Human populations are frequently divided into ethnic groups with marked traits such as dress,
style or speech. If humans have a predisposition to interact with people being similar to them,
such ethnic markers can evolve through natural selection, because they facilitate coordination
among individuals with the same markers. As a result, moral norms favouring group beneficial
cooperation should be supported by ethnic markers, and individuals will cooperate only with other
individuals carrying the same ethnic markers. The importance of ethnic markers for individual
behaviour should be most important when populations are made up of different ethnic groups
and at boundary regions, areas where the territories of different ethnic groups overlap (McElreath
et al. 2003). The effect of ethnic markers on social norms is the result of a co-evolutionary process
involving cultural as well as biological evolution (Henrich and McElreath 2003). Our study area is
located at the edge of the Foutah Djallon, the heartland of the Fulbe, close to the Moyenne-Guinée,
the traditional settlement area of the Malinke. Malinke and Fulbe speak different languages, have
different conventions and distinct appearances. Ethnicity is a crucial social category in Guinea,
where ethnic antagonism is pronounced (Groelsema 1998; Africa is a Country 2013). Ethnic
markers were very pronounced in our study population and played an important role in the daily
life of the individuals in the study area. Plenty of empirical evidence supports the hypothesis
that ethnic homogeneity of a population positively influences prosociality (Alesina et al. 1999;
Alesina and Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Miguiel and Gugerty 2005; Newton and Delhey
2005; Pennant 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Leigh 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2007;
Putnam 2007; Gustavsson and Jordahl 2008). On the other hand, Rousseau clearly also had income
inequality in mind when he asserted the negative influence of interest groups on the normative
integrity of a society. Interestingly, we are not aware of any study relating measures of income
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inequality with prosocial behaviour in experiments. Supporting evidence exists, however, for the
effect of income inequality on prosociality in general (Anderson et al. 2008).
Unlike Rousseau, Smith conceptualized moral norms as a by-product of daily interactions (section
2.3). As a result, they cannot be manipulated and used as a tool to govern, as suggested by
Rousseau. This does however not mean that Smith did not appreciate the importance of moral
norms for human society. Fairness, for example, was conceived by Smith as the central moral
norm to keep human egoism under control. He assumed that the gradual extension of the market
economy within a society would coincide with the gradual assertion of a global sense of fairness
among individuals within this society. Consequently, the fairness of the allocation of the salt in our
experiment should increase with the extent of the market integration within a village population.
Smith’s prediction related to the positive influence of the market on fairness is supported by other
theoretical- as well as empirical work. Good outside options for individuals of a population can
favour the evolution of fairness through natural selection (André and Baumard 2011a; Debove
et al. 2015). From this perspective, the emergence of the market economy, as one important
outside option for individuals, leads to a co-evolutionary process where cultural evolution and
natural evolution interact to create individuals adapted to a market economy, enforcing an even
stronger market institution. It is, however, also conceivable that individuals adapt to the market
economy solely through learning (Henrich et al. 2001; Henrich et al. 2010b). The positive effect
of market integration on fair behaviour has been shown in previous studies (Henrich et al. 2001;
Henrich et al. 2010b).
Furthermore, Smith was convinced that humans were striving for a positive judgment by others.
This should be seen as one of the main motives of human behaviour. As a result, we would
expect allocations of salt in our experiment to be fairer in the control condition with observation
than in the treatment condition without observation. This prediction has also been postulated in
the literature related to reputation. Reputation can favour the evolution of fair behaviour through
natural selection (Nowak et al. 2000) or through learning (Chiang 2008). Individuals can, however,
only build reputation if their past behaviour is known by potential interaction partners. Being
observed by others allows individuals to build such a positive reputation by acting as normatively
prescribed. Empirical evidence consistently supports the thesis that prosocial behaviour, especially
helping strangers or donating to non-profit organizations, is elicited by the presence of observers
(Satow 1975; Bull and Gibson-Robinson 1981; Kurzban 2001; Milinski et al. 2002; Soetevent
2005; Bereczkeit et al. 2007; Bereczkeit et al. 2010).
Contrary to Smith and Rousseau, Hobbes did not see a moral norm as strong enough to guide
human behaviour. Although such norms could be useful, in the end, they were nothing more
than empty words (chapter 2.1). As a consequence, the enforcement of a fair allocation in our
experiment would only be possible through an external authority with absolute rights over the
subjects. Obviously, we were not able to test this prediction in our experiment (tables 27 and 28).
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Table 27: Summary statistics of the variables (the correlations among these variables are shown in
table A4).
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. Freq.
Kinship 0.404 0.197 0.119 0.943
Ethnic
homogeneity
0.847 0.175 0.475 1
Market integration 2.934 2.707 0.014 9.804
Population size 254.108 157.133 45.000 908.000
Reputation Reputation:
324
No
Reputation:
305
Income inequality 0.443 0.060 0.320 0.600
Sex Male: 577
Female: 52
Age 44.420 15.989 3.000 86.000
Ethnicity Malinke:
398 Fulbe:
224 Other: 7
Income (yearly
household income
in C)
1056.480 1129.387 0.000 11,827.500
Kg salt 11.516 5.822 2.000 28.840
Control variables Since reputation was the only experimentally manipulated and randomized
condition, we used a set of control variables to check for the robustness of our estimations. We
controlled for the culture of subjects (Roth et al. 1991; Henrich 2000; Paciotti and Hadley 2003;
Tracer 2003; Cronk 2007), the sex of subjects, the household income of subjects, the age of
subjects, the amount of salt before subjects started the experiment, the kinship within the village
(Morgan 1979; Silk 1980; Daly and Wilson 1988; Alvard 2003; Gintis et al. 2003; Gardner and
West 2004; Madsen et al. 2007; Mulder 2007; Stewart-Williams 2008; West and Gardner 2010;
Apicella et al. 2012; Tomasello and Vaish 2013; Hintze and Hertwig 2016), as well as village
population size (Huck and Oechssler 1999; Stahl and Harvy 2006; Henrich et al. 2010b; Forber
and Smead 2014), (tables 27 and 28).
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Table 28: Predictions, theoretical mechanisms, and operationali-
zation of all variables.
Variable name Hypothesis Mechanism Operationalization
Predictors
Income Inequality Rousseau:
Subject’s fair
behaviour in our
experiment
decreases with the
income inequality
of the village
populations.
The normative
integration of
individuals within
a society decreases
with the number of
interest groups in
this society.
We built a Gini index for
the village populations
using information on
household income,
economic activities and
economic assets with the
INEQDECO module in
STATA 13.1
Ethnic
homogeneity
Rousseau:
Subject’s fair
behaviour in our
experiment
increases with the
ethnic
homogeneity of the
village
populations.
The normative
integration of a
society increases
with the
homogeneity of the
society.
Herfindahl index of all
individual ethnic
identities in a village
(The Herfindahl index
shows the probability to
randomly select two
individuals from the same
ethnic group in the same
village).
Market integration Smith: Subject’s
fair behaviour in
our experiment
increases with the
market integration
of the village
populations.
Market interactions
of individuals
correlate with their
sense of fairness.
Mean monthly trips to
markets of the village
populations
Reputation Smith: Subjects
behaviour in the
control condition,
with observation,
is fairer than in the
experimental
condition, without
observation.
Humans strive for
a positive
judgment by
others. Under
observation,
subjects should
therefore behave
more as morally
prescribed than in
anonymity.
Experimental treatment
of observation.
Control
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Kinship Kinship selection
(West & Gardner
2010).
Herfindahl index of all
family names in a village
(The Herfindahl index
shows the probability to
randomly select two
individuals with the same
family name in the same
village). Family names in
villages of the study area
should correlate with
kinship (Cantrelle and
Dupire 1964)
Population size In populations with
small size, spite
can favour the
evolution of
fairness through
natural selection
(Huck &
Hoechssler 1999,
Forber & Smead
2014).
Number of individuals
living in a village.
Sex Sex of subjects
could influence the
behaviour in
economic games.
We recorded the sex of
subjects (male or female).
Age Age of subjects
could influence the
behaviour in
economic games.
We recorded the age of
subject (in years).
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Ethnicity Previous studies
have found an
effect of ethnic
identity on
behaviour in
economic games
(Roth et al. 1991,
Cronk 2007,
Henrich 2000,
Paciotti & Hadley
2003, Tracer
2003).
We recorded the ethnic
identities of subjects
(Malinke, Fulbe or
others).
Income Household income
of subjects could
influence the
behaviour in
economic games
We recorded household
income, - economic
activities and - economic
assets in local currency to
calculate a yearly
household income in C
Kg salt The bargaining
power of
individuals in our
experiment
depends on the
amount of salt that
is available
We recorded the amount
of salt before subjects
took part in the
experiment
8.2.4 Data processing and operationalization of predictor variables
86% of all village households (1,389 households) participated in our survey and most of them
took part in the experiment. Our experimental sample was a good representation of the village
population: the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the sample size in our experiment and
the respective village population size was 0.81. A total of 911.35 kilograms of salt was distributed
to 881 individuals in 39 villages. Subjects for whom the amount of salt in the bucket was below 2
kilograms were not included in the analysis, because they had no opportunity of being distinctively
selfish. We also excluded all subjects for whom we did not have all necessary information for the
analysis. We furthermore excluded two villages from the analysis for which only two observations
without missing values were left. This was a necessary step to guarantee that village sample sizes
were large enough for the analysis. This left us with a total of 629 observations made in 37
villages. We used the data from our survey to generate the predictor and control variables.
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Measure for fairness The response variable was subject’s fair behaviour. It was common kno-
wledge that all households participating in our experiment had made the same effort (participation
in our survey) and would receive the same reward (1 kilogram of salt). The fair share in the ex-
periment coincided therefore with the most common concepts of fairness (Berman et al. 1985).
Besides, no participant in the experiment or in the survey complained about the amount of the
remuneration. We assumed that 1 kilogram of salt was perceived by all participants as the fair and
normatively prescribed share. We measured subject’s fair behaviour by calculating the deviation
of the amount of salt taken by subjects from the fair share of 1 kilogram. A deviation of 0 coinci-
ded with fair behaviour. The more the subjects deviated above 0, the more selfish they were, the
more below 0, the more generous.
Measure for income inequality We first recorded all economic activities, economic assets and
household incomes of all households in the villages. Then we valued these different income
classes with market prices and finally calculated a Gini index for the village populations using this
information with the INEQDECO module in STATA 13.1 (tables 28 and 27).
Measure for ethnic homogeneity We recorded the ethnic identities of the interviewees. We
coded ethnicities different to "Malinke" or "Fulbe" as "other" and assigned the father’s ethnicity
to all children of the household. We measured the ethnic homogeneity of the village populations
by calculating a Herfindahl index of ethnic identities of all individuals of the village populations.
This measure shows the probability to randomly choose two subjects with the same ethnic identity
in one village population (tables 28 and 27).
Measure for market integration We calculated the market integration of the village populations
by recording the number of monthly trips to markets of all individuals of a village population and
calculating the mean monthly trips to markets of the village population (tables 28 and 27).
Measure for reputation We measured reputation with our unobserved experimental treatment.
Building a positive reputation was possible when our assistants observed the subjects in our expe-
riment, the control group, while this opportunity was missing when the subjects were alone when
taking their share of salt, the treatment group. This was the case in our treatment condition (tables
28 and 27).
8.2.5 Data Analysis
Using the lmer function of the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2015; R Core Team 2016), we ran
a mixed-effects regression on the subject’s deviation from the fair share, including all variables
from table 27 as fixed effects, controlling for village differences with a village random intercept
and random slopes for all variables varying within a village. This was our full model. To test the
significance of our predictor variables as a whole, we compared the fit of the full model with that
of a reduced model only comprising the control variables (Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011) using
the anova function in R. All predictor and control variables were transformed when necessary
(i.e. to achieve approximately symmetrical distributions and to avoid influential cases) and then
standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one prior to estimation to achieve easier
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interpretable estimates (Schielzeth 2010). We further transformed and standardized the response
variable in order to meet model assumptions (Quinn and Keough 2002). We estimated random
slopes for all fixed effects varying within villages. Such random slopes account for the possibility
that the effect of a predictor varies among villages, and their inclusion is also important to keep
type I error rates at the nominal level of 5% (Schielzeth and Forstmeier 2009; Barr et al. 2013).
We checked whether multicollinearity was an issue in our estimation by running a multiple linear
regression using all main terms from our full model and looking at the VIF values of this estimation
using the vif function of the car package in R (A5) (Fox and Weisberg 2011). We also checked
whether the random terms, as well as the residuals of our full model approximately followed a
normal distribution (A6 - A13). We finally checked for constant variance of the residuals of our
full model and run model stabilities on our full model (A14 - A16).
8.3 Results: experimental study
Subjects mean deviation from the fair share in our experiment was 44 grams and differed signi-
ficantly from 0 (One-sample t-test, t=9.366, df=628, p<0.001). This suggests that the subjects in
our experiment were selfish on average. The subjects’ behaviour varied however strongly: while
the most selfish subject took 1.222 kg more than the fair share, the most generous subject took 238
grams less than the fair share. There was also a significant variation in mean deviations between
the villages (Kruskal wallis test, chi²=144.83, df=36, p<0.001). Mean village deviations ranged
from -130 to 142 grams (Figure 55). An important fraction of the subjects’ mean deviation from
the fair share and the village specific variation in mean deviations was accounted for by village
effects and our predictor and control variables. In a first step, by modelling the subjects’ deviation
from the fair share as a function of normally distributed village specific means deviating from an
overall mean (village random intercept), the subjects’ mean deviation decreased to 27 grams and
the range of the mean village deviations decreased to -109 to 90 grams. Additionally, adjusting for
characteristics of the subjects (reputation, sex, age, ethnicity, income, kg salt) further decreased
subjects’ mean deviation to 18 grams and the range in the mean village deviations to -103 to 66
grams. Finally, by also adjusting for differences in village characteristics (kinship, ethnic homo-
geneity, market integration, population size and income inequality), the subjects’ mean deviation
slightly increased to 20 grams and the range in the mean village deviation further decreased to -2
to 41 grams (figure 55).
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Figure 55: Mean deviations from the fair share for the different villages and the overall population.
The adjusted means shown are for the references of the respective regression models.
Overall, our predictor variables (ethnic homogeneity, kinship, market integration, population size,
reputation) clearly influenced subjects’ fair behaviour in our experiment (AIC difference: -6.87,
Chi² = 45.526, df = 6, p=<0.001). All village level variables were statistically significant: while
kinship and population size had a negative effect on fair behaviour, ethnic homogeneity, income
inequality and market integration had a positive effect on fair behaviour (table 29, figure 56). Alt-
hough the overall effect of a lack of opportunity to build reputation on subjects’ fair behaviour in
our experiment was not statistically significant, we found a highly statistically significant variation
of this effect between the villages: while in Tendanssaba, the unobserved subjects took on average
29 grams less than the observed subjects, this difference reached its maximum in Maliko, where
the unobserved subjects took on average 107 grams more than the observed subjects. The effect
of our treatment of no observation on the amount of salt taken by the subjects was negative in 13
villages. In the other 24 villages, the lacking opportunity for reputation building led to bigger (e.g.
202
8.3. RESULTS: EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Kounkoum, Marga, Maliko and more) or smaller (e.g. Alfaya, Dara, and more) increases in the
amount of salt taken (table 29, figure 57). Overall, there was no significant effect of the household
income on fair behaviour. However, there was a significant variation in the way the household
income affected fair behaviour between the villages (table 29, A17). The same holds true for the
effect of the amount of salt in the bucket on fair behaviour (table 29, A18). None of the estimates
of sex, ethnicity and age were statistically significant at the 5% level of statistical significance.
Table 29: Full model. Result of the mixed effects regression on the subjects’ fair behaviour.
Observations
629
Villages
37
Random intercept Sd
Villages 0.058
Random slopes Sd Chi Square Df p value
No reputation 0.121 16.608 2.000 <0.001
Female 0.040 0.156 2.000 0.346
Malinke 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.500
Kg salt| 0.053 8.639 2.000 0.001
Age* 0.000 0.000 2.000 0.500
Income| 0.058 8.613 2.000 0.001
Fixed effects Estimate Standard
error
Likelihood
ratio test
p value
Intercept -1.170 0.047
Ethnic Homogeneity| -0.082 0.020 13.079 <0.001
Kinship* 0.051 0.021 5.773 0.016
Gini* -0.041 0.020 4.689 0.030
No reputation 0.052 0.029 3.038 0.081
Population size# 0.077 0.020 13.121 <0.001
Market Integration| -0.065 0.018 11.183 0.001
Female -0.018 0.042 0.183 0.669
Malinke 0.048 0.032 2.216 0.137
Income| -0.005 0.015 0.100 0.751
Kg salt| -0.023 0.014 2.506 0.113
Age* 0.019 0.011 2.749 0.097
*) z-transformed |) square root and then z-transformed #) log-transformed prior to z-transformation.
Prior to estimation, we added 290 grams and log-transformed the subjects’ deviation scores. Re-
ference for “No reputation” is “reputation”, for “female” is “male”, for “Malinke” is “Fulbe”.
P-values for all terms were calculated following the approach proposed by Bolker et al. 2009.
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Figure 56: The influence of ethnic homogeneity, kinship, population size, market integration and
income inequality on the subjects’ fair behaviour.
The thin dashed line depicts the location of 0 on the y-axis across the range of the x-axis. The
darker the observed value point, the more observations were made on the respective location. The
fitted values were estimated for male Fulbe subjects in the condition with observation with all other
variables being at their mean using the full model estimates (table 3). The 95% confidence inter-
vals were estimated using a bootstrap procedure, provided by Roger Mundry (www.eva.mpg.de),
on the full model.
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Figure 57: The influence of a lack of reputation building opportunity on the subjects’ fair behavi-
our.
The name of the village is written in bold on top of the respective plot, and the sample size for
every village is shown below the plot. The graph in the centre of the plot shows the estimated mean
difference in the deviation from the fair share conditional on reputation (=0). The thin dashed line
depicts the location of 0 on the y-axis across the range of the x-axis. The darker the observed
value point, the more observations were made on the respective location. The estimated effect of
a lack of reputation building opportunities on the subjects’ fair behaviour in our experiment was
calculated by subtracting the fitted value for male Malinke subjects in the control condition (with
observation) from the fitted value for male Malinke subjects in the treatment condition (without
observation) using the full model estimates. The village variables were set at their actual values
and all the other variables at their mean.
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8.4 Conclusion: experimental study
The results of our multivariate analysis revealed that the subjects’ behaviour in our experiment
on fair sharing was mainly driven by the characteristics of the village population they belonged
to: first, a simple look at the data revealed an important variation in fair behaviour between the
villages. However, we were able to explain an important portion of this village specific variation in
the subjects’ fair behaviour by controlling for the characteristics of the village populations (figure
55, table 29). Second, we also found an important variability between the villagers in the way they
responded to our experimental stimulus of a lack of opportunity to build reputation, as well as to
how the household income and the amount of salt influenced their behaviour in our experiment
(table 29, figure 57, A17, A18). Third, the importance of the village population characteristics on
the subjects’ behaviour is further highlighted by the fact that all village level fixed effects were
statistically significant in our analysis. In contrast, none of the individual level fixed effects was
statistically significant (table 29). Unlike in previous studies (Roth et al. 1991; Henrich 2000;
Paciotti and Hadley 2003; Tracer 2003; Cronk 2007), we did not find an effect of the subjects’
ethnicity on fair behaviour in our experiment. We assume that this is due to the fact that, on the
one hand, we intentionally sampled several villages containing different range of both main ethnic
groups under study (figure 54, table 27). On the other hand, we also controlled for the population
characteristics our subjects lived in (table 29). If we had only selected one Malinke and one
Fulbe village for our experiment, like for example Boubere and Beleya Koko, not being able
to properly control for the population characteristics, we would have found a highly significant
effect of ethnicity on fair behaviour in our experiment. We would have concluded that Malinke
subjects are much more selfish than Fulbe subjects (A19) and would have speculated about the
reasons for this ethnic difference in fair behaviour. All these findings highlight the importance of
sampling a multitude of populations of each cultural group and controlling for contextual factors
when conducting cultural comparative studies (Oosterbeek et al. 2004; Lamba and Mace 2011).
8.4.1 Fair sharing from the perspective of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith
First, subject’s fair behaviour was positively influenced by the village’s ethnic homogeneity. Pre-
dicted behaviour of subjects in our experiment was only fair in ethnically homogenous villages
(table 29, figure 56). This result clearly supports Rousseau’s prediction related to the homogeneity
of a society and its normative integration. This result was also expected from an evolutionary point
of view (McElreath et al. 2003) and aligns well with the existing empirical evidence regarding the
influence of ethnic homogeneity on prosociality (Alesina et al. 1999; Alesina and Ferrara 2000;
Costa and Kahn 2003; Miguiel and Gugerty 2005; Newton and Delhey 2005; Pennant 2005; An-
derson and Paskeviciute 2006; Leigh 2006; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Putnam 2007; Gustavsson
and Jordahl 2008). However, fair behaviour was also positively influenced by villages’ income
inequality. This result clearly contradicts Rousseau’s prediction related to the negative effect of
interest groups and the normative integration of a society. The result also contradicts a common
perception seeing income inequality as highly problematic for human societies: “Ungleichheit hat
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desaströse Folgen” (Tagesspiegel 2016). It seems, therefore, that the stratification of a popula-
tion into multiple subgroups has no general negative effect on the normative integration of the
population, as postulated by Rousseau (section 2.2). The effect of the stratification on normative
integration depends on the underlying stratification characteristics. In our study, ethnic stratifica-
tion had a negative- and income stratification a positive influence on the normative integration of
the population. A review of findings on the effect of population stratification on prosociality even
suggests that the effect of population stratification on the normative integration may vary across
time, place, and context:
“A consistent finding in the literature on social capital is that not all forms of group
heterogeneity are important determinants of the efficacy of collective action. For ex-
ample, using the General Social Survey, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) finds that par-
ticipation in one or more voluntary membership organizations is negatively associated
with metropolitan area income inequality, as well as racial and ethnic fragmentation,
but not age fragmentation. Costa and Kahn (2003a,b) conduct a similar analysis using
data from several surveys; they find that membership is negatively associated with
metropolitan area income inequality, racial fragmentation and birthplace fragmenta-
tion; however, neither the magnitude nor significance of these measures is consistent
across surveys. In a study of shirking within companies of the Union Army, Costa
and Kahn (2003c) report desertions and other acts of cowardice are positively asso-
ciated with group heterogeneity based on income, ethnicity, occupation or age, albeit
not significantly so for income inequality. These findings suggest that not all forms
of heterogeneity are salient for group cooperation in all times or places.” (Anderson
et al. 2008, pp. 1012-1013 )
Third, the subjects’ behaviour in our experiment became increasingly fair with an increasing mar-
ket integration of the village populations (table 29, figure 56). This result clearly supports Smiths
prediction related to the influence of market interactions and fairness. This result was also ex-
pected from an evolutionary point of view (André and Baumard 2011a; Debove et al. 2015) and
corroborates the positive effect of market integration on fairness found in studies conducted across
different human societies (Henrich et al. 2001; Henrich et al. 2010b).
Finally, our results also show that a missing opportunity to build reputation did not lead to a ge-
neral increase in selfish behaviour in our experiment: in none of the villages was the difference
between observed subjects and unobserved subjects statistically significant. This result is not con-
sistent with Smith’s assumption related to the motives of human behaviour and the broad literature
presenting empirical evidence for a general increase in the subjects’ prosociality elicited by the
presence of observers (Satow 1975; Bull and Gibson-Robinson 1981; Kurzban 2001; Milinski
et al. 2002; Soetevent 2005; Bereczkeit et al. 2007; Bereczkeit et al. 2010). Instead, the effect of
a lack of opportunity to build a positive reputation on fair behaviour in our experiment differed
significantly between the villages. We found the expected increase in selfish behaviour in two thi-
rds of the villages (a few very high deviations from the fair share were observed in the condition
without observation (up to 1.2 kg) and the village specific estimated mean deviations from the fair
share in the condition without observation went up to 106 grams). However, our experimental
treatment under the no-observation condition led in one third of the villages to a fairer behaviour,
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or even to generous behaviour (table 29, figure 57). We can only speculate about this finding.
From a methodical perspective, our experimental stimulus may not have worked as expected in all
villages. From a theoretical point of view, the villages where our experimental treatment worked
as expected must have differed in some ways which we did not control for compared to the villages
where the treatment did not work as expected. Relevant factors could have been the influence of
the village chiefs’ authority or the feeling of privacy within the village communities.
8.4.2 Other findings
As expected (Huck and Oechssler 1999; Forber and Smead 2014), the ability of villages to stabilize
fair behaviour decreased with village population size. Predicted subjects’ behaviour was only
fair for population sizes below 200 individuals (table 29, figure 56). An intriguing aspect of
our results is that the predicted positive effect of kinship on the subjects’ fair behaviour was not
confirmed. On the contrary, increasing kinship among individuals of a village population led
to more selfish behaviour of the subjects in our experiment. Predicted behaviour was only fair
in the village populations with the lowest kinship among individuals (table 29, figure 56). A
theoretical explanation for this result can be found when looking at the reproductive behaviour of
male lions. Male lions of a pride form coalitions to protect their territory and share the females.
The reproductive success of the individual males of a coalition depend on the coalition size: while
all male lions have the same reproductive success in small coalitions (2 individuals), at least one
male fails to breed in larger coalitions. These males become breeding-helpers. Being a breeding
helper is, however, only a successful strategy if it increases the reproductive success of close
relatives. As high levels of kinship guarantee for this condition to be met, breeding helpers only
occur in coalitions made up of relatives (Packer et al. 1991). The same mechanism may also
explain the negative effect of kinship on fair sharing in our experiment: instead of restraining
the selfishness of individuals through equal sharing, kinship allows for unequal sharing, because
individuals are more likely to accept unequal shares at their expense if the beneficiary is a kin than
if the beneficiary is unrelated.
A methodical explanation for the unexpected negative effect of kinship on fairness is based on the
fact that we used a measure of kinship at the aggregate level of the village. For some individuals,
this measure may be a better approximation than for others. The share of a subjects’ kin group to
the total village population is a more accurate measure for the individual relatedness of a subject
to the rest of the village population. Including this measure as a predictor into the full model
does, however, not change the result: the estimate for the share of a subjects’ kin group is not
significant and does not change the estimate related to kinship (table 29, A20). Another theoretical
explanation for the negative effect of kinship on fairness could be redistribution. If this was the
case, we would expect individuals of important kin groups to take more salt during the experiment
and redistribute it to other kin after the experiment. As shown in A20, this was however not the
case.
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8.4.3 Implications
In our study, we were dealing with traditional, small-scale societies that are partly in transition to
more complex and socially stratified societies. The different villages showed an important vari-
ation in population, as well as in individual characteristics, although they were all located in the
same area (figure 54, table 27). Putting our results in a broader human context might help to un-
derstand their implication. Some scholars have argued that humans are a unique species, as their
altruism is not primarily based on kinship. The evolution of fairness and cooperation in human
large scale societies cannot be explained solely by genetic evolution, but is best accounted for with
cultural evolution and gene-culture co-evolution. The empirical evidence for these claims is based
to an important extent on behavioural experiments (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Gintis et al. 2003;
Henrich et al. 2010a). As far as we know, these experiments do, however, not include measures
of kinship to test predictions related to the effect of kinship on behaviour in experiments. In our
experiment, we found a statistically significant effect of kinship on fair behaviour: kinship led,
however, to an increase in selfish behaviour and not, as expected by us, to increased fair behavi-
our. This result indicates that kinship might in fact be a driver of the evolution of fairness and
cooperation in human large scale societies: as long as human populations were mainly composed
of kin, tolerance for unfair behaviour was pronounced and fairness norms likely not able to evolve.
In such a setting, cooperative activities among unrelated individuals were probably rare, one had
to reach out of his own group to encounter unrelated individuals, and cooperation was fostered
by kinship. Only as soon as human populations started to be made up of important fractions of
unrelated individuals (through migration, population mixing, population growth or other mecha-
nisms), did fairness have a chance to evolve. In such populations, unequal shares resulting from
cooperative activities among individuals cannot be sustained by kinship, and humans had to rely
on other mechanisms to promote cooperation. This may have been the catalyst for the emergence
of fairness and large-scale cooperation among humans.
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Conclusion
In my thesis work, I confronted empirical observations I made in two field studies in Guinea with
theoretical predictions deduced from the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. In chapter 2, I
summarized and discussed the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. The scholars followed a
comparative approach, explaining differences between humans and human societies with institu-
tional differences. These differences are related to the capacity of the societies to enforce social
order. Hobbes argued that only an absolutist state, as found in European monarchies, is able to
create the trust needed for any cooperative activity. This state is known as the Leviathan. Humans
lacking such a state are distrustful, defecting, and not able to enforce social order. In compari-
son, absolute states are able to enforce social order and their people are trustful and cooperative.
Rousseau, on the other hand, argued that the main reason for differences found in human societies
was the level of dependence of people on each other. This dependency results from private pro-
perty and the division of labour and cannot be reversed once those social institutions have been
created. The more people depend on each other, the more they try to increase their position at
the expense of others, and the more violent their conflicts become. This leads to enduring violent
conflicts and threatens social order. The only solution to end this vicious cycle of violence is a
state and government ruled by the general will of the people. In such a collectivist state, social
order lasts as long as the moral values of the people coincide with the laws of the state. This is
the case as long as the people are homogeneous and equal. Smith, finally, agreed that the division
of labour was a key aspect of society, because it allows to generate surplus production. As long
as the division of labour is coordinated through some authority, the people are however not free
and society is constantly involved in violent conflicts, threatening social order. If the division of
labour is however coordinated through the free market, this not only leads to the maximal amount
of wealth, at the same time, the freedom of the people is guaranteed, and the social order secured
by the invisible hand of the free market. Accordingly, the state, the private property, the moral
values as well as the free market are the key social institutions needed to explain differences found
between human societies and their capacity to enforce social order. These thoughts are highly
relevant for sociology. However, what is entirely lacking in this short summary are the dogmatic
and philosophical arguments used by the classical scholars to reach their conclusions. Not only
are the works of the classical scholars not mutually compatible, differing fundamentally in some
of their key assumptions, they are furthermore not suitable for a scientific investigation in their
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original form, since some of their key assumptions and arguments cannot be captured empirically.
In chapter 3, I discussed how the works of the classical scholars can nevertheless be used as the
fundament for a scientific investigation. By sticking to simple assumptions of rationality and re-
nouncing to all the others, orthodox game theory allows incorporating the main concepts suggested
by the three classical scholars in a common theoretical framework. Although this approach does
not satisfy the philosophical depth and complexity of the arguments of the three scholars, it nevert-
heless allows analysing the problem of social order from a more general perspective. From this
perspective, the problem of social order is a problem of rational cooperation. In most situations,
the rationality of actors following their self interest will lead to an optimal outcome for all parties
involved. In some cases, however, the outcome will be suboptimal. In these situations, which
are known as social dilemma situations, the rationality of actors fails in providing the optimal
outcome. The definition as well as key concepts suggested to overcome social dilemma can be
linked to the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith. The incorporation of key concepts of Hob-
bes, Rousseau, and Smith in the minimalistic game-theoretical framework is a first step towards
a scientific investigation of the relevance of their thoughts, since it allows formulating hypotheses
in a mutually compatible theoretical framework that can be captured empirically.
In chapter 4, I discussed one of the most important social dilemmas, which occurs when humans
exploit natural resources. Rational actors using a resource held in common will inevitably ove-
rexploit this resource, putting their own existence at risk. This is known as the tragedy of the
commons. The tragedy of the common is a fundamental problem of social order since natural
resources are essential for the survival of humans and the functioning of societies. Not only does
the overexploitation of a key natural resource lead to conflicts that may result in violence or even
the collapse of society, natural resources are also intrinsically linked to the social order of a society
due to their allocation. An allocation of natural resources that is perceived as unfair might trigger
violent conflicts and put the social order of a society into question. Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith
suggested different mechanisms favouring social order. Based on these mechanisms, I formula-
ted hypotheses related to factors influencing the sustainable use and the fair allocation of natural
resources. These hypotheses lay the theoretical foundation for my empirical work.
By confronting theoretical hypotheses with empirical observations, cumulative knowledge on cau-
sal laws determining the functioning of our world can be generated. In chapter 5, I discussed the
methodical and philosophical foundation of causal inference. Based on Popper’s falsificationism,
the continual confrontation of logically sound theoretical hypotheses with empirical observation
allows discerning good from bad theories. Theoretical hypotheses that are not confirmed by em-
pirical observation are falsified and therefore dismissed. Theoretical hypotheses that are corro-
borated by empirical observation are temporally supported. After an empirical test, the theories
are adapted and altered according to the actual standard and confronted with new empirical ob-
servation. The continual practice of this approach then leads to robust and meaningful theories
about the world. The confrontation of theoretical hypotheses with empirical observation is based
on statistical tools applied to data. The result of such a confrontation is however only meaningful
if the data and the statistical tools used are appropriate.
Following the contemporary science of human nature approach, a sound empirical test of my
theoretical hypotheses requires that the used data basis is derived from observations made on
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a non-WEIRD study population with substantial variation in socioeconomic, demographic, as
well as cultural factors. In chapter 6, I described the field work I conducted to collect empirical
observations on small-scale societies living in a remote area of Guinea and showing important
variations in demographic, cultural, as well as socio-economic factors. My data basis therefore
clearly meets the requirements. Although there are a large number of potential statistical tools
available to conduct an empirical test of theoretical hypotheses, these differ in their ability to
capture the dependencies present in the data and to provide reliable results. Based on a simulation
study (section 5.4), I showed that the most universally applicable tool of statistical inference is the
mixed effects regression model. The statistical inferences in my empirical studies in chapters 7 and
8 were therefore all based on mixed effects regression models. The use of such rigorous statistical
analysis as well as such comprehensive data is only rarely found in the empirical literature on
cooperation and fairness in humans. In the next section, I give a brief summary of the results of
my empirical hypotheses tests.
9.1 Summary of findings
In my observational study (chapter 7), I estimated the influence which the local human population
had on wild mammals in my study area in Guinea. Wild mammals were used as a natural resource
by the human population in the study area: meat, fur, and pets were the main commodities obtained
by exploiting wild mammals (chapter 6). Based on abundance figures of 11 large wild mammal
species in the study area, and the survey data obtained by interviewing the local human population
(chapter 6), I found clear evidence for a strong influence of the local human populations on wild
mammals in the study area. First, wild mammals were more abundant in areas under communal
property than in areas under state property. Second, wild mammal species targeted by food taboos
were more abundant than other species that were not subject to any food taboos: their abundance
increased with the share of the human population abiding to respective food taboos. Third, while
the market integration did not affect wild mammal abundance on average, it had a a strong negative
effect on some of the wild mammals, and a strong positive effect on others. These results clearly
show that the works of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith helped understanding the distribution of
wild mammals in the study area. While Hobbes’ prediction was falsified, Rousseau’s predictions
were supported and Smith’s prediction was supported for some species, while falsified for others.
Unfortunately, the private property regime was not implemented in the study area. For this reason,
Smith’s prediction related to the effect of the private property regime on resource exploitation
could not be tested (table 30). The main finding of my study on the abundance of wild mammals
was therefore that it is essential to additionally consider detailed socioeconomic factors, beside
the usual environmental factors, when modelling the distribution of wild species.
In my experimental study (chapter 8), I conducted a field experiment where the participating sub-
jects shared a natural resource held in common. By linking the experimental data with the survey
data obtained by interviewing the subjects and the rest of the human population living in the same
study area (chapter 6), I was able to identify drivers of fair sharing in my field experiment. I
found that fair sharing was strongly influenced by the characteristics of the villages where the sub-
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jects lived, as well as by the experimental treatment of observability: first, the propensity for fair
sharing increased with the market integration of the subjects’ villages; second, the propensity for
fair sharing increased with the ethnic homogeneity of the subjects’ villages; third, the propensity
for fair sharing increased with the income inequality of the subjects’ villages; finally, although
the observability of the subjects’ behaviour during the experiment had no effect on fair sharing of
the subjects on average, the propensity for fair sharing increased when subjects were observed in
some villages and decreased in others. These results show that the works of Rousseau and Smith
helped understanding the behaviour of subjects in my field experiment. While one of Rousseau’s
predictions was supported, the other was falsified. Similarly, while one of Smith’s predictions was
supported, the other was only supported for some villages and falsified for others. Unfortunately,
I was not able to test any prediction based on Hobbes’ work in my experimental study. Out of a
total of 10 predictions, eight were put to an empirical test, four were supported, two were clearly
falsified, and mitigated evidence was found for the remaining two (table 30).
213
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION
Table 30: Result of the hypotheses-tests of Hobbes, Rousseau and Smith related to the use and the
allocation of natural resources.
Scholar Study Prediction Result
Hobbes Natural
resource use
(chapter 7)
Leviathan: Sustainable natural
resource use can only be
implemented in a state property
regimes
Falsified
Rousseau Natural
resource use
(chapter 7)
General will: Sustainable
natural resource use is best
implemented in a communal
property regime
Supported
Rousseau Natural
resource use
(chapter 7)
General will: The sustainability
of natural resource use increases
with the salience of a moral rule
regulating its offer or demand
Supported
Smith Natural
resource use
(chapter 7)
Invisible hand: Natural resource
use increases with the extent of
the market
Ambiguous evidence. No
overall market effect but effect
varying depending on the
resource
Smith Natural
resource use
Invisible hand: Natural resource
use increases with the extent of
the market
Not tested
Hobbes Natural
resource
allocation
Leviathan: The fair allocation of
natural resources is only
possible under the auspice of a
coercive authority opting for
such an allocation
Not tested
Rousseau Fair natural
resource
allocation
(chapter8)
General will: The fairness of the
allocation of a natural resource
decreases with increasing
income inequality of a society
Falsified
Rousseau Fair natural
resource
allocation
(chapter8)
General will: The fairness of the
allocation of a natural resource
increases with the ethnic
homogeneity of a society
Supported
Smith Fair natural
resource
allocation
(chapter8)
Invisible hand: The fairness of
the allocation of a natural
resource increases with the
extent of the market integration
of a society
Supported
Smith Fair natural
resource
allocation
(chapter8)
Invisible hand: The fairness of
the allocation of a natural
resource increases with the
transparency of the behavir of
individuals responsible for the
allocation of the resource
Ambiguous evidence. No
overall effect of observation.
Effect varies depending on the
society
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BEHAVIOUR
9.2 Incorporating the social environment when studying human be-
haviour
The results of my work clearly highlight the use of the works of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Smith
in understanding drivers of human behaviour. I showed that the work of Hobbes, Rousseau, and
Smith could be used to understand human behaviour in situations that were not conceived by
the authors and in types of societies they did not know. They lacked all the investigative and
analytical tools of contemporary science (chapter 5), but their work still allowed to deduce valuable
predictions that proved to be true. Most importantly, they focused on social institutions (the state,
the property, the social norms, and the market) to explain differences between humans. My results
strongly support the idea that the social environment is essential to understand human behaviour.
Without considering the social environment, we would have missed the most important aspects of
the way the people in the study area used and shared natural resources (chapters 7 and 8). This
puts in question pure labouratory approaches that deliberately fade out the social environment of
the subjects. Instead, a cross-cultural, empirical and quantitative approach, intentionally including
variations in the social environment within the study sample, should be followed when studying
human behaviour. Such an approach has prominent advocates (section 5.1) and I believe to have
successfully applied it in this work.
In some instances, however, the results of my studies did falsify predictions derived from the
classical scholars. Interestingly, this was the case for the two predictions I assumed to be the
most straightforward and widely accepted. First, wild mammals were less abundant in protected
areas under state property regimes than in areas under communal property regimes. Following
Hobbes, we would expect the opposite. In fact, in his influential article “The Tragedy of the
Commons”, Hardin (1968) did not even consider the communal property regime as a solution to
the tragedy of the commons (section 4.3.2). Some would rightly argue that the Guinean state is
not a good example for Hobbes’s Leviathan. Therefore, they would argue, the hypothesis related
to the effectivity of the state property regime in protecting wild mammals was not really tested.
Accordingly, the people living in the study area are in a Hobbesian state of nature, characterized
by the lack of an external state authority. Interestingly, they were nevertheless able to enforce a
high level of social order, contradicting Hobbes’ assumption about humans and the state of nature.
No matter from which perspective the matter is considered, Hobbes is wrong in this case.
Second, fairness increased with the income inequality of the villages. Following Rousseau, we
would have expected the opposite. A short google search for “income inequality destroys society”
reveals that this is indeed a widely held assumption. More research is needed to uncover the me-
chanisms responsible for these two intriguing findings. However, it may well be that the works
of the classical scholars are to some extent outdated. Even if they were right at their time, when
centralized states were rare and private property restricted to a few privileged people, society has
changed a lot since the classical scholars wrote their works. Now, centralized states rule over the
majority of humanity and private property has spread to some extent even to the poorest people.
It is, therefore, likely that individual behaviour has evolved and adapted to these massive changes
in the social environment. A social theory that builds upon the different dogmatic traditions esta-
blished by Hobbes, Rousseau, and Smith, and follows an eclectic paradigm could be a first step
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towards updating obsolete assumptions and uncovering the true human nature. Considering the
sharp ideological trenches between the different disciplines in the social sciences, building such
a theory would be an extremely exhausting task: while economists largely follow the tradition of
Smith (Ostry et al. 2016), other social scientists are mostly adepts of Rousseau’s tradition (Pinker
2002; Duarte et al. 2015). So far, there has been no fruitful dialogue between the different dog-
matic camps (Lindsay et al. 2018). Instead, they live side by side (Stern 2016). However, even
if the different dogmatic camps cannot be reconciled, more dogmatic diversity within the social
scientific disciplines, combined with a quantitative empirical approach to scientific investigations,
would still improve the quality of the scientific output by reducing bias in general (Duarte et al.
2015).
9.3 Drivers of sustainable natural resource use
The results of my two empirical studies (chapter 7 and 8) revealed some interesting findings related
to the question of how to reach sustainability in natural resources use. This question is of high rele-
vance, considering its importance for the future well-being of humanity (chapter 4). First, it seems
that a normative solution, combined with a communal property regime, could be a promising ap-
proach to reach sustainability targets. This follows from the positive effect of the food taboos
and the communal property regimes on the abundance of wild mammals (table 30). Second, the
applicability of such a normative approach is strongly influenced by the social environment. This
follows from the substantial effects of the market integration, the ethnic homogeneity, the income
inequality, the population size, and the kinship of the villages on fairness (figure 56). Finally, the
market mechanism can help reaching sustainability targets by providing a substitute for a given
natural resource. This follows from the effect of the market integration on the abundance of wild
mammal species. For some species, the effect was positive, providing a substitute for the species
products, decreasing the economic pressure on these species and increasing their abundance. For
others, the effect was negative, providing additional incentives to exploit these species and thereby
decreasing their abundance. The rest of the species were only marginally affected by the market
integration (figure 50). On the small geographical and time scale of my empirical studies, these
results clearly help understanding how humans use natural resources. This understanding can then
be used to work out pragmatic and comprehensive strategies for the conservation of wild mam-
mals in the study area. But can these findings in some ways help understanding and solving global
environmental problems?
9.4 Species loss and global warming
In order to put my findings in a global context, I will focus on two major global environmental
challenges. First, the living planet report 2016 revealed that overall vertebrate population abun-
dance of wild species declined by 58% from 1970 to 2012 (Oerlemans 2016, p. 18). The decline
in wild species was ongoing since then, with overall vertebrate population abundance of wild spe-
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cies declining by 60% from 1970 to 2014. The decline consisted of 89% for South and Central
American animal species and 83% for freshwater species (Grooten and Almond 2018, p. 8). It
is obvious that this ongoing decline will eventually lead to the loss of most wild species at some
point in the future, with unpredictable negative consequences for human well-being.
Second, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its report on Global
Warming of 1.5 degree in October 2018. According to the IPCC, human activities (figure 58) have
led to an increase in global average annual temperature by 1 degree above pre-industrial levels
(Masson-Delmotte et al. 2018, p. 6).
Figure 58: Pattern and explanation of climate change (the figure and the following legend are from
Bindoff et al. 2013, p. 29).
(Left) Time series of global and annual-averaged surface temperature change from 1860 to 2010.
The top left panel shows results from two ensemble of climate models driven with just natural for-
cings, shown as thin blue and yellow lines; ensemble average temperature changes are thick blue
and red lines. Three different observed estimates are shown as black lines. The lower left panel
shows simulations by the same models, but driven with both natural forcing and human-induced
changes in greenhouse gases and aerosols. (Right) Spatial patterns of local surface temperature
trends from 1951 to 2010. The upper panel shows the pattern of trends from a large ensemble of
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) simulations driven with just natural
forcings. The bottom panel shows trends from a corresponding ensemble of simulations driven
with natural + human forcings. The middle panel shows the pattern of observed trends from
the Hadley Centre/Climatic Research Unit gridded surface temperature data set 4 (HadCRUT4)
during this period.
At current rate, global warming is expected to reach 1.5 degree between 2030 and 2052. Eventu-
ally, global warming will then reach levels of 2 degrees or more at some point of time if the current
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trend keeps going on. This will have consequences for human and natural systems. Climate-related
risks will be lowest if the warming stays below 1.5 degree and highest if it reaches 2 degrees. Glo-
bal warming above 2 degrees will lead to unpredictable outcomes. Climate-related risks include
increases in the intensity and/or frequency of droughts, increases in the frequency of extreme he-
ats, increases in the frequency of heavy precipitation and flood hazards, rising global sea level,
loss and degradation of ecosystems and habitats, increases in forest fires, spread of invasive spe-
cies, thawing of permafrost areas, loss of coastal resources, decrease in marine productivity, loss
of marine and coastal ecosystems, loss of species, migration of species as well as melting and
even loss of arctic ice cover (Masson-Delmotte et al. 2018, pp. 6-10). In summary, earth will
become a much less pleasant place for humans, strongly affecting the well-being of humans and
the functioning of human societies. According to the IPCC, these negative consequences can only
be prevented if humans radically change their lifestyle:
“Reaching and sustaining net zero global anthropogenic CO2 emissions and declining
net non-CO2 radiative forcing would halt anthropogenic global warming on multi-
decadal time scales (high confidence). The maximum temperature reached is then
determined by cumulative net global anthropogenic CO2 emissions up to the time of
net zero CO2 emissions (high confidence) and the level of non-CO2 radiative forcing
in the decades prior to the time that maximum temperatures are reached (medium
confidence). On longer time scales, sustained net negative global anthropogenic CO2
emissions and/ or further reductions in non-CO2 radiative forcing may still be requi-
red to prevent further warming due to Earth system feedbacks and to reverse ocean
acidification (medium confidence) and will be required to minimize sea level rise
(high confidence).” (Masson-Delmotte et al. 2018, p. 7)
9.5 CITES and EU ETS: solutions to global environmental problems
The fact that biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas emissions pose a serious threat to human well
being has been widely acknowledged by the public opinion and the global political elite. As a
result, institutional arrangements have been implemented to tackle these issues.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flaura (CITES),
for example, was created in order to ensure the sustainability of international trade in wild flora
and fauna (CITES 2018d). To reach this goal, member states of CITES are supposed to regulate
their trade according to the guidelines defined in CITES. These guidelines regulate trade in wild
species by first determining a threat level for each species. Species listed in appendix 1 are thre-
atened with extinction. Their trade is allowed only under special circumstances. Species listed
in appendix 2 are potentially threatened and trade should therefore be limited. Species listed in
appendix 3 are protected in at least one member state. CITES supports the member states in re-
gulating international trade in the protected species. International trade in species listed in CITES
appendices relies on authorization given by CITES through a licensing system. All member sta-
tes are responsible for the management and the enforcement of CITES (CITES 2018b). CITES
entered into force in 1975 (CITES 2018e) and had 183 member states in November 2018 (CITES
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2018c). While an average of 9 million whole organism equivalents (WOEs) were legally traded
under CITES from 1975 to 1985, this figure went up to 100 million WOEs between 2005 and
2014. Overall, the trade shifted from a majority of products captured in the wild to a majority of
products bred in captivity. 81.5% of transactions, products and quantities cited by the exporters
matched with the products and quantities cited by the importers. In summary, although the trade
in wild species products increased sharply since CITES entered into force, there was also a shift
from wild- towards more captive sourced wildlife products (Harfoot et al. 2018, pp. 50-55). But
what is the impact of CITES on the protection of wild species from threats occuring through glo-
bal trade? Case studies can help finding an answer to this question. Pangolins had been classified
in CITES appendix 2 from 1978 to 2000. During this period, trade in pangolins reported to CI-
TES involved an annual average of about 23,418 animals. For the period between July 2000 and
2013, after pangolins were classified in CITES appendix 1, seizures in illegal trade amounted to
an annual average of about 16,269 animals. Considering that these seizures only represent a small
part of the illegal trade, the true extent of the illegal trade should be much larger (Challender et al.
2015, pp. 252-253). For pangolins, it seems that CITES did not succeed in limiting trade. Trade
in pangolins simply shifted from a legal to an illegal sphere. A second case study focuses on the
effect of CITES trade regulation on the exploitation of hammerhead sharks and whitetip sharks
in India. These two species were listed in the CITES 2 appendix in September 2014 (Zacharia
et al. 2017, p. iii). Indian landings of hammerhead sharks did not decrease substantially after their
listings as CITES appendix 2 species. The same applies to whitetip sharks (Zacharia et al. 2017,
pp. 20-27). In the case of these two shark species, CITES listing did not reduce their exploitation.
Finally, let us look at the international trade in African grey parrots, a species listed in the CITES
appendix 2 since June 1981 (CITES 2018a). The most important exporter of African grey parrots,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, exported 86,744 African grey parrots from 2005 to 2014.
These were 26,744 more than permitted by the CITES (Poole and Shepherd 2017, p. 416). Even
when export permits for vulnerable species are granted generously by considering the economic
importance for the member states, members states can still exceed the quota without suffering
any serious consequences. So what is the conclusion regarding CITES trade regulation now? Of
course, it is not possible to know how the wildlife would have evolved without CITES. For some
species, the situation would surely be worse now. However, on average, I would conclude that
CITES failed so far in protecting wild species from the threats of international trade, because the
legal trade increased since the implementation of CITES. Surley, trade in wildlife could also have
increased due to increased wildlife abundance, but this it is highly unlikely.
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) entered into force in 2005. The EU
ETS is the main tool developed by the EU to combat climate change. It operates in 31 countries
(Lichtenstein, Norway, Iceland plus all 28 EU countries), limits the emissions of more than 11,000
industrial plants and power stations as well as airlines operating within these countries, and covers
about 45% of total EU’s greenhouse gas emissions. The system works by defining a total amount
of emissions allowed for the companies covered by the system. This is the cap. The cap is suppo-
sed to decrease over time. Companies receive or buy emission allowances and can trade these. At
the end of each year, the emissions of a company are compared with their emission allowances.
If the actual emissions surpass the emission allowances, heavy fines are imposed. Otherwise, the
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companies can keep their emission allowances for the future or sell them. The target set by the
EU is to reduce EU emissions, compared to 2005, by 21% in 2020 and by 43% in 2030 (European
Commission 2018). At first glance, the EU seems to have succeeded so far in reducing emissi-
ons. In 2016, the EU emissions declined by about 18% compared to 2005 (European Commission
2017, p. 4, own calculations). However, looking at the per capita emissions in the EU, we see
that they only decreased marginally from 1990 to 2012 (European Commission 2017, p. 5). At
the same time, global emissions even increased by 18% between 2005 and 2014 (Boden et al.
2017, own calculations). Considering that the EU ETS was primarily developed to combat global
climate change, the figures cited suggest that it has failed so far.
9.6 Reasons for the failure of CITES and EU ETS
The broad literature on CITES and EU ETS discusses numerous reasons possibly responsible for
the failure of CITES and EU ETS to reach their targets (Challender et al. 2015; Fan et al. 2017;
Grosjean 2017; Harfoot et al. 2018; Naegele and Zaklan 2017; Poole and Shepherd 2017;Sommer
and Hain 2017; Segura et al. 2018; Sills 2018). Here, I am going to apply the lessons learned from
my field studies on these two cases.
Let us first look at the case of the EU ETS as a tool to combat human induced global warming.
Human induced global warming results mainly from the consumption of fossil fuels and the ce-
ment production of all humans worldwide (Boden et al. 2017). Structurally, this is equivalent to
the abundance of wild mammals in the study area in Guinea, which is negatively affected by the
exploitative activities of all humans located within the borders of the study area (chapter 7). For
illustrative purpose, let us focus on wart hogs. Wart hogs were targeted by food taboos in the
study area. However, not all village communities did abide to wart hog food taboos (table 22).
Food taboos succeeded in limiting the exploitation of wart hogs in the study area: their abun-
dance increased with the share of the human population abiding to wart hog food taboos (figure
51). Obviously, food taboos limit the demand for wart hog products, since Muslims abiding to
the food taboo do not eat pig meat. However, focusing on wart hog food taboos alone to decrease
the exploitation of wart hogs in the entire study area is no promising strategy. What about the
communities not abiding to wart hog food taboos? What if they keep on exploiting wart hogs at
the usual levels, or even increase their consumption?
Similarly, the EU ETS reduces the demand for fossil fuels by defining a cap, which is decreasing
over time, leading to a decreased consumption of fossil fuels within the EU. However, if the rest
of the world continues with business as usual, or even increases its consumption of fossil fuels,
the EU ETS will only have a limited impact on the global consumption of fossil fuels. Global
problems ask for global solutions. However, no binding agreement to reduce emissions has been
reached yet at the global level (Clémencon 2016, p. 4). One of the main reasons for this lack of
global agreement on emission reduction at the global level is the human sense of fairness. Rich
and developed countries are not ready to reduce their emissions, because they feel the suggested
solutions come at their expense. Bargaining outcomes that are perceived as unfair run a risk of
being undermined or broken and cause conflicts (Falk et al. 2003). President Trump made this
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clear when he declared his intention to withdraw from the not binding Paris agreement:
“Not only does this deal subject our citizens to harsh economic restrictions, it fails to
live up to our environmental ideals. As someone who cares deeply about the environ-
ment, which I do, I cannot in good conscience support a deal that punishes the United
States - which is what it does - the world’s leader in environmental protection, while
imposing no meaningful obligations on the world’s leading polluters. For example,
under the agreement, China will be able to increase the emissions by a staggering
number of years – 13. They can do whatever they want for 13 years. Not us. India
makes its participation contingent on receiving billions and billions and billions of
dollars in foreign aid from developed countries. There are many other examples but
the bottom line is that the Paris Accord is very unfair at the highest level to the United
States.” (Climate Analytics 2017, p. 18)
Poor and undeveloped countries, on the other hand, feel that they have to pay for the mistakes of
others. This view was well summarized by Robert Mugabe at the open summit of the Paris climate
change talks: “Developed countries are being miserly [...] they burden us for cleaning up the mess
they have created.” (Reuters 2015). In my experimental study on fair sharing (chapter 8), I showed
that some village communities were able to implement a fair outcome in a situation characterized
by asymmetric bargaining power. This capacity depended on the social environment of individuals
within the villages that can be conceived as human groups: under favourable conditions, the social
environment supports cooperative social norms, self-sacrifice, and the equalizing of individual’s
baragaining power, leading to fair outcomes (chapter 8). The entire humanity, however, cannot be
conceived as a group in the same way. This rules out that a fair agreement to reduce the global
reduction of emissions can be reached based on the adaptive mechanisms that worked within the
studied village populations.
CITES goes one step further than the EU ETS system. It acknowledges that a global threat needs
a global solution and has convinced most of the countries in the world to join the club. Now, for
simplicity, let us consider the 183 member states of CITES as the whole world population and
the wild species as the resource. CITES aims at decreasing the exploitation of the resource by
limiting its trade. Structurally, this situation is comparable to the village populations exploiting
wild mammals within the study area in Guinea. Furthermore, let us consider the listing of one
species in CITES appendix 1 as a form of taboo to trade the respective species. In my work, I
showed that food taboos worked as a tool to decrease the exploitation of a species (figure 51).
However, market mechanisms nevertheless still applied in the study area: while the abundance
of wart hogs increased with the share of the population abiding to wart hog food taboos (food
taboos decrease the local demand), at the same time, the abundance of wart hogs decreased with
the market integration of the population (incentives to exploit wart hogs increase with the market
driven demand) (figures 51 and 50). It seems that moral values and market incentives interact:
“[...] market interaction displays a tendency to lower moral values [...]” (Falk and Szech 2013, p.
710).
Strictly speaking, when a new species is listed in CITES appendix 1, no new moral value is created.
Instead, a new law enters into force. Unfortunately, market interactions also display a tendency
to counteract the rule of laws. This is best exemplified with the failure of the global “war on
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drugs”. Despite policies implementing severe and restrictive laws penalizing the production and
the consumption of drugs over the last decades, the global area used to cultivate opium poppy
doubled from 2006 to 2017, the global area used to cultivate coca bush increased by 76% from
2000 to 2013 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018, p. 28) and the estimated number of
users of illegal drugs reached its historical peak in 2016 with 275 million people (United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime 2018, p. 11). Normative and/or legal rules alone will always fail to
decrease the exploitation of a resource, when not considering alternatives to satisfy the demand,
or even means to decrease the demand for the resource in question: institutional limitations in
exploitation (supply) will lead to higher prices if the demand persists. These higher prices will
then lead to an increased supply on the black market. Criminal organizations will always find
ways to supply the demand if the price is high enough. These remarks corroborate the findings of
Challender et al 2015 for the failure of CITES to decrease the trade in pangolin products:
“[...] CITES lacks a responsive mechanism through which to consider and act on these
market dynamics. For instance, price data are not recorded in CITES. Although rising
prices for pangolin products and suspected population declines were recorded in the
RST process, this mechanism does not comprise an in-depth assessment of markets,
and nor does it formulate interventions to address them, at least in demand terms.
As Asian pangolins demonstrate, the remedial measures formulated for these species
did nothing to address demand directly. However, these price trends are extremely
worrying because where similar price increases have been observed for other rare
species; they have been inversely correlated to population size” (Challender et al.
2015, p. 256).
According to the insights gained in my field work in Guinea, the failures of CITES and EU ETS
to target the global environmental problems of species loss and global warming are basically
threefold: first, global problems need global solutions, and humanity has not been able to agree on
globally binding agreements; second, the inability to agree on globally binding agreements is due
to the fact that the whole humanity does not function like a human group, blessed with means to
foster prosociality and overcome social dilemma; third, the adaptations and measures necessary to
tackle the issues of global warming and species loss would have serious effects on the supply and
demand of crucial natural resources. All institutional solutions to the problems of species loss and
global warming need to either find substitutes for the natural resources in question, or to reduce
the demand for these resources. If not, any effort done in the right direction will be counteracted
by the market mechanism. In summary, global environmental issues are true problems of social
order and the institutional arrangements built to deal with these issues are not up to the job.
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  1 
Date: 
Questionnaire 
Village:_______________________________ Foyer:_______________________________ 
Père de famille:______________________________________________________________ 
Nombre et âge des Femmes:____________________________________________________ 
Nombre et âge des fils:_________________________________________________________ 
Nombre et âge des filles:_______________________________________________________ 
Est-ce que des parents vivent dans le foyer (âge, sex)? _______________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Quel âge avez-vous? ________________________________________________________ 
2. Origine ethnique? □Fulbé □ Malinké □Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger: _______________ 
3. Ou êtes-vous né? ___________________________________________________________ 
4. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ____________________________________ 
5. Combien de mois par an êtes-vous au village? ____________________________________ 
6. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher? _________________________________ 
7. Combien de fois par an allez-vous en ville? ______________________________________ 
8. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région? □ Oui □ Non   
Quel travail et région? ____________________________________________________________________ 
9. Est-ce que vous soutenez vôtre famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non  
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
10. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________ 
11. Quelle école? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
12. Savez-vous lire? □ Oui □ Non  
13. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Autre:_______________ 
14. Quelle profession exercez-vous? □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur□ Forgeront □ Commerçant  
□ Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Maçon  
□ Tisseur □ Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre: _______________________________ 
15. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? ______________________________________________ 
16. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous? _______________________________________ 
17. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation?  
□ Oui □ Non      Quels projets et quand? __________________________________________ 
  2 
FOYER SECTION CHAMPS                       Date : 
           Heure: 
 
1. Avez-vous des terres?  □ Oui    □ Non  
Lieux (carré dans carte): _______________________________________________________ 
2. Cultivez-vous des champs?   □ Oui      ->     Si oui, question 3  
                □ Non    ->     Si non, section jardin 
3. Qui travail dans les champs ?   
□ Foyer  (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□ Employé  (préciser) ________________________________________________________ 
4. Pratiquez-vous une culture sur brûlis? □ Oui □ Non  
5. Est-ce que vous épargnez certains arbres pendant le défrichement?  □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui, lesquels? ____________________________________________ 
6. Est-ce que vous bloquez le feu ? 
□ Oui  □ Non   
7. Quel est votre rythme de culture et de jachère? 
Culture: ____________________________________________________________________ 
Jachère: ____________________________________________________________________ 
8. Entretenez-vous des haies mortes, vives ou mixtes pour vos champs? 
□ Mortes   □ Vives   □ Mixtes  □ Pas de haies   
9. À quelle distance (km) du village vous éloignez-vous pour vos champs? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  3 
Tableau pour les champs 
Plante Engrais Grandeur 
(largeur x longueur m) 
Lieux 
(Carré dans carte) 
Unités récoltées 
(Dernière récolte) 
Unités vendues 
(Dernière récolte) 
Gain 
(Dernière récolte) 
Riz       
Haricot       
Manioc       
Fonio       
Arachide       
Patate       
Taro       
Mil       
Autre:       
Autre:       
Autre:       
  4 
FOYER SECTION JARDINS                       Date : 
           Heure: 
1. Cultivez-vous des Jardins?   □ Oui      ->     Si oui, question 2  
                □ Non    ->     Si non, section arbres fruitiers 
2. Qui travail dans les jardins ?    
□ Foyer (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□ Employé (préciser) _________________________________________________________ 
3. Entretenez-vous des haies mortes, vives ou mixtes pour vos jardins?  
□ Mortes  □ Vives  □ Mixtes  □ Pas de haies 
4. À quelle distance (km) du village vous éloignez-vous pour vos jardins? ________________ 
 
1. Position dans le foyer ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Quel âge avez-vous ? _______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Sexe: □ Féminin □ Masculin  
4. De quelle origine ethnique êtes-vous ?  □ Fulbé □ Malinké □ Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger ______ 
5. Où êtes-vous né? __________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ___________________________________________________ 
7. Combien de temps par an êtes-vous au village? __________________________________________________ 
8. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher ?________________________________________________ 
9. Combien de fois par ans allez-vous en ville ?____________________________________________________ 
10. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quel travail? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Est-ce que vous soutenez la famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
12. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________________________ 
13. Quelle école avez-vous fréquentée? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
14. Savez-vous lire? □ Oui □ Non  
15. Combien d’enfants avez-vous? ______________________________________________________________ 
16. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Aucune  
17. Quelle profession exercez-vous ?  □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur □ Forgeront □ Commerçant □ 
Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur  □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Macon □ Tisseur □ 
Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre ___________________ 
18. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? _____________________________________________________________ 
19. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous ? _____________________________________________________ 
20. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation? □ Oui □ Non 
Quels projets et quand ? ______________________________________________________________________ 
  5 
Tableau pour les jardins 
Plante Engrais Lieux 
(GPS track ou carte) 
Unités récoltées 
(Dernière récolte) 
Unités vendues 
(Dernière récolte) 
Gain 
(Dernière récolte) 
Aubergine      
Oignon      
Tomate      
Gombo      
Chou      
Carotte      
Piment      
Ail      
Patate      
Autre:      
Autre:      
  6 
FOYER SECTION ARBRES FRUITIERS               Date : 
           Heure: 
1. Cultivez-vous des arbres fruitiers?   □ Oui      ->     Si oui, question 2  
                 □ Non     ->     Si non, section animaux 
2. Qui s’occupe des arbres fruitiers ?   
□ Foyer (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□ Employé (préciser) _________________________________________________________ 
3. À quelle distance (km) du village vous éloignez-vous pour vos arbres fruitiers? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Position dans le foyer ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Quel âge avez-vous ? _______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Sexe: □ Féminin □ Masculin  
4. De quelle origine ethnique êtes-vous ?  □ Fulbé □ Malinké □ Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger ______ 
5. Où êtes-vous né? __________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ___________________________________________________ 
7. Combien de temps par an êtes-vous au village? __________________________________________________ 
8. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher ?________________________________________________ 
9. Combien de fois par ans allez-vous en ville ?____________________________________________________ 
10. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quel travail? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Est-ce que vous soutenez la famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
12. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________________________ 
13. Quelle école avez-vous fréquentée? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
14. Savez-vous lire? □ Oui □ Non  
15. Combien d’enfants avez-vous? ______________________________________________________________ 
16. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Aucune  
17. Quelle profession exercez-vous ?  □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur □ Forgeront □ Commerçant □ 
Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur  □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Macon □ Tisseur □ 
Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre ___________________ 
18. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? _____________________________________________________________ 
19. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous ? _____________________________________________________ 
20. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation? □ Oui □ Non 
Quels projets et quand ? ______________________________________________________________________ 
  7 
Tableau pour les arbres fruitiers 
Plante Engrais Nombre de Pieds Lieux 
(Gps track ou carte) 
Unités récoltées 
(Dernière récolte) 
Unités vendues 
(Dernière récolte) 
Gains 
(Dernière récolte) 
Manguier       
Bananier       
Oranger       
Avocatier       
Ananas       
Acajou       
Colatier       
Citronnier       
Papayer       
Autre:       
Autre:       
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FOYER SECTION ANIMAUX DOMESTIQUES            Date : 
             Heure: 
1. Avez-vous des animaux domestiques?  □ Oui   ->  Si oui, question 2  
                □ Non   ->  Si non, section pêche 
2. Qui s’occupe des animaux?    
□ Foyer (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□Employé (préciser) _________________________________________________________ 
3. À quelle distance (km) du village vous éloignez-vous pour vos animaux domestiques? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Position dans le foyer ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Quel âge avez-vous ? _______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Sexe: □ Féminin □ Masculin  
4. De quelle origine ethnique êtes-vous ?  □ Fulbé □ Malinké □ Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger ______ 
5. Où êtes-vous né? __________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ___________________________________________________ 
7. Combien de temps par an êtes-vous au village? __________________________________________________ 
8. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher ?________________________________________________ 
9. Combien de fois par ans allez-vous en ville ?____________________________________________________ 
10. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quel travail? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Est-ce que vous soutenez la famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
12. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________________________ 
13. Quelle école avez-vous fréquentée? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
14. Savez-vous lire? □ Oui □ Non  
15. Combien d’enfants avez-vous? ______________________________________________________________ 
16. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Aucune  
17. Quelle profession exercez-vous ?  □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur □ Forgeront □ Commerçant □ 
Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur  □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Macon □ Tisseur □ 
Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre ___________________ 
18. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? _____________________________________________________________ 
19. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous ? _____________________________________________________ 
20. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation? □ Oui □ Non 
Quels projets et quand ? ______________________________________________________________________ 
 
  9 
Tableaux pour les animaux domestiques 
Animal Nombre Lieux 
(Carré carte) 
Utilisation Nombre Vendu 
(Année dernière) 
Gain 
(Année dernière) 
Poulet      
Cochon      
Cheval      
Âne      
Chèvre      
Mouton      
Escargot      
Vache      
Agouti      
Pigeon      
Ruche à miel      
Canard      
Autre:      
Autre:      
Utilisation: Production viande; Force de travail; Production produits laitiers; Valeur; Statut; Dots; Funérailles; Culte (Sacrifice); Commerce…
  10 
FOYER SECTION  PÊCHE                Date : 
             Heure: 
1. Est-ce que vous pêchez?        □ Oui      ->  Si oui, question 2  
                    □ Non     ->  Si non, section chasse 
2. Combien de fois par mois pêchez-vous? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
-> □ Si plus de 4 fois, question 3   -> □ Si moins de 5 fois, section chasse 
 
3. Qui s’occupe de la pêche?    
□ Foyer (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□ Employé (préciser) _________________________________________________________ 
4. À quelle distance (km) du village vous éloignez-vous pour la pêche? __________________ 
 
1. Position dans le foyer ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Quel âge avez-vous ? _______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Sexe: □ Féminin □ Masculin  
4. De quelle origine ethnique êtes-vous ?  □ Fulbé □ Malinké □ Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger ______ 
5. Où êtes-vous né? __________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ___________________________________________________ 
7. Combien de temps par an êtes-vous au village? __________________________________________________ 
8. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher ?________________________________________________ 
9. Combien de fois par ans allez-vous en ville ?____________________________________________________ 
10. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quel travail? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Est-ce que vous soutenez la famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
12. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________________________ 
13. Quelle école avez-vous fréquentée? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
14. Savez-vous lire? □ Oui □ Non  
15. Combien d’enfants avez-vous? ______________________________________________________________ 
16. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Aucune  
17. Quelle profession exercez-vous ?  □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur □ Forgeront □ Commerçant □ 
Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur  □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Macon □ Tisseur □ 
Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre ___________________ 
18. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? _____________________________________________________________ 
19. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous ? _____________________________________________________ 
20. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation? □ Oui □ Non 
Quels projets et quand ? ______________________________________________________________________ 
  11 
Tableau pour la pêche 
Poisson Lieux 
(Rivière et carré carte) 
Technique Quantité pêchée 
(par mois) 
Quantité vendue 
(Par mois) 
Gain 
(Par mois) 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Technique: Nasse; Filet; Pêche à la ligne; Poison; Barrage; Harpon…
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FOYER SECTION CHASSE                Date : 
             Heure: 
1. Est-ce que vous chassez?   □ Oui    ->  Si oui, question 2  
               □ Non    ->  Si non, section produits de brousse 
2. Combien de fois par mois chassez-vous? ________________________________________ 
-> □ Si plus de 4 fois, question 3 -> □ Si moins de 5 fois, section produits de brousse 
3. Qui s’occupe de la chasse?    
□ Foyer (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□ Employé (préciser) _________________________________________________________ 
4. Avez-vous un fusil? □ Oui □ Non       Combiens: ________________________________ 
5. Est-ce que vous louez un fusil? □ Oui □ Non      Où:______________________________ 
6. Où vous ravitaillez-vous en munitions? _________________________________________ 
7. Quels animaux avez-vous déjà chassez (Montrer images)? 
Numéro images:______________________________________________________________ 
8. Quels animaux ne chassez-vous jamais (Montrer images)? 
Numéro images:______________________________________________________________ 
Pourquoi pas ? _______________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
9. Est-ce que vous faites des battues ? □ Oui □ Non  Si oui, quels animaux (Montrer images)  
Numéro images______________________________________________________________ 
10. Où vendez-vous le gibier? __________________________________________________ 
11. À quelle distance (km) du village vous éloigniez vous pour la chasse? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  13 
Tableau pour la chasse (Jusqu’à 10 proies importantes)  
Animal Lieux 
(Carré carte) 
Technique Nombre Chassé 
(Par mois) 
Nombre Vendu 
(Par mois) 
Gain 
(Par mois) 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Technique: Piège; Enfume; Fusil; Arc; Chien… 
  14 
FOYER SECTION PRODUITS DE LA BROUSSE            Date : 
             Heure: 
1. Est-ce que vous utilisez des produits de la brousse? (Miel, plantes…)  
□ Oui  ->  Si oui, question 2 
□ Non  ->  Si non, section soutient familial 
2. Qui s’occupe de la récolte des produits de la brousse?      
□ Foyer (préciser) ___________________________________________________________ 
□ Employé (préciser) _________________________________________________________ 
 
3. À quelle distance du village (km) vous éloignez-vous pour la récolte des produits de 
brousse? ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Position dans le foyer ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Quel âge avez-vous ? _______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Sexe: □ Féminin □ Masculin  
4. De quelle origine ethnique êtes-vous ?  □ Fulbé □ Malinké □ Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger ______ 
5. Où êtes-vous né? __________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ___________________________________________________ 
7. Combien de temps par an êtes-vous au village? __________________________________________________ 
8. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher ?________________________________________________ 
9. Combien de fois par ans allez-vous en ville ?____________________________________________________ 
10. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quel travail? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Est-ce que vous soutenez la famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
12. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________________________ 
13. Quelle école avez-vous fréquentée? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
14. Savez-vous lire? □ Oui □ Non  
15. Combien d’enfants avez-vous? ______________________________________________________________ 
16. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Aucune  
17. Quelle profession exercez-vous ?  □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur □ Forgeront □ Commerçant □ 
Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur  □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Macon □ Tisseur □ 
Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre ___________________ 
18. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? _____________________________________________________________ 
19. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous ? _____________________________________________________ 
20. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quels projets et quand ? ______________________________________________________________________ 
  15 
Tableau pour produits de brousse 
Produit Lieux 
(carré carte) 
Quantité collectée 
(dernière saison) 
Quantitée vendue 
(dernière saison) 
Gain 
(dernière saison) 
Miel     
Vitelaria Paradoxa     
Tamarindus Indica     
Datrium Microcarpum     
Lannea Acida     
Parkia Biglobosa     
Xyclopia Aethiopium     
Sorendia Juglandifolia     
Landolphia Heudelotii     
Carapa Prossera     
Combretum Micranthum     
Elaeis Guineensis     
Cola Cordifolia     
Syzygium Guineense     
Vitex Doniana     
Piliostigma Thonningii     
Adonsonia Digitata     
Annona Senegalensis     
  16 
Produit Lieux 
(carré carte) 
Quantité collectée 
(dernière saison) 
Quantité vendue 
(dernière saison) 
Gain 
(dernière saison) 
 
Saba 
    
 
Raphia 
    
 
Ficus 
    
 
Dialium 
    
 
Afromommum 
    
 
Jetrofa 
    
Autre:     
Autre:     
Autre:     
Autre:     
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FOYER SECTION SOUTIEN FAMILIAL             Date : 
             Heure: 
1. Est-ce que le foyer reçoit du soutient de membre de l’extérieur? 
□ Oui -> Question 2  
□ Non -> Section individuelle 
2. Combien de Membres soutiennent le foyer et quelle est leur fonction? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
3. À quel montant par an s’élève ce soutient?   
□ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
 
1. Position dans le foyer ______________________________________________________________________ 
2. Quel âge avez-vous ? _______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Sexe: □ Féminin □ Masculin  
4. De quelle origine ethnique êtes-vous ?  □ Fulbé □ Malinké □ Soussou □ Forestiers □ Étranger ______ 
5. Où êtes-vous né? __________________________________________________________________________ 
6. Combien d’années avez-vous vécu au village? ___________________________________________________ 
7. Combien de temps par an êtes-vous au village? __________________________________________________ 
8. Combien de fois par mois allez-vous au marcher ?________________________________________________ 
9. Combien de fois par ans allez-vous en ville ?____________________________________________________ 
10. Travaillez-vous pendant une période de l’année dans une autre région ? □ Oui □ Non 
Quel travail? _______________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Est-ce que vous soutenez la famille économiquement grâce à ce travail? □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui: □ 100- 500`000 □ 500’000-1'000'000 □ 1'000'000-3'000’000 □ Plus de 3'000'000  
12. Combien d’années êtes-vous allé à l’école? ____________________________________________________ 
13. Quelle école avez-vous fréquentée? □ De l’état □ Coranique □ Privée □ Missionnaire chrétien  
14. Savez-vous lire? _________________________________________________________________________ 
15. Combien d’enfants avez-vous? ______________________________________________________________ 
16. Quelle est votre religion? □ Musulman □ Chrétien □ Animiste □ Aucune  
17. Quelle profession exercez-vous ?  □ Agriculteur □ Éleveur □ Forgeront □ Commerçant □ 
Fonctionnaire □ Chasseur □ Pêcheur  □ Religieux □ Salarié □ Menuisier □ Macon □ Tisseur □ 
Minier □ Teinturier □ Autre ___________________ 
18. Quel est votre revenu  mensuel? _____________________________________________________________ 
19. Quels moyens de locomotion avez-vous ? _____________________________________________________ 
20. Avez-vous fait des expériences avec des projets de développement/conservation? □ Oui □ Non 
Quels projets et quand ? ______________________________________________________________________ 
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INDIVIDU SECTION CONFLITS AVEC DES ANIMAUX         Date : 
Nom:                  Heure: 
1. Avez-vous peur de certains animaux?   □ Oui □ Non 
Lesquels? __________________________________________________________________ 
2. Avez-vous déjà été attaqué par un animal?  □ Oui □ Non 
Lesquels? __________________________________________________________________ 
3. Est-ce que vous vous sentez en concurrence avec des animaux pour certains produits ?  
□ Oui □ Non  Si oui: Quels produits et animaux? 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Les animaux sauvages vous causent-ils des désagréments dans le cadre de vos activités 
□ Oui □ Non  Si oui, précisez le genre de désagréments subis et la fréquence: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
5. Les animaux sauvages causent-ils des dégâts aux cultures du village? □ Oui □ Non  
6. A quelles cultures les animaux s’attaquent-ils? (Quels animaux/quels cultures) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
7. Que feriez-vous/ font les riverains quand les animaux (leur) causent des désagréments ?  
□ Les fait fuir □ Pose des pièges □ Les empoisonne □ Leur tire dessus □ Ne fait rien  
□ Les captures  
8. Organise-t-on des battues dans votre zone ?  □ Oui □ Non  
9. Que fait-on des animaux piégés lors de ces battues ?   
□ On les tue  □ On les mange □ On les attrape pour les vendre  □ On les laisse s’enfuir 
10. Pensez-vous que les riverains et les animaux peuvent cohabiter sans grands dommages ?  
□ Oui □ Non 
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INDIVIDU SECTION TABOU     Date : 
Nom:             Heure: 
1. Votre religion ou vos traditions donne-t-elle des enseignements pour l’attitude à avoir vis-
à-vis des animaux sauvages en général?  □Oui  □ Non 
Des chimpanzés?  □ Oui □ Non 
Si oui, précisez ______________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Ces enseignements sont-ils toujours respectés ? □ Oui □ Non 
3. Quelle est la loi concernant l’utilisation des animaux sauvages ? (différents animaux) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Pensez-vous que les animaux devraient être protégés par la loi Guinéenne ?  
□ Oui □ Non 
Pourquoi ?__________________________________________________________________  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Pensez-vous que les lois qui protègent les animaux sont efficacement appliquées ?  
□ Oui □ Non 
6. Connaissez-vous des gens qui ont tué des chimpanzés ?  
□ Oui □ Non 
7. Connaissez-vous des gens qui ont été punis par la loi pour avoir tué des chimpanzés ?  
□ Oui □ Non 
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Date 
 
Impressions sur les réponses données 
 
 
1. Est-ce que les personnes questionnées ont réfléchi avant de répondre?  
 
□ Très □ plutôt  □ ni l`un ni l`autre □ plutôt pas □ pas du tout 
 
2. Est-ce que les personnes étaient attentives?  
 
□ Très □ plutôt  □ ni l`un ni l`autre □ plutôt pas □ pas du tout 
 
3. Est-ce que les personnes étaient influencées dans leurs réponses par d’autres?  
 
□ Très □ plutôt  □ ni l`un ni l`autre □ plutôt pas □ pas du tout 
 
4. Est-ce que les personnes vous paraissaient sincères?  
 
□ Très □ plutôt  □ ni l`un ni l`autre □ plutôt pas □ pas du tout 
 
5. Est-ce que les réponses vous paraissent probables?  
 
□ Très □ plutôt  □ ni l`un ni l`autre □ plutôt pas □ pas du tout 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A2.1 Correlations among predictor and control variables for the data on duiker, bushbuck, 
african civet, porcupine, hare, wart hog, jackal, common genet, Guinea baboon and patas 
monkey 
 
 
Market 
integration 
Hunting 
pressure 
Population 
density 
Distance 
nearest 
road 
Fish 
provision 
Taboo 
influence 
Share 
classified 
forest 
Distance 
nearest 
field NDVI 
Distance 
nearest 
river 
Market 
integration 1 0.781 0.85 0.015 0.933 0.249 -0.236 -0.386 -0.066 -0.124 
Hunting 
pressure 0.781 1 0.979 -0.128 0.917 0.247 -0.056 -0.414 -0.026 -0.168 
Population 
density 0.85 0.979 1 -0.126 0.953 0.257 -0.105 -0.407 -0.034 -0.154 
Distance 
nearest road 0.015 -0.128 -0.126 1 -0.012 -0.016 0.308 0.541 0.204 0.171 
Fish 
provision 0.933 0.917 0.953 -0.012 1 0.261 -0.151 -0.374 -0.057 -0.177 
Taboo 
influence 0.249 0.247 0.257 -0.016 0.261 1 -0.04 -0.103 0.006 -0.039 
Share 
classified 
forest -0.236 -0.056 -0.105 0.308 -0.151 -0.04 1 0.299 0.127 0.074 
Distance 
nearest field -0.386 -0.414 -0.407 0.541 -0.374 -0.103 0.299 1 0.11 0.327 
NDVI -0.066 -0.026 -0.034 0.204 -0.057 0.006 0.127 0.11 1 0.133 
Distance 
nearest river -0.124 -0.168 -0.154 0.171 -0.177 -0.039 0.074 0.327 0.133 1 
 
 
A2.2 Correlations among predictor and control variables for the data on chimpanzee 
 
 
Market 
integratio
n 
Hunting 
pressure 
Populatio
n density 
Distance 
nearest 
road 
Fish 
provision 
Taboo 
influence 
Share 
classified 
forest 
Distance 
nearest 
field NDVI 
Distance 
nearest 
river 
Market 
integratio
n 1 0.777 0.848 0.004 0.933 0.91 -0.233 -0.363 -0.115 -0.112 
Hunting 
pressure 0.777 1 0.979 -0.151 0.913 0.957 -0.042 -0.419 -0.027 -0.161 
Populatio
n density 0.848 0.979 1 -0.146 0.951 0.983 -0.094 -0.405 -0.046 -0.145 
Distance 
nearest 
road 0.004 -0.151 -0.146 1 -0.024 -0.091 0.286 0.543 0.165 0.16 
Fisher 0.933 0.913 0.951 -0.024 1 0.98 -0.147 -0.359 -0.114 -0.165 
Taboo 
influence 0.91 0.957 0.983 -0.091 0.98 1 -0.11 -0.402 -0.058 -0.146 
Share 
classified 
forest -0.233 -0.042 -0.094 0.286 -0.147 -0.11 1 0.266 0.127 0.067 
Distance 
nearest 
field -0.363 -0.419 -0.405 0.543 -0.359 -0.402 0.266 1 0.091 0.315 
NDVI -0.115 -0.027 -0.046 0.165 -0.114 -0.058 0.127 0.091 1 0.111 
Distance 
nearest 
river -0.112 -0.161 -0.145 0.16 -0.165 -0.146 0.067 0.315 0.111 1 
 
A3.1 Model formulas of all mixed effects Poisson regression models in the model set used for 
the model selection analysis on mixed species abundance in R 
 
1 
abundance~z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
2 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
3 
abundance~z.hunter+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
4 
abundance~z.fisher+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
5 
abundance~z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
6 
abundance~z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
7 
abundance~z.fisher+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
8 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
9 
abundance~z.hunter+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
10 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
11 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
12 
abundance~z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
13 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
14 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
15 
abundance~z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
16 abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
17 
abundance~z.hunter+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
18 
abundance~z.fisher+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.fisher+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
19 
abundance~z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
20 
abundance~z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
21 
abundance~z.fisher+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.fisher+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
22 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
23 
abundance~z.hunter+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
24 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
25 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
26 
abundance~z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
27 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+ 
z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
28 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+ 
z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ac.term||species) 
29 abundance~ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
30 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
31 
abundance~z.hunter+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
32 
abundance~z.fisher+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
33 
abundance~z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
34 
abundance~z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
35 
abundance~z.fisher+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
36 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
37 
abundance~z.hunter+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
38 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
39 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
40 
abundance~z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
41 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
42 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+ac.term||species) 
43 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+ac.term||species) 
44 
abundance~z.hunter+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+ac.term||species) 
45 
abundance~z.fisher+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.fisher+ac.term||species) 
46 
abundance~z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.taboo+ac.term||species) 
47 
abundance~z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.tr.pop.size+ac.term||species) 
48 
abundance~z.fisher+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.fisher+z.taboo+ac.term||species) 
49 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+ac.term||species) 
50 
abundance~z.hunter+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.taboo+ac.term||species) 
51 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+ac.term||species) 
52 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+ac.term||species) 
53 
abundance~z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+ac.term||species) 
54 
abundance~z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+ac.term||species) 
55 
abundance~z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+ 
ac.term+offset(log(transect.length))+ 
(1+ac.term||transect.ID)+(1+z.sqrt.market+z.taboo+z.tr.pop.size+ac.term||species) 
 
A3.2 Model formulas of all zero inflated negative binomial regression models in the model set 
used for the model selection analysis on chimpanzee abundance in R 
 
1 
abundance~1+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
2 
abundance~1+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
3 
abundance~1+z.hunter+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.hunter+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
4 
abundance~1+z.fisher+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.fisher+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
5 
abundance~1+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.taboo+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
6 
abundance~1+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
7 
abundance~1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
8 
abundance~1+z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+ 
z.sqrt.dist.roads+z.percent.protected+offset(log(transect.length))| 
1+z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+z.ndvi+z.sqrt.dist.field+z.sqrt.dist.river+z.sqrt.dist.roads+ 
z.percent.protected+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
9 abundance~1+offset(log(transect.length))|1+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
10 
abundance~1+z.sqrt.market+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.sqrt.market+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
11 abundance~1+z.hunter+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.hunter+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
12 abundance~1+z.fisher+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.fisher+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
13 abundance~1+z.taboo+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.taboo+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
14 
abundance~1+z.tr.pop.size+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.tr.pop.size+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
15 
abundance~1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.hunter+z.sqrt.market+ 
offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
16 
abundance~1+z.sqrt.market+z.tr.pop.size+offset(log(transect.length))|1+z.sqrt.market+ 
z.tr.pop.size+offset(log(1/transect.length)) 
 
 
A4) Correlations among variables 
 
 
 
Ethnic 
homogeneity Kinship 
Income  
inequality Reputation 
Population  
size 
Market  
integration Sex Ethnicity Income 
Kg  
salt Age 
Ethnic  
homogeneity 1 0.407 0.06 0.01 0.046 0.132 0.009 -0.148 -0.041 -0.053 -0.05 
Kinship 0.407 1 0.164 0.002 0.377 0.003 0.008 0.199 -0.07 0.027 0.004 
Income  
inequality 0.06 0.164 1 0.004 0.115 0.208 -0.05 -0.161 -0.016 -0.044 -0.09 
Reputation 0.01 0.002 0.004 1 0.023 0.035 -0.01 -0.013 0.029 -0.008 -0.04 
Population  
size 0.046 0.377 0.115 0.023 1 0.06 0.072 0.049 0.058 0.063 0.14 
Market  
integration 0.132 0.003 0.208 0.035 0.06 1 -0 -0.189 0.097 0.007 -0.04 
Sex 0.009 0.008 -0.05 -0.009 0.072 -0.002 1 0.023 0.131 0.066 0.357 
Ethnicity -0.148 0.199 -0.161 -0.013 0.049 -0.189 0.023 1 0.002 -0.021 -0.02 
Income -0.041 -0.07 -0.016 0.029 0.058 0.097 0.131 0.002 1 -0.013 0.149 
Kg salt -0.053 0.027 -0.044 -0.008 0.063 0.007 0.066 -0.021 -0.013 1 0.094 
Age -0.046 0.004 -0.085 -0.037 0.14 -0.041 0.357 -0.015 0.149 0.094 1 
 
A5) VIF values of linear multiple regression with all terms from the full model. 
Term VIF 
z.sqrt.HerfindahlEthnic 1.391 
z.HerfindahlFamily 1.733 
z.Gini 1.145 
Anonymity 1.004 
z.log.PopTotal 1.323 
z.sqrt.MarketIntegration 1.105 
Sex 1.166 
Malinke 1.215 
z.sqrt.incomeEU 1.073 
z.sqrt.Kgstart 1.03 
z.Age 1.204 
 
 
A6) Distribution of random intercepts from full model 
 
A7) Distribution of sex random slope from full model 
 
A8) Distribution of malinke random slope from full model 
 
A9) Distribution of kg start random slope from full model 
 
A10) Distribution of reputation random slope from full model 
 
A11) Distribution of income random slope from full model 
 
A12) Distribution of age random slope from full model 
 
A13) Distribution of residuals from full model 
 
A14) Fitted vs residuals plot from full model 
 
A15) Range of the estimates from the model stability analysis on the full model. 
Here we checked for the influence of single villages on our estimates. 
Term Mimimum Estimate Maximum 
Intercept -1.206 -1.168 -1.141 
z.sqrt.HerfindahlEthnic -0.092 -0.082 -0.064 
z.HerfindahlFamily 0.034 0.053 0.068 
z.Gini -0.053 -0.042 -0.023 
Anonymity 0.033 0.051 0.06 
z.log.PopTotal 0.054 0.079 0.093 
z.sqrt.MarketIntegration -0.074 -0.066 -0.047 
Sex -0.039 -0.018 0.009 
malinke 0.024 0.046 0.066 
z.sqrt.incomeEU -0.012 -0.005 0.002 
z.sqrt.Kgstart -0.032 -0.024 -0.015 
z.Age 0.015 0.019 0.024 
(1|village) 0.045 0.075 0.086 
(0+Anonymity|village) 0.111 0.127 0.131 
(0+Sex|village) 0 0.045 0.066 
(0+malinke|village) 0 0 0.034 
(0+z.sqrt.Kgstart|village) 0.036 0.055 0.059 
(0+z.Age|village) 0 0 0.017 
(0+z.sqrt.incomeEU|village) 0.038 0.06 0.063 
 
A16) Range of the estimates from the model stability analysis on the full model. 
Here we checked for the influence of single subjects on our estimates. 
Term Mimimum Estimate Maximum 
Intercept -1.195 -1.168 -1.151 
z.sqrt.HerfindahlEthnic -0.087 -0.082 -0.074 
z.HerfindahlFamily 0.049 0.053 0.058 
z.Gini -0.046 -0.042 -0.037 
Anonymity 0.046 0.051 0.055 
z.log.PopTotal 0.073 0.079 0.082 
z.sqrt.MarketIntegration -0.068 -0.066 -0.06 
Sex -0.032 -0.018 0.008 
malinke 0.027 0.046 0.056 
z.sqrt.incomeEU -0.008 -0.005 0.001 
z.sqrt.Kgstart -0.028 -0.024 -0.02 
z.Age 0.016 0.019 0.022 
(1|village) 0.052 0.075 0.086 
(0+Anonymity|village) 0.117 0.127 0.137 
(0+Sex|village) 0 0.045 0.071 
(0+malinke|village) 0 0 0.032 
(0+z.sqrt.Kgstart|village) 0.044 0.055 0.058 
(0+z.Age|village) 0 0 0.01 
(0+z.sqrt.incomeEU|village) 0.037 0.06 0.065 
 
 
 
A17) The effect of household income on the subject's fair behavior. The name of the village is written in 
bold on top of the respective plot and the sample size for every village is shown below the plot. The figure 
in the center of the plot shows the estimated mean difference in the deviation from the fair share between 
the richest and the poorest subjects in the village. The thin dashed line depicts the location of 0 on the y-
axis across the range of the x-axis. The darker the observed value point, the more observations were made 
on the respective location. The fitted values were estimated for male Malinke subjects in the control 
condition with observation and with the village variables as well as the income at their actual values and 
the other variables at their mean using the full model estimates. 
 
 
A18) The effect of the amount of salt in the bucket on the subject's fair behavior. The name of the village 
is written in bold on top of the respective plot and the sample size for every village is shown below the 
plot. The figure in the center of the plot shows the estimated mean difference in the deviation from the 
fair share between the subject with the most amount of salt in the bucket and the subject with the least 
amount of salt in the bucket in the village. The thin dashed line depicts the location of 0 on the y-axis 
across the range of the x-axis. The darker the observed value point, the more observations were made on 
the respective location. The fitted values were estimated for male Malinke subjects in the control condition 
with observationand with the village variables as well as the amount of salt at their actual values and the 
other variables at their mean using the full model estimates. 
A 19) Result of the linear regression on the subject's fair behavior. In this case, we only included 
subjects from the villages of Boubere and Beleya Koko and did not control for the village 
population characteristics. 
 
Number of 
observations     
37     
Adj. R²     
0.52     
     
 Estimate 
Standard 
Error t value p value 
(Intercept) -1.937 0.186 -10.424 <0.001 
Sex -0.011 0.169 -0.065 0.949 
Ethnicity 0.583 0.146 3.978 <0.001 
z.sqrt.incomeEU -0.146 0.055 -2.68 0.012 
z.sqrt.Kgstart 0.088 0.048 1.844 0.075 
z.Age -0.022 0.062 -0.358 0.723 
Reputation 0.239 0.111 2.155 0.039 
 
A20) Fixed effects of the full model additionally including the share of subject’s kin group to the 
total population as an additional predictor 
 
Fixed effects Estimate Standard error Likelihood ratio test p value 
Intercept -1.169 0.046   
Kinship* 0.059 0.022 6.851 0.009 
Ethnic 
Homogeneity† 
-0.080 0.020 12.524 <0.001 
Reputation 0.052 0.029 3.108 0.078 
Market Integration† -0.066 0.018 11.198 <0.001 
Population size‡  0.079 0.020 13.450 <0.001 
Gini* -0.041 0.018 4.654 0.031 
Sex -0.018 0.042 0.178 0.673 
Ethnicity 0.046 0.032 2.027 0.154 
Income† -0.003 0.015 0.042 0.838 
Kg salt† -0.023 0.014 2.379 0.123 
Age* 0.020 0.011 2.921 0.087 
Share kin group† -0.014 0.014 0.986 0.321 
 
*) z-transformed †) square root and then z-transformed ‡) log-transformed prior to z-
transformation. Prior to estimation, we added 290 grams and log-transformed the subject's 
deviation scores. Reference for “Reputation” is “reputation”, for “Sex” is “male”, for “Ethnicity” 
is “Fulbe”. P-values for all terms were calculated following the approach proposed by Bolker et 
al. 2009. 
 
